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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Boumediene v. Bush' in
June 2008-the latest of several cases regarding the rights of terrorist sus-
pects held at Guantdnamo Bay-it was hailed by progressive commentators
and human rights advocates as a landmark in rights jurisprudence.2 Holding
that the Guantdnamo prisoners possess a constitutional right to challenge
the legality of their detention through the writ of habeas corpus, Justice
Kennedy reached for appropriately lofty language, stating, "The laws and
Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary
times. Liberty and security can be reconciled, and in our system, they are
reconciled within the framework of the law."3 Indeed, the extension of a
constitutional provision to noncitizen wartime prisoners held outside the
United States was breathtaking. This was especially so in the face of six
years of government insistence that the prisoners at Guantdnamo had no
rights whatsoever, and could be held indefinitely, even for life, without
charge or meaningful opportunity to contest their treatment or detention.'
The decision was a rebuke to the Executive's claims of outsized authority,
and, the Court told us, a reassertion of the supremacy of law. It was a rights
moment.' Or so it seemed.
For many of us who have represented prisoners at Guantdnamo,6 the
promise of Boumediene felt eerily familiar. While commentators, the press,
and even some critics argued that the Court's holding that the prisoners
could challenge the legality of their detention augured the closure of Guan-
tdnamo, few prisoners' advocates were holding their breath. In the 2004
case of Rasul v. Bush,7 the Court similarly had held that the prisoners had a
right of habeas corpus, and yet, four years on, when Boumediene was de-
cided, not a single prisoner had received a meaningful opportunity to con-
test his detention! Like Boumediene, commentators greeted Rasul as a
1 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, 55 N.Y. REv. BOOKS No. 13, Aug. 14,
2008.
3 128 S. Ct. at 2277.
4 See infra Part I.B.1.
5 By "rights moment," I mean a moment in history in which the assertion of rights leads to the kind
of legal victory that promises transformative change, particularly with regard to marginalized individu-
als or communities. Although its legacy remains contested, we might think of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation as a paradigmatic rights moment. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 As discussed throughout this Article, I represented a Guanthnamo prisoner, Omar Khadr, from
2004 until 2007.
7 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
8 Since Boumediene, district court judges have begun to hold habeas merits proceedings, and in a
number of cases, have ordered prisoners released. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191
(D.D.C. 2008) (granting writ as to Lakhdar Boumediene, Mohamed Nechla, Hadj Boudella, Mustafa Ait
Idir, and Saber Lahmar; denying writ as to Bekacem Bensayah); Bin Mohammed v. Obama, No. 05-
1347, 2009 WL 4015435 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2009) (granting writ); Al Rabiah v. United States, No. 02-
828, 2009 WL 3048434 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2009) (granting writ); Barhoumi v. Obama No. 05-1506, slip
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game-changing decision,9 and optimism spread among advocates and pris-
oners alike that the decision would bring law, and therefore justice, to the
seemingly lawless zone of GuantAnamo. Rasul seemed an important exam-
ple of transformative legal practice-that is, a fundamental change in power
arrangements, brought about through law-but the Executive managed to
frustrate that decision for years. Importantly, Rasul was decided on statuto-
ry grounds while Boumediene was squarely constitutional."0 Nonetheless,
for many of the prisoners' advocates, and for the prisoners themselves, the
euphoria of Boumediene was tempered by the experience of Rasul, which
taught of the vast space that can exist between judicial decree and executive
action. The problem did not lie with Boumediene, whose legal victory was
resounding, but with the limitations inherent in any such legal victory, and
the limitations inherent in rights.
It was clear the moment the case was decided, and has been borne out
in the months of litigation in hundreds of cases since, that Boumediene
alone could not close GuantAnamo, but could only narrow the space in
which it is allowed to operate. It was into this space that the Obama Ad-
ministration stepped, promising to close Guantdtnamo not because of a legal
requirement to do so, but because of political commitments, shaped but not
ordained by court action." Now that the headlines have faded, the rights
op. (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2009) (denying writ); Al Odah v. United States, No. 02-828, 2009 W 2730489
(D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009) (denying writ); A1-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280, 2009 WL 2584685 (D.D.C.
Aug. 21, 2009) (granting writ); Ali Awad v. Obama, No. 05-CV-2379, 2009 WL 2568212 (D.D.C. Aug
12, 2009) (denying writ); Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385, 2009 WL 2365846 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009)
(granting writ); Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting writ); Al Ginco
v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting writ); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30
(D.D.C. 2009) (granting writ); Ahmed v. Obama, No. 05-1678, 2009 WI 948712 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009)
(granting writ); Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying writ); Bihani v. Ob-
ama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying writ); Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C.
2009) (granting writ); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying writ); Sliti v. Bush,
592 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying writ). The case of the Uighurs, a Chinese ethnic minority,
has posed special challenges, as their imprisonment has continued despite the district court ordering
their release. Their case is now pending before the Supreme Court. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d
1022 (D.D.C. 2009), cert. granted, 2009 WL 935637 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009) (No. 08-1234). For more in-
formation on the Uighurs, see infra note 126.
9 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Three Decisions, One Big Victory for Civil Rights, 40 TRIAL 74, 74
(Sept. 2004); Michael Greenberger, A Third Magna Carta, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 2, 2004, at S7; Linda
Greenhouse, Access to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at Al; Oona A. Hathaway, Prisoner's Rights:
The Court Puts the White House in Its Place, NEWSDAY, June 29, 2004, at A33.
10 Compare Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (holding that the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006),
provides for habeas jurisdiction over the detention of Guantdnamo prisoners), with Boumediene, 128 S.
Ct. 2229 (holding that the habeas-stripping provisions of the Military Commissions Act violated the
Suspension Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
11 See "Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantinamo Bay Naval Base and
Closure of Detention Facilities," Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (providing
for the closure of Guantd.namo "as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this or-
der"); see also "Ensuring Lawful Interrogations," Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22,
2009) (regarding minimum standard of detention for executive detainees, application of Common Ar-
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moment of Boumediene has dissolved into the less visible daily practices of
the Guantdnamo lawyers, human rights advocates, and other allies, where
the assertion of rights is a necessary but inadequate step toward justice for
the prisoners. In this post-Boumediene period, even as some Guantdnamo
prisoners' rights appear to be vindicated, 2 and even as the world awaits the
closure of the blighted facility, some positions taken by the new Adminis-
tration portend the perpetuation of some Bush Administration policies, or
even the creation of a new Guantdnamo. 3 Thus, we see now another itera-
tion of what we experienced after Rasul: that the work of rights is important
but limited, and that the mere existence of rights is not enough to do justice.
This Article is about the work that rights do, and the work of the law-
yers who assert them on their clients' behalf, particularly in the face of in-
ordinate state violence, as is the case with Guantdnamo. I write this story of
Guantdnamo based on my experiences of nearly three years of representing
a prisoner there. 4 While commentators can point to an unbroken record of
legal victories in Guantdnamo cases at the Supreme Court, 5 the view from
ticle 3 of the Geneva Conventions, repudiation of Bush Administration legal positions on interrogation,
and closure of CIA detention facilities).
12 As discussed below, see infra note 126 and accompanying text, federal judges have ordered a
small number of prisoners released following the Boumediene decision, and the Executive Branch has
complied with these orders.
13 Three developments thus far in the Obama Administration are particularly troubling. First, as
discussed in greater detail below, although the new Administration has abandoned the "enemy comba-
tant" terminology on which the Bush Administration's Guantdinamo policy was based, it appears to have
retained much of the substantive definition. See infra Parts I.D & II.B.1. Second, the Obama Adminis-
tration has decided to revive the military commission system. See Press Release, The White House Of-
fice of the Press Secretary, Statement of President Barack Obama on Military Commissions (May 15,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/Statement-of-President-Barack-
Obama-on-Military-Commissions. Finally, the Obama Administration has opposed attempts to apply
Boumediene to prisoners held outside of Guantdinamo. In Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205
(D.D.C. 2009), Judge John D. Bates extended Boumediene, holding that foreign nationals detained by
the United States at its military base in Bagram, Afghanistan, similarly had a constitutional right of ha-
beas corpus. Disappointing many human rights advocates, the Obama Administration sought an interlo-
cutory appeal, which was granted. SeeAl MaqaIeh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009). This
has led some, including the New York Times, to warn that the new Administration's position, denying
judicial review of indefinitely detained terrorist suspects, threatens to create a new Guantdnamo. See,
e.g., Editorial, The Next Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at A20.
14 Although my description and analysis of GuantAnamo are deeply informed by my experience
representing a prisoner there, the fact of representation limits what I am ethically able to disclose. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) (2004). As such, my report-
ing on his case is limited to what is in the public record, and even then errs on the side of nondisclosure.
As of this writing, the prisoner I represented is still imprisoned at Guantknamo, and I no longer represent
him, thus making his consent to firther disclosure by me impossible.
15 See Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (holding that Guantrnamo prisoners have a constitutional right
of habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (invalidating the military commissions
system at GuantAnamo); Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (holding that Guantknamo prisoners have a statutory right
of habeas corpus); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality) (holding that a
U.S. citizen detained as an "enemy combatant" has a due process right to challenge the factual basis of
his detention before a neutral decisionmaker). Although the Hamdi case involved a U.S. citizen impri-
1686
Resisting Guantnamo
the prisoners' perspective is quite different, and throws into question the
claim of transformative legal practice that the Court cases might otherwise
suggest. This is not to say that the lawyering has itself been a failure. Ra-
ther, I argue that instead of expecting rights-based legal contest at and
around Guantdnamo to produce transformative results, wc might better un-
derstand it as a form of resistance to dehumanization. Such a refraining of
the Guantdinamo litigation invites comparison with other forms of resis-
tance, and helps explain both the power and the limitations of legal practice
in extreme instances of state violence.
When placed in a human rights frame, Guantdinamo is often described
in terms of the government's denial of rights to the prisoners, but equally
important has been the denial of their humanity. Guantdsnamo has been a
project of dehumanization, in the literal sense; it has sought to expel the
prisoners-consistently referred to as "terrorists"-from our shared under-
standing of what it means to be human, so as to permit, if not necessitate,
physical and mental treatment (albeit in the context of interrogation) abhor-
rent to human beings. This has been accomplished through three forms of
erasure of the human: cultural erasure through the creation of a terrorist
narrative; legal erasure through formalistic legerdemain; and physical era-
sure through torture.
While these three dimensions of dehumanization are distinct, they are
also interrelated. All are pervaded by law, and more specifically, by rights.
This is to say that law has been deployed to create the preconditions for the
exercise of a state power so brutal as to deprive the Guantdnamo prisoners
of the ability to be human. In this way, Guantdinamo recalls Hannah
Arendt's formulation of citizenship as the right to have rights.16 By this she
meant that without membership in the polity, the individual stood exposed
to the violence of the state, unmediated and unprotected by rights. The re-
sult of such exposure, she argued, was to reduce the person to a state of bare
life, or life without humanity. What we see at Guantdinamo is the inverse of
citizenship: no right to have rights, a rights vacuum that enables extreme
violence, so as to place Guantdinamo at the center of a struggle not merely
for rights, but for humanity-that state of being that distinguishes human
life from mere biological existence. 7
In order to better understand the work that rights do, this Article ex-
plores why prisoners' advocates, including myself, adopted a rights-based
advocacy strategy in an environment defined explicitly by the absence of
rights. Since the first prisoners arrived at Guantdinamo, the Bush Adminis-
soned at a military brig in South Carolina, it is properly considered in this line of cases because Hamdi
was held on the same "enemy combatant" basis as the GuantAnamo prisoners and was initially held at
Guantdnamo until his U.S. citizenship was discovered. Hamdi, 542 U.S at 510.
16 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 298 (new ed., Harcourt, Brace, & World,
Inc. 1966) (1951).
17 Id.; see also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998).
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tration's position had been that they lack any rights whatsoever, under any
source of law." Thus did the Bush Administration attempt to defie a
rights-free zone, through a manipulation of rights which seemed demonstr-
ably political. And yet, despite the overwhelming evidence of politics ani-
mating law at Guantdnamo, as advocates we made a conscious decision to
engage in rights-based argument, and "rights talk"'9 more generally. This
approach finds some support in the work of rights scholars (and critical race
theorists in particular) regarding the continuing vitality of rights-based ap-
proaches and the promise of "critical legalism"2° or "radical constitutional-
ism"2 -the very kinds of progressive constitutional optimism that the Rasul
and Boumediene decisions inspire. But the subsequent litigation history
demands further inquiry into the political, cultural, jurisprudential, and stra-
tegic value of arguing rights in the historical moment and place of Guantd-
namo.
I argue that while we might hope for rights to obtain transformative ef-
fect-to close Guantdnamo, for example, or to free those who are wrongful-
ly imprisoned-at Guantdinamo and in other places of extreme state
violence, rights may do the more modest work of resistance. Rather than
fundamentally reconfiguring power arrangements, as rights moments aspire
to do, resistance slows, narrows, and increases the costs for the state's exer-
cise of violence. Resistance is a form of power contestation that works
from within the structures of domination." While it may aspire to overturn
prevailing power relations, its value derives from its means as much as from
its ends. Through resistance, new political spaces may open, but even if
they do not, the mere fact of resistance, the assertion of the self against the
violence of the state, is self- and life-affirming. Resistance is, in short, a
way of staying human. This, then, is the work that rights do: when pushed
to the brink of annihilation, they provide us with a rudimentary and perhaps
inadequate tool to maintain our humanity.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the cultural erasure of the Guantdina-
mo prisoners through the creation of a post-September 11 terrorist narrative,
or what I term an iconography of terror, their legal erasure through the crea-
18 See infra Part I.D.
19 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991) (critiquing an overreliance on individual rights in American legal discourse).
20 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 393-94 (1987) (defining critical legalism as "a legal concept that has transforma-
tive power and that avoids the traps of individualism, neutrality and indeterminancy that plague many
mainstream concepts of rights or legal principles").
21 Id. at 334.
22 As Foucault famously wrote, "resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power." MICHEL




tion of the now abandoned "enemy combatant"2 3 category and their physical
erasure through torture. I contextualize these discussions with narrative de-
scriptions of the place and space of Guantdnamo, which I argue are neces-
sary to understand the contextual nature of rights and rights claims, and the
integral connection between law and narrative. In Part II, I deepen the dis-
cussion of legal erasure through critique and analysis of my representation
of a teenage Canadian Guantdinamo prisoner, Omar Khadr, in military
commission proceedings, and through a doctrinal analysis of the shifting
meanings of core legal terms in the Guantdnamo legal regime. In so doing,
I suggest how the experience of lawyering in and around Guantdnamo
helped to prove up its lawless nature.
Part III considers the tactical, strategic, and theoretical values of adopt-
ing rights-based legal approaches in the rights-free zone of Guantdnamo,
paying particular attention to the value of rights as recognition, and ulti-
mately arguing the importance of rights as a mode of resistance to state vi-
olence. In Part IV, I build upon this discussion of resistance by considering
direct forms of resistance in which prisoners themselves have participated.
In particular, I suggest the hunger strike as a paradigmatic form of prisoner
resistance, and argue the lawyers' rights-based litigation and the prisoners'
hunger strikes share a conceptual understanding of the relationship between
rights, violence, and humanity. I conclude by reflecting on the value and
limitations of reframing the work of the Guantdnamo prisoners' lawyers as
nothing more, but also nothing less, than resistance. I suggest that neither
the resistance of the lawyers nor that of the prisoners may be enough to gain
the prisoners' freedom, but that they are nonetheless essential when, as at
Guantdnamo, state violence is so extreme as to attempt to extinguish the
human.
Throughout the Article, I insist upon an understanding of Guantdnamo
in both material and theoretical terms. Seven years after its opening as an
interrogation and detention center, Guantdnamo today is understood more
for its symbolism than for the actual events that have transpired or lives that
have been transformed there. Politically and culturally, domestically and
internationally, Guantdnamo is a stand-in for torture, abandonment of the
rule of law, and the general threat to civil liberties posed by the "war on ter-
rorism."24  In this way, even among its critics, Guantdnamo has been re-
23 The Obama Administration's abandonment of the "enemy combatant" construct is discussed in
Part II.B. 1.
24 1 put "war on terrorism" in scare quotes because as currently conducted, U.S. antiterrorism efforts
encompass not only combat in places such as in Afghanistan, but the capture of individuals far from any
battlefield, such as in Bosnia, Gambia, and Zambia. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. Simi-
larly, antiterrorism policy includes practices as disparate as warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens, see
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2005, at Al, and rendering of noncitizens to third countries where they have alleged torture, see
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR,
REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATED TO MAHER ARAR (2006), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
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duced to allegory. But as critical as the lessons of Guantdnamo are for U.S.
law and policy, they must be rooted in the lived experiences of those who
have inhabited and endured the real world of Guantinamo. For example,
torture at Guantdnamo is not simply a question of abstract legal memoranda
or an exercise in line drawing, but a concrete project of state violence
enacted upon, and realized in, the human body. In this regard, the most im-
portant laws relating to torture are the laws of physics, as these are the go-
verning principles and limiting factors in the exercise of force by one body
against another.
At base, Guantinamo is a material project, and more specifically a hu-
man one, enacted upon and through the bodies of those imprisoned there.
Thus, the story of Guantdinamo I seek to tell here is of erasure--cultural, le-
gal, and physical-and equally important, resistance to such erasure, itself
enacted upon and through the humanity of the Guantdtnamo prisoners.
I. THE DEHUMANIZATION PROJECT OF GUANTANAMO: CULTURAL
AND LEGAL ERASURE
The purpose of Guantinamo is to destroy people.
-Jumah al Dossari"5
A. Rights in Context, Law in Narrative
I have visited the U.S. detention and interrogation center at Guantdna-
mo Bay approximately twelve times since the fall of 2004. On one visit, in
December 2005, I met with my then-client, Omar Khadr, at that time one of
about 400 prisoners26 at Guantdnamo, in a small trailer inside one of the
prison camps.27 Typically when my co-counsel and I met Omar, it was in a
20080313145724/http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AREnglish.pdf. The "war on terrorism" is there-
fore a war in metaphor only. For further discussion of the dangerous consequences of accepting this me-
taphor, see infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. For similar critiques of the war terminology, see
JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 1, 43 (2006) (arguing
that the "war on terror" justification has resulted in "an Administration that exercises substantially more
power in the conduct of military operations, with fewer restraints, than ever before"); see also Brief for
Petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan at 18, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) (refer-
ring to "the so called 'war on terror"').
25 Jumah al Dossari, I'm Home, but Still Haunted by Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2008, at
B4. Al Dossari was imprisoned at Guantinamo from January 2005 until July 2007, at which time he
was released without charge. Id.
26 Throughout this Article, I refer to the individuals incarcerated at Guantfnamo as "prisoners" ra-
ther than "detainees," the term favored by the government. The government's refusal to refer to those
incarcerated as "prisoners" is of a piece with its invention of the "enemy combatant" designation, and its
position that they are not prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions. See infra note 83 and accom-
panying text. The doctrinal implications of the choice of terminology aside, I find that the term "detai-
nee" obscures the factual reality of the long-term, and indeed potentially lifetime, incarceration of those
at Guantinamo, a reality I believe is better captured by describing them as prisoners.
27 Although he is still at Guantinamo as of this writing, I no longer represent Omar Khadr. With
colleagues and students in the International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University Washing-
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place called Camp Echo, a cluster of bungalow-style buildings set around
the perimeter of a fenced-in compound. The rooms in which we met were
divided, with a very small cell on one side of a chain metal wall, and an
empty space on the other, furnished with only a folding table and a couple
of plastic chairs. There was one vertical, opaque slit window by the door,
conjuring the outdoors but not actually permitting sight of it. The floors
and walls were a dingy institutional white, and an air conditioner droned
endlessly, keeping the room overcooled. To sit there for a few hours at a
time, as we typically did, was claustrophobic and at times despairing.
But the room in which I met Omar this time was different. The walls
had wood paneling and there was an oriental rug on the floor. I sat in an
overstuffed couch and Omar sat in a recliner. There was a coffee table, a
television and DVD player, and a mini-refrigerator stocked with sodas and
snacks. Although it did so crudely, the space was designed to mimic a typi-
cal Middle Eastern living room. There was even a hookah in one comer.
Only after several minutes in this altered space did I realize we were in a
high-end interrogation room. The camera in the ceiling and the metal eye-
hooks in the floor, to which prisoners are chained, were the giveaways. It
was a reminder that Guantdnamo is built upon deception, that even what
appears normal-or especially what does-is artifice. The high-end inter-
rogation room exists in opposition to the low-end interrogation rooms-
rooms I have never been allowed to see-those spaces designed not for
momentary comfort, but for threats of permanent pain. Omar had been in
the faux living room before, but he had also been in those other rooms, sub-
jected to harsh interrogation and even torture. This included one instance,
at the age of sixteen, when soldiers used him as a human mop-lifting him
off the ground, pouring solvent on him, and using his body to clean the
floor on which he had urinated because he hadn't been permitted a bath-
room break. In those other rooms, interrogators threatened him with rendi-
tion 28 to other countries, where, he was told, he would be raped by older
men.
2 9
ton College of Law, I represented Omar from July 2004 to April 2007. He continues to be represented
by military defense counsel and by Canadian civilian counsel.
28 Rendition has been defined as "the transfer of an individual, without the benefit of a legal pro-
ceeding in which the individual can challenge the transfer, to a country where he or she is at risk of tor-
ture." Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2005). Although the CIA has maintained a rendition program for
decades, it gained new relevance after September 1 th. Two cases of rendition to torture by the United
States, those of Maher Arar and Khaled el-Masri, have been especially well documented. Maher Arar is
a Canadian citizen whom U.S. officials detained in New York en route to Montreal following a visit to
his family in Tunisia. The CIA transferred Mr. Arar, against his will, to Jordan, and then to Syria, where
he was detained and tortured. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 14, 27-30, 33-34 (2006). Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen, was arrested in Ma-
cedonia, transferred to CIA custody, and transferred to a CIA prison in Afghanistan. Dana Priest,
Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at Al. For further ex-
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These two interrogation rooms, the one seemingly normal, the other
the site of deliberate dehumanization, exist side-by-side, their histories so
conjoined as to question whether they are in fact separate spaces, or are in-
stead mutually constitutive of a single reality.
Despite aspirations across the political spectrum to identify a universal-
ist source of rights, rights and our understanding of them emerge from spe-
cific political, cultural, and historical moments. As a matter of theory, we
might locate rights in some ontologically ethereal space, as natural law at-
tempts, but in practice, we can only discern the emergence of rights-their
arrival on the scene-in the particularity of historical place and time. Simi-
larly, the substantive content of rights, their material expression through
law, has proven dynamic and specific. As Austin Sarat and Thomas Keams
have observed, "Rights, which are claimed to be natural and unalienable, do
not spring fully formed at the conclusion of some philosophical argument or
analysis; instead, they take a long time to be realized and instantiated."3
So, too, do those instantiations vary over time, and gain force through his-
torical accretion." Elizabeth Schneider similarly has argued the dialectical
amples of the CIA rendition program, see Amnesty Int'l, USA/Jordan/Yemen Torture and Secret Deten-
tion: Testimony of the 'Disappeared' in the 'War on Terror', Al Index AMR 51/108/2005, Aug. 4,
2005, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/108/2005/en/3df5f930-d4cc-1 dd-
8a23-d58a49c0d652/amr511082005en.pdf (detailing the experiences of three Yemeni men: Muhammad
Faraj Ahmed Bashmilah, Salah Nasser Salim 'Ali, and Walid Muhammad Shahir Muhammad al-Qadasi,
held in secret U.S. detention). For further background on the development of rendition in U.S. policy,
see Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History ofAmerica's "Extraordinary Rendition " Pro-
gram, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21,2005, at 106.
29 See Memorandum from Muneer I. Ahmad & Richard J. Wilson to Habeas Privilege Team Re:
Request for Classification Review, O.K. v. Bush, 04-CV-0 1136 (JDB) (Dec. 30, 2004) (copy on file
with author). For a recitation of other instances of mistreatment that Omar experienced, see O.K. v.
Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102, 106-10 (D.D.C. 2005). In 2008, Omar's Canadian lawyers obtained and
released video of an interrogation of him in February 2003, when Omar was sixteen. See Ian Austen,
Blurry Peek at Questioning of a Guantdnamo Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2008, at AI0. The video is
available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNCyrFV2G_.0.
30 Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams, Editorial Introduction, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 6-7 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996).
31 Derrida has described this temporality as the "mystical foundation" of law's authority, a formula-
tion he borrows from Pascal:
Nothing, according to reason alone, is just in itself; all changes with time. Custom creates the
whole of equity, for the simple reason that it is accepted. It is the mystical foundation of its au-
thority. Whoever carries it back to its first principle destroys it.
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 230, 239 (Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson eds.,




relationship of rights and politics. 32 Finally, the coercive dimension of
rights is perpetually contested, taking the form of such questions as "Is
there a right without a remedy?" and "Are rights self-executing?" With this
understanding of the contextual specificity of rights in mind, I situate my
discussion not merely in the historical period inaugurated by September
11 th, and not merely in the governance regime of Guantdnamo Bay, but in
the even more particularized experience of representing a Guantdnamo
prisoner in legal proceedings. I explicitly reject the role of legal historian,
whose work is to look at the development of law with the benefit of dis-
tance, time, and personal detachment. Instead, I embrace the role of acci-
dental legal ethnographer. Informed by the methodological principles of
social anthropology,3 3 I am in this story a participant observer, seeking to
chart, document, and interpret the legal and cultural topographies of Guan-
tdnamo from the inside out, through a process of information gathering and
analysis made possible only through social engagement in the very legal
and cultural systems I am studying. I declare openly my subjectivities as an
advocate, but subjectivity is inherent in all ethnography; it is the price one
pays for the qualitative and relational analysis of participant observation.
Admittedly, mine is a deeply imperfect methodology. I did not set out
to research and write an ethnography of Guantdnamo; rather, I intended to
be an advocate there. And so in both intention and practice, my claims to
ethnographic method are perhaps more gestural than rigorously faithful.
Nonetheless, I insist upon situating the question of prisoner's rights within
the "social text"34 of Guantdnamo, and through the use of narrative, attempt
to provide the kinds of thick description of Guantdnamo-its people, insti-
tutions, histories, and ambitions-that enable meaningful cultural and legal
inquiry.
It is, however, not only the historical specificity of rights that compels
such an approach. Law itself is dependent upon narrative for its meaning.
Narrative renders law from doctrine to praxis, law in stasis to law in action,
abstract hermeneutic to the friction of real-world substantiality. Robert
Cover described law as semiotic, a system of signification, rather than a de-
terminate corpus of self-defining rules.35 On its own, then, law is indeter-
minate. As Cover argued, "law is a resource in signification that enables us
32 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Wom-
en's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
33 See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, NEGARA: THE THEATRE STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BALI (1980);
CLAUDE LEvI-STRAUSS, TOTEMISM (1963); BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, THE FAMILY AMONG THE
AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY (1963).
34 See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 449 (1973) (espousing the in-
terpretation of cultures and complex societies as "texts").
35 "[L]aw is predominantly a system of meaning rather than an imposition of force." Robert Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (1983) [he-
reinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative].
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to submit, rejoice, struggle, pervert, mock, disgrace, humiliate or dignify."36
Narrative context fixes the meaning of law, legal institutions, doctrine, and
legal practice, because law is fundamentally and inextricably embedded in
narrative. As Cover wrote:
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that
locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each
decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that
give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but
a world in which we live. 7
Let me be clear about what I mean by narrative. Specifically, I want to
distinguish narrative from mere story. The narrative with which I am con-
cerned is the social construction of meaning in human behavior, a construc-
tion both antecedent to and constitutive of law. Of course, in any historical
moment, multiple narratives exist simultaneously, pitched in implicit con-
test with one another, each promising the fullest explanation of our times.
In this sense, narrative is a vision of the world, a story not just of plot and
characters, but of what forces and motivations animate people and events.3"
I say that narrative is both antecedent to and constitutive of law be-
cause it is through the meaning-making process of narrative construction
that law itself acquires meaning.39 We can think of narrative as the architec-
ture of context, claiming and defining specific spaces, evoking histories,
giving expression to social and cultural influences, arising from and ex-
pressing a specific politics, and fusing a normative vision with the material-
ity of the real world. Narrative makes argument, around law and through
law, rooting itself, as Cover wrote, in normative worlds.4" To understand a
legal dispute, one must comprehend the narrative context it inhabits. And
to understand a legal victory, one must recognize the triumph of one narra-
tive vision over another.
36 Id. at 8.
" Id. at 4-5.
38 Yet narrative does not merely reflect a social order. The discursive act of narration renders that
social order, and its social meaning, flexible and dynamic, creating realities as it describes them. See
BRUCE LINCOLN, THEORIZING MYTH: NARRATIVE, IDEOLOGY, AND SCHOLARSHIP 149 (1999) (describ-
ing a political theory of narrative that "recognizes the capacity of narrators to modify details of the[ir]
stories,.. . introducing changes in the classificatory order ... that reflect their subject position and ad-
vance their interests"). Narrative derives from and generates substantiality. The act of narration is
transformed into an ideological contest, in which discursive interpretation-the naming of actors and
ideas, the foregrounding of values, and the selection of chronologies-simultaneously reflects and con-
stitutes the social reality it seeks to create. See Clifford Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in
IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 63-64 (David E. Apter ed., 1964) ("[T]he function of ideology is to make
an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful .... ").
Narrative and social reality thus are locked in "a symbiotic relation of co-reproduction, each one being
simultaneously producer and product of the other." LINCOLN, supra, at 210.
39 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113 (2000) (describing
narrative as "the necessary discourse of law").
40 Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 35, at 5, 25.
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My recourse to narrative in this Article, then, is itself argument, a
claim to the multiple, conflicting, and projected understandings of Guantd-
namo as place and people, historical time and historical event, ideology and
belief. I seek to illuminate the legal and rights context of Guantdnamo, for
which narrative is not merely a convenient device, but an indispensable and
constitutive methodology.
B. The Cultural Erasure of the Human: An Iconography of Terror
From the moment Guantnamo opened as an interrogation center for
terrorist suspects, the Bush Administration described the prisoners as "the
worst of the worst," as unfathomably dangerous, and as trained and har-
dened killers.4 As the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared
in January 2002, these are the kind of people who would chew through the
hydraulic cable of a C-17 cargo plane to bring it down.42 The government
coupled these characterizations with menacing imagery, as anonymous
sources leaked pictures of men being transported to Guantdnamo while
strapped to the floor of a plane, heads covered, hands shackled, an Ameri-
can flag draped above, and still more pictures of men in orange jumpsuits,
crumpled on the ground behind chain-linked fence. 3 Taken together, these
images helped to construct a state iconography of the "war on terrorism."
They told a narrative of transnational forces of evil fanatically committed to
the destruction of the United States, to which the United States then re-
sponds with military and moral superiority. Thus, the enemy is subdued,
neutralized, and rendered abject, and remains broken and contained.
In this regard, we might think about the value that Guantdnamo served,
international condemnation notwithstanding, in purchasing domestic faith
in the belief that the homeland is secure. Guantdnamo is evidence of the
government's success-visible but not too visible, close but not too close-
in subduing evil. Through partial visibility, the American public was en-
couraged to see a government ensuring our safety; through partial occlu-
sion, we were relieved of the knowledge of the methods used to achieve
such security. Thus Guantdinamo fills an existential need for security. That
we obtain such security through the quarantine of darkened bodies is a fa-
miliar compromise-at Guantdinamo, as well as in the territorial United
States-and one that is not easily disturbed. Indeed, the very ground on
which prisoners were first kept at Guantdinamo was previously used by the
41 See John Mintz, U.S. to Free 7 Held in Cuba, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2002, at A2 (quoting Donald
Rumsfeld's description of the prisoners as the "worst of the worst").
42 See Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def., and Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Department of Defense News Briefing (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.defenselink.miU
Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptlD=203 1.
43 Representative photos are available at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CRG21 lA.html.
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U.S. government to detain Haitian refugees in the 1990s.' Closer to home,
the overincarceration of African Americans and Latinos in U.S. prisons
promises safety through racial containment. 5 And it was this exact bargain
of securing the nation through incarceration of a racial minority, uninvited
to the bargaining table, that led to the incarceration of Japanese Americans
during World War 11.46
The dark, bearded, turbaned men of Al Qaeda are central figures in the
post-September 11 state iconography, and though pictures of the prisoners
at Guantdinamo as they currently appear have not been released, it seems
fair to say that these essentialized notions of the terrorist47 are what Guanti-
namo is meant to conjure. It is men like these, we are meant to believe,
who are imprisoned there.
44 The history of Haitian detention at Guantanamo is a particularly ugly one. See BRANDT
GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United
States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391 (1994); The Lowenstein Human Rights Clinic, Aliens
and the Duty of Nonrefoulement: Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1993).
Amy Kaplan has linked this racialized history of GuantAnamo to its present usage, writing:
The current prisoners not only first literally inhabited the camps built for the Haitian and Cuban
refugees, but they also continue to inhabit the racialized images that accrued over the century in
the imperial outpost of Guantdnamo: images of shackled slaves, infected bodies, revolutionary
subjects, and undesirable immigrants. The prisoners fill the vacated space of colonized subjects,
in which terrorism is imagined as an infectious disease of racialized bodies in need of quarantine.
The category of "enemy combatants" effaces all differences among the detainees and also draws
on these older imperial codes.... Thus "enemy combatant" is a racialized category, not only be-
cause of rampant racism toward Arabs and Muslims, but also because of this history. Stereotypes
of the colonized, immigrants, refugees, aliens, criminals, and revolutionaries are intertwined with
those of terrorists and identified with racially marked bodies in an imperial system that not only
colonizes spaces outside U.S. territories but also regulates the entry of people migrating across the
borders of the United States.
Amy Kaplan, Where Is Guantinamo?, 57 AM. QUARTERLY 831, 840 (2005).
45 The argument regarding structural racism in the U.S. criminal justice system, culminating in the
disproportionate imprisonment of African Americans and Latinos, is a familiar one. See, e.g., MICHAEL
J. LYNCH & E. BRITT PATTERSON, RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1991) (compiling several articles dis-
cussing the impact of racial biases on all stages of the criminal justice system); Angela J. Davis, Prose-
cution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 25-30 (1998-99)
(discussing the discriminatory impact of police officer and prosecutorial discretion and describing them
as further manifestations of racial disparities in the criminal justice system).
46 See, e.g., BRIAN MASARU HAYASHI, DEMOCRATIZING THE ENEMY: THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT (2004) (concluding that U.S. internment of Japanese Americans during World War II fur-
thered broad sociopolitical goals of the U.S. government vis-A-vis the Japanese American population);
TETSUDEN KASHIMA, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICAN IMPRISONMENT DURING
WORLD WAR 11 (2003) (arguing that plans for U.S. internment and incarceration of Japanese Americans
far preceded the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and were developed as early as the 1920s in preparation
of a perceived future conflict with Japan).
47 I have written previously on the racial construction of the terrorist. See Muneer 1. Ahmad, A
Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence As Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259
(2004) [hereinafter, Ahmad, Rage Shared by Law]; Muneer Ahmad, Homeland Insecurities: Racial Vi-
olence the Day After September 11, 72 Soc. TEXT 101 (2002). See also Margaret Chon & Donna E.
Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (2005); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).
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My former client, Omar Khadr, is imprisoned there. He was a fifteen-
year old boy when taken into U.S. custody. When Omar arrived at Guantd-
namo, he could not yet grow a beard. Indeed, he had not completed puber-
ty. As scientific research on adolescent development tells us, his brain
physiology was still in a state of flux, the biological bases for impulse con-
trol and exercise of judgment still inchoate.48 Now, at age twenty-three,
Omar, a Canadian citizen, has spent nearly one fourth of his life at Guantd-
namo Bay.
The state is as dependent upon narrative for the instantiation of law as
are those who would contest state power.49 Precisely for this reason, narra-
tives of the state are instruments of violence.5" Their totalizing, explanatory
claims bludgeon multiple and divergent histories, the wave of master narra-
tive washing over the granular, specific accounts of 400 individual human
beings. The task of the prisoners' lawyers has been to surface these altema-
tive accounts, thereby contesting the blanket assertion of state power
through the exercise of narrative autonomy.
At Guantdnamo, the state narrative was presumptively legitimate be-
cause it did not begin there. Instead, it derived from and helped to reinforce
a racialized social construction of the terrorist that had already taken hold in
the aftermath of September 11, and that has its antecedents well before.
Immediately following the terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration dep-
loyed a set of racially directed immigration enforcement and detention prac-
tices which, coupled with thousands of incidents of hate violence-
including nineteen murders-helped to consolidate the disparate identities
of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians into a newly minted monolithic cate-
gory in the American racial lexicon: the "Muslim-looking" person."
Through these state and ostensibly private practices, the Muslim and the
terrorist became one and the same. As Leti Volpp has argued, this racial
48 See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) ("[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among
the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions."); see also
Brief for the American Medical Ass'n, American Psychiatric Ass'n, American Society for Adolescent
Psychiatry, American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Psychiatry &
the Law, National Ass'n of Social Workers, Missouri Chapter of the National Ass'n of Social Workers,
and National Mental Health Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) (arguing that adolescent minds are "anatomically immature").
49 See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 35, at 33 ("[T]he nomos of officialdom is also 'par-
ticular' .... And it, too, reaches out for validation and seeks to extend its legitimacy by gaining accep-
tance from the normative world that lies outside its core.").
50 See id. at 40 ("[T]he jurisgenerative principle by which legal meaning proliferates in all commun-
ities never exists in isolation from violence.").
51 See Ahmad, Rage Shared by Law, supra note 47, at 1265-82; Volpp, supra note 47, at 1576-86.
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category was inherently oppositional to a newly consolidated post-
September 11 national identity, and acted to expel Arabs, Muslims, and
South Asians from the cultural or affective (nonformal) citizenship they
might otherwise have enjoyed. 2
"Muslim-looking" is a peculiar category, as it collapses phenotype and
faith, and conjures a literal face of religion. It presumes that we know what
a Muslim (and therefore a terrorist) looks like. Although this category is
ostensibly about religion, and embraces various visual cues, such as tur-
bans, beards, and veils, 3 it opens a space hovering somewhere between re-
ligion and race, and indeed, has significant racial valance. The Muslim is
different, and deficient, not only in appearance, but in constitution. The
menace is not merely the God who is worshipped, but the broader set of
cultural practices, modes of living, and systems of belief that are attributed
monolithically to more than a billion people. It is, therefore, the total em-
bodiment of the Muslim-the Muslim body-that is constructed as an inhe-
rent mortal threat.
The political power of the Muslim terrorist equation is in expelling the
Muslim terrorist suspect not only from the national polity, but from the civi-
lized world. The seeming incomprehensibility of the September 11 attacks
renders the terrorist suspect monstrous,54 thereby necessitating a strategy of
containment. Thus the neo-Orientalis 5 formation of the "Muslim-looking"
category in the aftermath of September 11 helped to make Guantdinamo not
only possible, but necessary.
This phenomenon-the creation of a monster who not only exists in
opposition to the civilized, but is invented in order to establish the liberal
bona fides of the civilized-is painfully familiar, especially for its invoca-
tion of the Muslim subject. As Sartre wrote in the context of French racism
toward Algerian colonial subjects, "One of the functions of racism is to
compensate the latent universalism of bourgeois liberalism: since all human
52 Volpp, supra note 47, at 1592-98. Volpp does not argue that the post-September II national
identity was monolithic, but instead that state actions helped to forge a new and recognizable identity
claim. Id. Of course, that claim, like all identity claims, has been contested.
53 For a discussion of the performative dimensions of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian identities in
the aftermath of September 11, see Chon & Arzt, supra note 47; Sunita Patel, Performative Aspects of
Race: "Arab, Muslim, And South Asian" Racial Formation After September 11, 10 ASiAN PAC. AM. L.J.
61 (2005). For a discussion of performance theory and identity, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati,
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating
Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REv. 1 (2000); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 11l YALE L.J.
769 (2002).
54 See Jasbir K. Puar & Amit S. Rai, Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Pro-
duction of Docile Patriots, 20 SOCIAL TEXT 117 (2002).
55 See EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978) (introducing the term "Orientalism" to describe a
Western conception of the Orient, in terms that reflected and perpetuated political and cultural hegemo-
ny toward the region).
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beings have rights, the Algerian will be made a subhuman."56 The existence
of the liberal, civilized West, therefore, required the invention of the illiber-
al, barbaric East57: "the only way the European could make himself man
was by fabricating slaves and monsters."58 The post-September 1 1 icono-
graphy thus easily took hold in the entrenched understandings of the Mus-
lim subject.
Returning to Omar's case, he was captured near Khost, Afghanistan, in
July 2002, following an intense firefight around the house in which he was
living. 9 Several hours of combat and two 500 pound bombs killed the other
occupants, who were believed to be Al Qaeda fighters.60 The government
alleges that at the conclusion of the firefight, Omar arose from the rubble of
the destroyed house and threw a grenade that killed a U.S. soldier.6' While
the Bush Administration claimed the authority to detain those at Guantdna-
mo indefinitely and without charge as "enemy combatants,"62 it nonetheless
chose to try a small number of prisoners, including Omar, for alleged war
crimes in military commissions.63
Hovering in the background of the formal charges against Omar are a
variety of suspicions and allegations about his family.' His father, in par-
ticular, is suspected by the United States to have had terrorist ties, and his
family is deeply unpopular in Canada. Taken together, the formal and in-
formal charges against Omar assimilate him into a barbaric clan of cold,
calculated, murderous men, finding a special place for him in the govern-
ment's iconography of terror. In the narrative, he is terror's child, thus
subtly reinforcing the notion of the Muslim terrorist suspect as constitutive-
ly monstrous, so much so that his children are natural-born terrorists, too.
56 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM 149 (Haddour, Brewer & McWil-
liams trans., Routledge 2001) (1964).
57 See Volpp, supra note 47, at 1586-91 (characterizing the post-September II construction of the
terrorist as a redeployment of Orientalist tropes).
58 Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface to FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH lviii (Richard Phil-
cox trans., Grove Press 2004) (1961).
59 See Charge Sheet at 5-8, United States v. Khadr, (Apr. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2007/Khadrreferral.pdf; Canadian Press, Canadian teenager threw
grenade: U.S. Military (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://montreal.ctv.ca/servlet/an/plocal/CTVNews/
20020909/kahdr omarrecovery_020909/20020909/?hub=MontrealHome.
60 See MICHELLE SHEPHARD, GUANTANAMO'S CHILD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF OMAR KHADR 83
(2008).
61 Charge Sheet at 5-8, United States v. Khadr, (Apr. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2007/Khadrreferral.pdf.
62 See infra Part II.B.1.
63 See infra notes Part lI.A.
64 For an exhaustive discussion of Omar's family, see SHEPHARD, supra note 60.
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C. Cultural Erasure Through Normalization: Welcome to Guantdnamo
The central cultural project of Guantdnamo has been to normalize what
is, on first inspection, extraordinarily aberrant, and to render intelligible the
seemingly bizarre.
My colleague and co-counsel Rick Wilson and I made our first trip to
Guantdnamo in October 2004. Over the course of nearly a dozen subse-
quent visits, my experience and memory of the place have become routi-
nized, but that first trip was fraught with anxiety, anticipation, and fear of
the unknown. Only a handful of habeas lawyers had visited the island be-
fore us,65 leaving to our imagination what a military interrogation and deten-
tion center in a law-free zone must look like. Into that imagined world, I
projected myself, a brown-skinned Muslim entering a facility whose preoc-
cupation was the interrogation and detention of brown-skinned Muslims,
thus adding identity-based anxiety to my many other fears.
Our travel to Guantdnamo did nothing to disabuse our expectations of a
dark and secretive island. We flew to Fort Lauderdale, and from there
boarded a nineteen-seat turbo-prop charter flight on Lynx Air.66 The flight
was full, so full that the excess weight necessitated a refueling stop on Ex-
uma Island. Stooping under the plane's low roofline to arrive at my seat, I
eyed my fellow passengers with suspicion, as I wondered what reputable
business they could possibly have at Guantdnamo. Only when we arrived
did I come to understand that the physical plant of the base, and many of its
services, rely on contractors for their operation.
The flight was long, loud, and uncomfortable. We were less than 500
miles away, but the flight took four hours; because the United States does
not have diplomatic relations with the Castro government, we could not fly
over Cuban airspace and therefore had to detour around the eastern peninsu-
la of the island. As I sat wedged against the window, the two small engines
blaring, I recalled the iconography of the prisoners' transport to the isl-
and-heads hooded, wrists and ankles shackled, sitting on the floor of a ca-
vernous cargo plane with nylon straps tethering them to one another and to
the sides of the plane.67 This would be the first of many comparisons I
65 Counsel visits were enabled by the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush, handed down on
June 30, 2004, which recognized the right of Guantnamo prisoners to challenge the legality of their de-
tention by way of habeas corpus. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Once the right of the prisoners to file habeas
petitions was established, a right of access to counsel (though not a right to counsel at government ex-
pense) followed. See Al Odah v. United States, No. 02-828 (CKK) (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2004) (Mem.),
available at http://guantanamobile.org/pdf/kollar-kotelly.pdf.
66 Later flights would be via a Lynx competitor, optimistically named Air Sunshine.
67 See Gitmo Photos, supra note 43 and accompanying text. Representative images are available at
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CRG21lA.html. Images of U.S. military transports of prisoners were
anonymously sent to media sources on November 8, 2002. Although the U.S. government was unaware
of who leaked the photos, it verified the photos were authentic. See Pentagon Probes Anonymous Re-




would draw between my condition and Omar's, an early signal of the expe-
riential and situational distance between us.
Our convoluted itinerary reflected the spatial dimension of the gov-
ernment's detention project. It was no accident that visiting the base was
difficult: inaccessibility was a core design element of Guantdnamo. The
geographic remoteness of the base from the territorial United States reflect-
ed and facilitated the legal and psychic dispossession that the government
intended Guantdnamo to achieve. The prisoners were deliberately lost at
sea, held outside the realm of the normal, as part of a twofold strategy to
free the hand of the government-both literally and figuratively-and to
induce despair among the prisoners.68
By the time we arrived, night had fallen. We emerged onto the tarmac
with floodlights illuminating the humid air and armed soldiers, only slightly
older than our client, ready to greet us. We gathered our luggage, which
was searched, and then met our liaison, a young army corporal, who ac-
companied us to the dank rooms of the Combined Bachelor Quarters, the
small motel where we would be staying. In a matter of minutes, GuantA-
namo shifted from the realm of the imagination into our lived experience.
That night, our theoretical understanding of the place stood poised for colli-
sion and reconciliation with its real-world materiality.
Despite our initial disorientation, days at Guantdnamo were quickly
routinized, and with routinization came normalization. A ferry takes you
across Guant~namo Bay itself, from the Leeward to the Windward side.
For fifteen or twenty minutes, it is the calm beauty of the Caribbean. Then,
arriving at the other side, you encounter a giant desalination plant, which is
necessary because Castro cut off the supply of fresh water to the base. Af-
ter a short drive up a winding hill, you enter what has been consciously de-
signed to mimic a small town in 1950s middle America. A single road,
Sherman Avenue, runs from one end of the base to the other, along which
one finds an outdoor movie theater, evocative of drive-ins of a bygone era.
There is a McDonald's, an A&W Root Beer, a bowling alley, and a "pub-
lic" library. There is a large laundromat, and the Navy Exchange, a com-
bined grocery and department store. On our first visit there, it was
impossible to find a good cup of coffee, but they have since begun serving
Starbucks at one small outlet. There are athletic fields and housing devel-
opments named West Iguana and Tierra Kay that look like suburban subdi-
visions. There is even a school for the kids on base. The speed limit is
twenty-five miles per hour-strictly enforced, in large part to protect the
68 See MARGULIES, supra note 24, at 27 (discussing how U.S. interrogators at Guant~namo Bay jus-
tified barring prisoners' access to counsel because this "instills in the prisoner the dangerous and mis-
guided belief that he may secure relief 'through an adversarial civil litigation process'-that is, the
courts .... The prisoner must realize that his welfare is wholly in the hands of his interroga-
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iguanas6 -which reinforces the sensation that time passes slowly at Guan-
tdnamo.
But the aspiration of small town normalcy stands in permanent tension
with the dystopic detention camps erected just a few miles from the town
center. To get to the camps, one winds through the dry hills of the base,
and after cresting the last of these, a series of low-slung buildings appear on
the horizon, the shimmering waters of the Caribbean behind them. From a
distance, they might be mistaken for a luxury resort, but as one approaches,
the multiple checkpoints, concertina wire, and guard towers betray that
momentary delusion, and the reality of the camps, their maximum security
and deliberate despair, overwhelm the senses.
Power is exercised at Guantdnamo not only through spatial demarca-
tion, but through administration of "indigenous" ritual. In Muslim coun-
tries, the call to prayer is heard five times day. In the old days, a muezzin
ascended a steep minaret to make the call. Today, it is broadcast from loud
speakers attached to the minarets. At Guantdnamo, too, the call to prayer is
heard (though prisoners have complained that it is not broadcast all five
times and that the government sometimes deliberately disrupts it). But on
our first visits there, the recorded call was broadcast from loud speakers not
atop minarets, but attached to the guard towers encircling the camps, each
tower staffed by armed guards, and each emblazoned by an American flag.
The prisoners' call to prayer issued nearly from the barrel of their captors'
guns.
Thus is Guanttnamo built deliberately upon contradiction, these two
worlds existing side-by-side, the one self-consciously normal, the other a
carefully constructed project of dehumanization. The town's aspiration of
normalcy is made all the more urgent by the aberrance of the camps. The
service members who work in the camps but spend their off hours in the
town cross between these two worlds daily, traversing the dividing line
known as "the Wire." The prisoners, of course, are forever delimited; their
containment underscores the service members' freedom, and the barbarity
of the camps helps to constitute the normalcy of the town.7"
69 See Associated Press, More rights for Gitmo's lizards than detainees?, MSNBC, Dec. 8, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22161810; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334) (discussing protection of iguanas at Guantinamo under U.S. law).
70 The normalcy of Guantinamo is called further into question-or perhaps is reestablished-when
one begins to appreciate its racialized labor market. Almost all of the laborers at the base-the janitors
and food service staff, the landscapers and maintenance workers-are Filipino, Haitian, and Jamaican
migrants, referred to as third-country nationals, or TCNs. See Matthew Hay Brown, Guantanamo Base
Provides an Enclave of Small-Town Life, HARTFORD COuRANT, Dec. 26, 2003, at A27 (noting that
many of Guantdnamo's Jamaican and Filipino laborers have worked on the base for over thirty years);
Paul Koring, The Uneasy Mix Called Guantanamo, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 14, 2006, at Al 9 (describing
the "TNC Hills," a housing complex where most of Guantinamo's labor force lives). The reliance on
migrant workers for low-wage service industry labor in the United States extends to Guantnamo. It is a
reminder that the penal colony that is Guant~namo Bay is indeed colonial. Moreover, it inaugurates rec-
ognition of a pervasive yet complex racial economy at Guantdnamo, where black and brown migrant
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D. The Legal Erasure of the Human: "Enemy Combatants"
and the Law of Guantdnamo
President Obama's promise to review the government's Guantdinamo
policy reflects widespread concern regarding the legality of the Bush Ad-
ministration's governance regime. But that very review reminds us that for
much of the Bush era, the government's policies presented a fundamental
question: Is there law at Guantdinamo?
By now, others have thoroughly documented the executive, legislative,
and judicial actions relating to Guantdnamo, beginning with the Presidential
Military Order approving the detention of "enemy combatants" and trials by
military commission,71 and the legal memoranda purporting to except the
prisoners from the protections of the Geneva Conventions72 and approving
labor services a multiracial U.S. military that in turn incarcerates and interrogates Muslim men. In this
regard, even though we were in the legal netherland of GuantAnamo, it seemed impossible to escape the
multiple taxonomies of American citizenship, and in particular, their racial, national, and labor dimen-
sions.
71 Presidential Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Presiden-
tial Military Order].
72 The Executive Branch's position on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the conflict in
Afghanistan has gone through three stages since the onset of hostilities. First, U.S. military commanders
concluded that the Geneva Conventions applied. See FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO
REVIEW DoD DETENTION OPERATIONS (Aug. 2004), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO
ABU GHRAIB 908, 947 (Karen J. Greenberg, Joshua L. Dratel & Anthony Lewis eds., 2005); William H.
Taft, Keynote Address, The Geneva Conventions and the Rules of War in the Post-9/l l and Iraq World
Symposium, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 149, 154 (2005).
Second, on February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum declaring the Geneva Conven-
tions inapplicable to members of Al Qaeda. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice
President, et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf. President Bush claimed inherent
authority to suspend the Conventions as to the conflict in Afghanistan, but declined to exercise that au-
thority. Id. Instead, he classified members of the Taliban as "enemy combatants" and asserted that "as a
matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the
extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of
Geneva." Id.
In so deciding, President Bush accepted the legal counsel of the Department of Justice over that of
senior military advisors. Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo advised President Bush that nei-
ther Al Qaeda nor the Taliban enjoyed protection under the Geneva Conventions. Memorandum from
John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel, Dep't of Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, (Jan. 9,
2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.01.09.pdf. Alberto Gon-
zales confirmed the legal conclusions of the Jan. 9, 2002 Yoo memo. Memorandum from Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to President George W. Bush, Decision Re: Application of Treaties
and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf ("The nature of the new war...
renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations ... and renders quaint some of its provisions .... ").
Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell disagreed, arguing that suspension of the Geneva Conventions
would evoke wide international condemnation. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum to
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the use of interrogation techniques previously considered to be torture."
Similarly, the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence-Rasul v. Bush,74
the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26,
2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf. Powell rec-
ommended the continued applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the conflict in Afghanistan, with
the qualification that neither members of Al Qaeda nor the Taliban would enjoy Prisoner of War status.
Id.; accord Memorandum from William H. Taft IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2, 2002),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20040608_DOC.pdf (echoing Secretary
Powell's concerns and legal recommendation).
The third, and latest, Executive Branch position came on January 22, 2009, when President Obama
issued two executive orders reversing the Bush policies with respect to executive detainees and the Ge-
neva Conventions. The first order requires that executive detention facilities operate in conformity with
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the
Guantinamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg.
4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). The second, concerning interrogation standards, provides that Common Article 3
sets the minimum standard of treatment for executive detainees and that the Army Field Manual be read
in conformity with Common Article 3. Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74
Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). This latter order specifically repudiates the Office of Legal Counsel
memoranda issued by the Bush Administration. Id.
73 In the initial-now notorious-August 2002 memo drafted by the Office of Legal Counsel on
permissible interrogation techniques, acts tantamount to torture were narrowly defined to include only
those specifically intended to produce harm of a gravity akin to "death, organ failure, or the permanent
impairment of a significant body function." Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re:
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/ bybee80102mem.pdf. Though later rescinded, the Bybee
Memo provided the legal framework for the authorization of interrogation techniques previously consi-
dered a violation of U.S. legal norms under domestic and international law. Moreover, it tacitly autho-
rized the explicit use of torture in limited circumstances where justified by necessity. Id. A subsequent
memorandum, written by John Yoo, went further to suggest that the claim of wartime executive authori-
ty could excuse interrogators from criminal liability for acts of torture. Memorandum from John Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II,
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Enemy Combatants Held Outside
the United States 80 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetownuniversity_
law/files/march.14.memo.partl.pdf (pt. 1) and http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetownuniversitylaw/
files/marchl4.memo.part2.pdf (pt. 2). Collectively, these and other Office of Legal Counsel memoranda
are referred to as the "Torture Memos." See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Nation; The Struggle Over the
Torture Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at D5. President Obama released additional Office of Le-
gal Counsel memos on April 16, 2009. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos Detail
Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at Al.
This new legal framework enabled numerous revisions to operations manuals of the U.S. armed
forces authorizing new interrogation techniques. For example, responding to a perceived lack of
progress with interrogations, Guantfinamo Commander Major General Michael E. Dunlavey sought au-
thorization for the use of techniques of greater severity than those previously permitted under the 1992
version of the Army Field Manual 34-52. Memorandum from Major Gen. Michael E. Dunlavey, Com-
mander, Joint Task Force 170, to Gen. James T. Hill, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Proposed
Counter-Resistance Strategies, Oct. 11, 2002, available at http://www.gwu.edu/
-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.12.02.pdf. For a comprehensive discussion of the Bush Adminis-
tration's evolving policy on permissible interrogation procedures, see Rick Abel, Contesting Legality in
the United States after September 11, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES
OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 361 (Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Mal-
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,75 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 76-the lower court actions, and
Congress's intervention in the form of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005"7
and the Military Commissions Act of 20068 have all been debated by oth-
ers.79 While the Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush poses a set of new
doctrinal and theoretical challenges,8" rather than rehearse previous discus-
sions of the case law or suggest new ones here, I seek to explore a more
fundamental question: despite the repeated claims by critics that Guant~na-
mo is a law-free zone, does the corpus of state action by all three branches
not constitute an abundance of law at Guantdnamo? Rather than Guantd-
namo suffering from a lack of law, is it possible that law is all around?
Answering this question requires a summary discussion of the creation
and development of the post-September 1 1 Guantdnamo governance re-
gime. While that regime is multifaceted and has evolved over time, at its
inception it sought to detain and interrogate indefinitely, without charge,
and without opportunity for judicial review, any non-U.S. citizen in the
world whom the Executive deemed to be an "enemy combatant."'" In addi-
tion, the regime contemplated the trial by military commission of select
"enemy combatants" for alleged war crime offenses, under rules of the Ex-
ecutive's making.82 Notably, the "enemy combatant" construct was a legal
invention of the Bush Administration, distinct from the presumptive "pris-
oner of war" status to which the prisoners otherwise would have been en-
titled, the intended effect of which was to remove the prisoners from the
ambit of both the Geneva Conventions and the U.S. courts.83 In this way, in
colm M. Feeley eds., 2007). For one of many critiques of John Yoo's legal advice, see Peter Margulies,
True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of
Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1 (2008).
74 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
75 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
76 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
77 Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
78 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-50 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2441;
and 28 U.S.C. § 224 1(c)-(e)).
79 See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-Territorial Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 369 (2007); Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIsc. L. REV. 1165 (2007);
Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the 'War on Terror', 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008).
80 Boumediene held that, as a constitutional matter, the writ of habeas corpus extends to the prison-
ers at Guant~inamo, that the prisoners there "are entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing," and that the
habeas courts have the power to order release. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266, 2275
(2008). However, the Court's opinion expressly notes two limitations: the definition of the key term
"enemy combatant" is relegated to the lower courts, as is the responsibility for establishing the "proce-
dural and substantive standards" for the habeas hearings. Id. at 2273, 2276.
81 See Presidential Military Order, supra note 71.
82 Id.
83 See Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees, (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB 127/02.01.09.pdf, see also MARGULtES, supra note 24, at 56-59.
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the eyes of the law, the prisoners were made invisible. Hidden on a remote
and mysterious island, which was made inaccessible to lawyers and human
rights advocates for nearly two years, the prisoners were nearly erased.
Importantly, the current moment is not the first time that the United
States has argued that Guantinamo is a rights-free zone. Reviewing its use
as a detention center for Haitian refugees in the 1990s, Gerald Neuman has
described Guanttinamo as an "anomalous zone," in which the United States
argued that the Haitians "had no constitutional rights whatsoever." 4 That
position was accepted by the Eleventh Circuit, 5 though rejected by the
Second.86 The result of this rights-free zone, Neuman argued, was "a true
reverse Carnival, a ruler's festival of uninhibited exercise of power" 7:
The government,. .. feeling unconstrained by law, responded with more se-
verity than sympathy to its unwelcome guests. The government surrounded
the camp with razor barbed wire, set out camp rules, and punished infractions
by confinement to the brig, after only the most rudimentary procedures ....
Although the government's own physicians warned against concentrating an
immune-suppressed population [some of the detainees were HIV-positive], the
government overrode their advice .... An INS spokesman dismissed concern
for the detainees with the remark, "they're going to die anyway, aren't they?"88
In this sense, while the current incarnation of Guantdinamo presents a par-
ticularly vivid example of a rights-free zone, anomaly is no stranger to
Guantdnamo. The Haitian experience presented a template for how rights
could be stripped away, and recommended Guantdnamo for its combination
of geographic proximity and jurisdictional extraterritoriality. Perhaps more
frightening, as Neuman suggests, anomaly is no stranger to law, but instead
seems a regular if episodic visitor.89
The creation of Guantdinamo and its current status as an interrogation
and detention center for suspected terrorists consists of three overlapping
components: executive authorization, judicial contest, and congressional in-
tervention. In the first instance, the idea of Guant~namo was purely execu-
tive and both arose from and helped to constitute a "virulent strain of' the
theory of the unitary executive.9" A presidential order authorized the appre-
84 Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1197, 1229 (1996).
85 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513 n.8 (11 th Cir. 1992).
86 Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub noma., Sale
v. Hatian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 918 (1993); see also Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028,
1041-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (vacated by Stipulated Order Approving Class Action Settlement Agreement
(Feb. 22, 1994)).
87 Neuman, supra note 84, at 1232.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1228-29.
90 Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L.
REv. 65, 69 (2006) (distinguishing the traditional theory of a unitary executive from the "wild-eyed
theory, masquerading as a 'unitary executive' concept, that purported to allow... [the Bush Administra-
tion] to defy and creatively reinterpret even the will of Congress-all supposedly entirely consistent
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hension and detention of terrorist suspects as "enemy combatants," any-
where in the world.9' Informed by legal advice from within the Executive
Branch,92 the presidential order purported to exempt the Guantidnamo pris-
oners from the Geneva Conventions, the primary advantage of which was to
enable the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques," ' which otherwise
would have violated the Geneva Conventions' prohibition on torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
Second, and perhaps most critical in the unfolding story of Guantdna-
mo, has been the contest for judicial involvement. As suggested previous-
ly,' the location of the interrogation and detention center at Guantdnamo
served multiple strategic purposes, including the intention to evade the j u-
risdiction of U.S. courts. Thus, the principal and enduring court challenge
regarding Guantdnamo has not been the adjudication of rights, but the reach
of the courts. In its first Guant~namo-related case, Rasul v. Bush, the Su-
preme Court held that the federal habeas statute reached the prisoners at
Guantdnamo, thus repudiating the government's claim of unreviewable au-
thority.95 In subsequent litigation in federal district court, prisoners' counsel
sought to exercise their clients' habeas rights by demanding that the gov-
ernment state the legal and factual bases for detention, and demanding a
hearing in federal court in which to contest those bases.96 But such attempts
at rights contestation were quickly aborted, as the government adopted an
exceptionally narrow interpretation of Rasul. By the government's account,
Rasul stood for the proposition that the habeas statute gave the federal
courts jurisdiction over any Guantinamo prisoner claims arising under their
statutory or constitutional rights, but the prisoners possessed neither statuto-
ry nor constitutional rights. Thus, by the government's account, the courts
could hear the cases but could not act; they could listen, but they could not
speak.97
with the Constitution. This virulent strain of the unitary executive, which emphasized the President's
'inherent authority' to act, gained traction and led to a number of exceptionally dangerous policies, cul-
minating in the so-called 'torture memorandum.') (internal citations omitted).
91 Presidential Military Order, supra note 71.
92 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
93 See Action Memo from William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., to Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Sec'y of Def., Counter-Resistance Techniques (Dec. 2, 2002), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.12.02.pdf (authorizing, among other tech-
niques, stress positions, extended isolation, hooding, twenty-hour interrogations, restriction on meals,
and exploitation of individual phobias).
94 See supra Part I.B.
95 542 U.S. 466 (2004). For an excellent analysis of Rasul, see Azmy, supra note 79.
96 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d. 443 (D.D.C. 2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355
F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
97 See Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Response Pursuant to the Court's
Sept. 20, 2004 Order, Khadr v. Bush, 04-CV-01 136JDB (D.D.C. Oct. 4,2004).
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Two federal district judges divided on the question of whether the pris-
oners possessed any enforceable rights.98 Before the Court of Appeals de-
cided the issue, Congress intervened, at the Bush Administration's behest,
passing the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA),99 which amended the federal
habeas statute and seemingly stripped the courts of the jurisdiction found in
Rasul.'0°
As the habeas litigation stalled in the Court of Appeals, the first chal-
lenge to the Guantdinamo military commission system rose to the Supreme
Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.' °' The DTA was enacted after certiorari had
been granted in Hamdan but before the case was heard, thus forcing the
Court to consider the statute's jurisdiction-stripping provisions as a thre-
shold matter. The Court disposed of the jurisdictional issue expeditiously °2
and proceeded to the merits, rejecting the government's argument that the
prisoners stood outside the Geneva Conventions. The Court instead found
that the military commission system was unauthorized under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and contrary to Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. 03
The Rasul and Hamdan decisions are enormously important, both for
their willingness to resolve jurisdictional questions in the prisoners' favor
and, in the case of Hamdan, to adjudicate the prisoners' substantive rights
claims. There has been a tendency to describe, and lament, the Rasul case
as "merely" jurisdictional, because the government's position has been that
Rasul had no direct bearing on the substantive rights of the prisoners and
that in fact they have none."°4 But even if merely jurisdictional, Rasul is
noteworthy precisely because of the ease with which the withholding of ju-
risdiction could have defeated the prisoners' claims entirely. By finding j u-
risdiction to hear the prisoners' cases, the Court rejected a long tradition of
upholding state action through the deployment of jurisdictional rules.0 5
98 Senior Judge Joyce Hens Green issued an opinion that found the prisoners to have Fifth Amend-
ment due process rights. See Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d. at 464. Judge Richard
Leon reached the opposite conclusion. See Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 320-24.
99 Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
o0 Id. § 1005(e).
101 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
102 Id. at 571-83.
103 Id. at 625, 632-33.
104 Much of the parties' debate over whether the prisoners possess constitutional or statutory rights
has centered on footnote 15 of the majority opinion in Rasul, which states:
Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terror-
ism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention for more than two years
in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without
access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe "cus-
tody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U. S. C.
§2241 (c)(3).
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,483 n.15 (2004).
'05 See Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
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Robert Cover decried this "apologetic and statist orientation" of jurisdic-
tional decisions for "prevent[ing] courts from ever reaching the threatening
questions.' ' 6 By Cover's account, jurisdictional disposal of a case was a
means of upholding state violence-and thereby doing state violence-
while disclaiming personal culpability of the judges involved.0 7
In Rasul, the Court resisted the state violence of Guantdnamo, conclud-
ing that while it may be geographically outside the United States, it was not
beyond the reach of the courts, or more simply, it was not beyond. By re-
cognizing Guantdnamo as within its realm, the Court helped to make it real;
by bearing witness through its finding of jurisdiction, the Court transported
Guantdnamo from the netherworld of the legal and popular imaginations to
the cognizable, demarcated, and substantial world.
As the post-Rasul litigation languished in the lower courts--depleting
the prisoners and their lawyers of the faith in law inspired by the Supreme
Court's decision-the Court went a significant step further in Hamdan.
There, the Court passed quickly and deliberately over the jurisdictional is-
sues, determined to reach the "threatening questions." And threatening they
were: whether the prisoners had enforceable rights under U.S. law, and
whether they were protected by the Geneva Conventions. Just as Rasul re-
pudiated the government contention that Guantdtnamo was beyond the reach
of the courts, Hamdan established that prisoners-at least those few facing
trial by military commission-had certain enforceable rights.0 8
The significance of the Hamdan decision can be measured by the speed
with which the Bush Administration moved for Congress to overturn it.
Congress yielded, and with the enactment of the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 (MCA), °9 it once more attempted to strip the courts of habeas ju-
risdiction over Guantdnamo, and authorized a new military commission
system to replace the one invalidated by the Court in Hamdan. The MCA is
remarkable in three ways: (1) its habeas-stripping provisions provoked a
constitutional dispute on a core liberty concern,"0 ultimately resolved in
Boumediene; (2) it attempted a unilateral reinterpretation of sections of the
106 Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 35, at 56.
107 Id. at 54 ("[T]he judge-armed with no inherently superior interpretive insight, no necessarily
better law-must separate the exercise of violence from his own person.").
108 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 561 (2006) (discussing the right to be present at
one's own trial).
109 Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
1 See id. § 7, amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(l) ("No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
by the United States who has been determined.., an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determina-
tion."). I have written previously about the implications of the MCA's habeas-stripping provisions for
noncitizens within the United States. See Muneer 1. Ahmad, Guantdnamo Is Here: The Military Com-
missions Act and Noncitizen Vulnerability, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (2007).
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Geneva Conventions;.' and (3) it replaced the discredited military commis-
sion system with one that suffers from many of the same defects that
troubled the Supreme Court in Hamdan."2 Until Boumediene was decided,
the cumulative result was to return the prisoners to a realm beyond law.
Of course, the government has never accepted the argument that Guan-
tdinamo is either lawless or beyond the law. Rather, it has insisted upon the
lawfulness of its governance regime, as it must; even the most totalitarian of
regimes claim to be operating in accordance with the law, and use the law,
its language, forms, actors, and mythologies to legitimize their actions."3
By the government's account, law is all around: contract law governs the
agreement with Cuba granting the United States use of Guantdnamo as a
naval station;".4 the Uniform Code of Military Justice applies to wrongdoing
committed by military personnel and civilian contractors on the base; and
international humanitarian law (IHL) authorizes wartime detention of com-
batants.
An argument can be made from the left that there is law (as opposed to
the normative argument that there should be) at Guantdnamo. Human
rights law posits that fundamental jus cogens norms apply everywhere and
all the time.' By this account, Guantinamo does not exist outside the law;
rather, the law of fundamental rights is permanent, and immanent, and thus
I I I Responding to the Hamdan decision, including the Court's finding that the commissions, as then
constituted, violated Common Article 3, the MCA sought to cabin the scope and application of the Ge-
neva Conventions. See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(d)(2)(f) (2006) (defining the military commissions as per se
"regularly constituted courts" under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions); id. § 948b(d)(2)(g)
(declaring that the Geneva Conventions may not be invoked as a source of rights by enemy combatants);
MCA, supra note 109, § 5(a) (barring the use of the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights in any
habeas or other civil proceeding in which the United States or its agents are a party); id § 6(a)(3)(A)
(granting the President inherent authority to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Con-
ventions, including the definition of "grave breaches").
Numerous commentators have argued against this evisceration of the Conventions under U.S. law.
See generally Mark A. Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Ham-
dan, the Geneva Conventions, and International Criminal Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (2007);
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A
Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 73 (2007).
112 See MCA, supra note 109, § 3 (adding Chapter 47A to Title 10 of the U.S. Code).
113 See generally Robert M. Cover, The Folkales of Justice, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 173, 174-75 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat eds.,
1992) [hereinafter Cover, Folktales of Justice] (discussing the value of law in legitimizing "the exercise
of coercion and.., the organization of authority and privilege").
114 See Agreement for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Sta-
tions, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. 111, T.S. No. 418, in THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES, 1902-
1903, at 429-430 (Clive Perry ed., Ocean Publications 1980).
115 See generally HENRY J. STEINER & PHILLIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 161-73, 1222-37 (2d ed. 2000) (discussingjus cogens in the con-
text of intemational human rights); Pieter van Dijk, A Common Standard ofAchievement About Univer-
sal Validity and Uniform Interpretation of International Human Rights Norms, 13 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS.
105 (1995) (recognizing the universality of a core set of human rights as evidenced by broad codifica-
tion in intemational and regional legal conventions).
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the conditions of Guantdinamo are the result of illegal acts by state authori-
ties. If one accepts the integrity of human rights law, and its ontological in-
dependence from any state sovereign, then it follows that there can never be
lawlessness, only gross violations of law.
But such competing claims to the existence of law at Guantdnamo re-
veal the "Is there law?" question to be both political and jurisprudential.
For the Bush Administration, the claim to law reflected a concern, and a
contest, over the legitimacy of state power."' I return to this inherent lin-
kage between law and legitimacy in Part II.A, but note here the suspicion
that must attach when the claim to law is made by an executive that simul-
taneously insists upon the nonjusticiability of its claim. Indeed, the Admin-
istration's claims of law's applicability were selective at best. For example,
it relied upon IHL for the principle that combatants may be detained for the
duration of hostilities,"7 but has sought to disclaim the applicability of other
provisions of IHL, most notably Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions."'8
For human rights advocates, the claim to law is also a claim about state
power and the subordination of state power to a set of norms and principles
that originate outside the state, and yet have the force to bind it, even with-
out the state's consent. While I am sympathetic to the human rights posi-
tion, my experience at Guantdnamo, and more importantly the prisoners'
experience, makes the assertion of law's existence seem ever more fanciful.
Indeed, looking from the lived experience of those on the receiving end of
illegality suggests a limit to the faith one can place in the aspiration of hu-
man rights law. At some point, systematic illegality-particularly when
enacted under a claim of law-crosses into lawlessness. We might consid-
er, for example, the experience of a now-released British prisoner named
Feroz Ali Abassi. In an administrative review proceeding called a Comba-
tant Status Review Tribunal,"9 created by the Bush Administration in the
aftermath of Rasul, Abassi submitted written complaints that military police
116 Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 113, at 174-75. But see Alan Hyde, The Concept of Le-
gitimaion in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIsC. L. REV. 379 (1983) (questioning the existence of a caus-
al relationship between actions by legal institutions and popular belief in the legitimacy of government).
Although Hyde raises an empirical question regarding causality between state action and popular con-
sciousness, my argument here is about the government's belief in the importance of making the commis-
sions appear legitimate.
117 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2003 WL 23189498, at
*20 (Dec. 3, 2003) (No. 03-6696) (relying upon "laws and customs of war," as well as Hague Conven-
tion of 1907, for authority for wartime detention of combatants).
118 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 37-38, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-
184 ), 2006 WL 460875 (arguing that Common Article 3 "is inapplicable to the ongoing conflict with al
Qaeda").
119 The Combatant Status Review Tribunal was created by the Bush Administration after the Su-
preme Court decided the Rasul case and, on the same day, the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
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had sex in front of him while he prayed. He also argued that he should be
considered a prisoner of war rather than an enemy combatant. But as the
Associated Press reported:
[A]n Air Force colonel, whose identity remains blacked out [on the transcript],
would have none of it. "Mr. Abassi, your conduct is unacceptable and this is
your final warning. I do not care about international law. I do not want to
hear the words international law again. We are not concerned about interna-
tional law," the colonel insisted before having Abassi removed from the hear-
ing so that the military could consider classified evidence against him. Abassi
was freed in January 2005.121
Or, as a U.S. intelligence official said to prisoner Hadj Boudella, "You are
in a place where there is no law-we are the law.''
Here, then, we must acknowledge the inextricability of law and the
state, and because of its monopoly on legitimate violence, the special,
though not exclusive, authority the state holds in defining what is law. The
challenge of the human rights movement is to establish law that transcends
sovereignty. It remains to be seen, however, whether law can so exist, or if,
like a trapped animal, one limb isn't always caught in state power. In this
context, the Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene decisions represent not just
law, but law's ambition, and its contradiction: a force that can transcend
state power even as it is constituted by it.
The Court's decision in Boumediene22 is the latest, but likely not the
last chapter in the Guantdnamo legal history. Like Rasul, which was de-
cided on statutory grounds, it affirms the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
hear the prisoners' habeas petitions, but it is even more significant because
the decision is based on constitutional grounds. Pushed into a comer by the
MCA, the Court confronted directly the question of whether the habeas-
stripping provision of Section 7 of the statute was in violation of the Sus-
pension Clause, and found that it was.'23 This constitutional vindication of
the prisoners' right to be heard, and the seeming willingness of the district
court judges to now proceed with the prisoners' habeas cases expeditious-
ly, 124 suggests anew the potential for transformative legal practice. And yet,
120 Gina Pace, U.S. Releases Gitmo Detainee Names, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4, 2006, available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/O3/O2terror/mainl 364552.shtml.
121 CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, REPORT ON TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN AND
DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA ii (July 2006) (quoting Unclas-
sified Attorney Notes of Robert Kirsch), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report ReportOnTor
ture.pdf.
122 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
123 Id. at 2274.
124 See Press Release, U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., DC Chief Judge Meets with Judges to Discuss Dis-
trict Court Procedures for Guantanamo Cases (July 2, 2008), http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/public-
docs/system/files/Guantanamo-PressRelease070208.pdf (."The judges of this Court are committed to
deciding these[] cases as expeditiously as possible."' (quoting Royce C. Lamberth, C.J.)) (last visited
Sept. 5, 2009). A flurry of case activity suggests that the district court is expediting these cases.
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the history of the Guantdnamo litigation suggests that the proper measure of
such court victories is not their doctrinal significance, but their effect in the
lived experience of the prisoners. Six years after some of the prisoners ar-
rived, the question finally resolved by the Court in Boumediene is not
whether they are being held lawfully, or what substantive rights they
have-Fifth Amendment due process or Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights, for example-but only that they are entitled to contest their deten-
tion. Indeed, the Court ensured many months more of wrangling in the
lower courts because it expressly declined to rule on two of the most fun-
damental issues necessary to the resolution of these cases: the definition of
"enemy combatant" and what procedures should govern the habeas pro-
ceedings. 25 Thus, while the Boumediene decision is undoubtedly historic in
limiting the scope of executive authority, it merely returned the prisoners to
the place they were four years ago, after Rasul. '26
125 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2273, 2275. The Court was sensitive to the issue of delay, noting,
"[w]hile some delay in fashioning new procedures is unavoidable, the costs of delay can no longer be
borne by those who are held in custody." Id. at 2275. Yet it seems that the costs will be borne by the
prisoners after all.
126 The Supreme Court did provide the lower courts with some significant guidance that should
make post-Boumediene litigation more fruitful than was the post-Rasul litigation. Specifically, the
Court found that the government procedure created in the aftermath of Rasul, known as the Combatant
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and purportedly designed to confirm the "enemy combatant" status of
each prisoner, was an inadequate substitute for federal habeas review. The Court found the procedure
inadequate even though the DTA authorized a limited review of its conclusions by the D.C. Court of
Appeals. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262-74. Thus, the Court has now ruled on two issues that domi-
nated the post-Rasul litigation: the availability of habeas after passage of the DTA and the MCA, and the
adequacy of the CSRT proceedings. With this doctrinal underbrush cleared, the path to full habeas pro-
ceedings should be clearer, and yet I remain concerned about the ability of the Executive Branch to fore-
stall hearings because of myriad other legal issues to be litigated, not least of which is the question of
what substantive rights the prisoners possess.
Jenny Martinez has raised a related set of concerns about the "war on terror" cases, noting the dis-
concerting tendency of lawyers and courts alike to focus on procedural rights at the expense of substan-
tive claims. See Martinez, supra note 79.
Finally, the case of the Uighurs at Guantfnamo provides an acute example of the post-Boumediene
gap between procedural and substantive justice. The Uighurs, a Muslim ethnic minority, have been de-
termined not to be enemy combatants, but cannot be returned to China because of a likeli- hood they
will be tortured by the Chinese government. On October 7, 2008, Judge Ricardo Urbina granted the writ
of habeas corpus to the Uighurs and ordered their release into the United States. In re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008). The government immediately challenged that order,
and the D.C. Circuit subsequently reversed, holding that the plenary power doctrine pre- cluded the
courts from ordering the government to admit someone to the United States. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555
F.3d 1022, 1026-29 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Thus, the Uighurs, who in all likelihood never should have been
brought to Guantnamo in the first place, were trapped there indefinitely despite their right to habeas
having been vindicated. Although the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in their case, Kiyemba
v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.D.C. 2009), cert. granted, 2009 WL 935637 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009) (No. 08-
1234), the plight of the Uighurs is likely to be resolved politically rather than legally: the United States
recently negotiated for the transfer of four Uighurs to Bermuda and six to the South Pacific nation of
Palau, and is attempting to resettle the remaing Uighurs elsewhere. See Erik Eckholm, Out of Guantd-
namo, Uighurs Bask in Bermuda, N.Y. TtMES, June 14, 2009, at A4; David Johnston, Uighurs Leave
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A few recent decisions by habeas judges to order release of a small
number of prisoners,'27 and the government's decision not to appeal, suggest
anew that Boumediene, and the rights-based strategy, may well have greater
vitality than my argument thus far has suggested. However, these decisions
come six years after Guantinamo opened, and at least as important, after the
2008 presidential election. Indeed, the dramatically changed political cli-
mate may prove to be the most important factor in rights enforcement at
Guantanamo. Even then, the change in Administration may not satisfy fully
the justice claims of Guantanamo.'25
E. The Physical Erasure of the Human: Torture
Taken together, the cultural and legal erasures discussed above enabled
the physical erasure of prisoners at Guantinamo and in particular,
their torture.
The physical erasure of torture is self-evident, and thus needs only
brief comment. By definition,'29 torture involves the degradation of the
body or the mind, such that torture always seeks to erase, even if to varying
degrees depending upon its specific method and duration. The infamous
"Torture Memos" written by John Yoo and others at the Department of Jus-
tice Office of Legal Counsel30 literally underwrote torture at Guantanamo,
including the well-documented practices of waterboarding, 3' rendition,'32
Guantdnamo for Palau, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at A22; Warren Richey, Supreme Court Leaves
Hanging the Case of Detained Uighurs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., June 30, 2009, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0701/p02s06-usju.html (reporting on the Supreme Court's failure to act
on Uighurs' petition for certiorari). Five Uighurs were previously resettled in Albania. See Tim Gol-
den, Chinese Leave GuantdnamoforAlbanian Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at Al.
127 See Basardh v. Bush, 2009 WL 856345 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2009) (ordering release ofYasin Mu-
hammad Basard); El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2009) (ordering release of Mo-
hammed el Gharani); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 199 (D.D.C. 2008) (directing
Respondents "to take all necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate the release of Petition-
ers Lakhdar Boumediene, Mohamed Nechla, Hadj Boudella, Mustafa Ait Idr, and Sabr Lahmar forth-
with").
128 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
129 The Convention Against Torture defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Pt. I,
Art. I, 1 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1027 (1984). This definition
was incorporated into federal regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2008).
130 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., Jonathan S. Landay, Cheney Confirms That Detainees Were Subjected to Water-
Boarding, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Oct. 25, 2006, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/190/story/
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and prolonged stress positions, as well as other conduct that while not rising
to the level of torture constituted cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment.13  The faulty reasoning of those legal memoranda enabled real-world
destruction enacted upon the bodies of the prisoners.
Through the infliction of pain, torture not only damages the body and
the mind, it is, as Elaine Scarry has described, "world-destroying."' 34 As
Scarry writes:
It is the intense pain that destroys a person's self and world, a destruction ex-
perienced spatially as either the contraction of the universe down to the imme-
diate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling to fill the entire universe.
Intense pain is also language destroying; as the content of one's world disinte-
grates, so the content of one's language disintegrates; as the self disintegrates,
so that which would express and project the self is robbed of its source and its
subj ect. "'
Thus, physical erasure also eliminates the intelligible voice, reducing hu-
man speech to the primordial expression of pain, "a state anterior
to language."'36
In addition to these erasures of the body, mind, and self, torture at
Guantdinamo has achieved a third form of physical erasure, for the very fact
of the prisoners' torture necessitated their concealment. The historical re-
treat of torture from respectability means that it must be performed in hid-
ing,' layering one more curtain over the already shrouded bodies of the
Guant~inamo prisoners.
14893.html (quoting then-Vice President Cheney confirming the use of waterboarding and stating that
its use is "'a no-brainer').
132 See supra note 28.
133 See generally JAMEEL JAFFER & AMRIT SINGH, ADMINISTRATION OF TORTURE: A
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM WASHINGTON TO ABU GHRAIB AND BEYOND 44 (2007) (collecting gov-
ernment documents, many obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union through Freedom of Infor-
mation Act litigation, relating to U.S. detention and interrogation practices); KRISTIAN WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN METHODS (2006) (discussing U.S. interrogation practices); THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg, Joshua L. Dratel & Anthony Lewis eds., 2005) (collecting
primary sources related to U.S. interrogation practices).
134 ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 29 (1995).
135 Id. at 35.
136 Id. at 4.
137 As Paul Kahn has written:
With the disappearance of the penal spectacle [when torture was carried out publicly] the practice
of torture became a secret practice ... occur[ing) in places closed to public regard, under condi-
tions of deniability, and by agents whose own relationship to the state is likely to be "shadowy."
The modem phenomenon of torture has the opaque presence of the "deniable." It must be known
but not seen; it must be spoken of but never speak itself. It is a political practice that cannot exist
in a public space. Nevertheless, to be effective the threat of torture must taint the public space. It
is always just beyond view.
PAUL W. KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE 3 (2008) (footnote omitted).
1715
103:1683 (2009)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
II. TECHNIQUES OF LEGAL ERASURE: LEGAL ABSURDISM AND
RADICAL INDETERMINACY
Having established the multiple forms of erasure that constitute the de-
humanization of Guantdnamo, in this Part I focus on legal erasure and the
deployment of law in the deprivation of rights. I first offer a description
and critique of the military commission system based on my experience
representing Omar Khadr, paying particular attention to the absurdist ten-
dencies of the thinly conceived commissions. I then discuss the legal inde-
terminacy of core legal concepts in the Bush Administration's Guantdnamo
regime and argue that the Administration's tendency toward legal invention
further undermined Guantdnamo, even as the Administration reached for
law's mantle of legitimacy.
A. Legal Erasure Through Legal Absurdism: The Military Commissions
It has become a commonplace to describe Guantdnamo as Kafkaesque.
Indeed the official narrative of Guantdinamo bears an uncanny resemblance
to the literary narrative of The Trial. 3 As one scholar has written:
If there is anything that is assuredly and appropriately "Kafkaesque," it would
be a situation of indefinite detention, where one is not formally charged, where
one is obstructed in seeking counsel, where various machinations keep an in-
dividual from having his or her "day in court," and where, all the while, one is
being secretly and separately "judged," either in a formal sense (by the state)
or more informally by the community of observers who are invited to infer
guilt based on the status or mark of the putative offender.'
39
Absurdity abounds at Guantinamo. Before Rasul, iguanas were pro-
tected under the Endangered Species Act but prisoners were protected by no
law. 4 ° Under pressure from the federal courts, the Bush Administration de-
termined that several men, whose "enemy combatant" status had never been
substantiated, were "no longer enemy combatants," even though, as a feder-
al judge noted, they had never been "enemy combatants" in the first
place. "' A habeas lawyer was falsely accused of smuggling contraband,
138 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Edwin Muir & Willa Muir trans., Schocken Books 1968) (1925).
139 Brian Pinaire, The Essential Kajka: Definition, Distention, and Dilution in Legal Rhetoric, 46 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 113, 154-55 (2007). The Kafkaesque quality of Guantnamo is similarly captured
in STEVEN T. WAX, KAFKA COMES TO AMERICA 176-77 (2008). For an insightful discussion of the tac-
tics used by the government to disrupt lawyers' relationships with their clients at Guantnamo, and the
ethical challenges of representing prisoners there, see David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guan-
tdnano, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (2008). For a more personal account of such challenges, see Marc Fal-
koff, This Is To Whom It May Concern: A Guantdnamo Narrative, I DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 153 (2008).
140 See Brief for Petitioners at 36 n.62, Al Odah v. United States, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03 -343),
2004 WL 96764 (noting applicability of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006), to Cu-
ban iguanas at Guantinamo); Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(No. 03-334) (Justice Souter noting, "We even protect the Cuban iguana.").
141 See Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198, 200 (D.D.C. 2005).
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namely, a pair of athletic underwear, in to a prisoner, ostensibly by wearing
them in himself.'42 The list is endless.
The invocation of Kafka, as well as Sartre and Lewis Carroll, speaks
not only to the absurdist tendencies of Guantdnamo, but more broadly to the
absurdist tendencies of unchecked legal regimes. In the existential crises of
The Trial or No Exit,'43 and in the topsy-turvy universe of Alice in Wonder-
land,1" nonsensical worlds are established through rules, and seeming law-
lessness is established by and through law. What troubles readers of the
existentialist texts, and amuses readers of the absurd, is the insistence on in-
ternal logic even as the rules they create are logically disjoined from histo-
ry, lived experience, liberal expectations, and common sense. Alice's world
is a wonderland only because it is so at odds with her, and her reader's,
conventions and expectations. And yet, the conceit of all three texts is to
demonstrate how an elaborate though opaque set of rules can reconstruct
reality, in a bid to reconstitute normalcy. It is Josef K., Garcin, and Alice
who are made to feel foolish, not their keepers. Thus these texts launch into
a narrative contest with the known and understood worlds of their readers.
Similarly, the law of Guantdnamo is embedded in the story of Guantdnamo,
and that story is made and remade through narrative contest.
As lawyers began to penetrate Guantinamo in the fall of 2004, they
learned and exposed prisoner stories of torture and abuse, of mistake and
innocence, and of lawless detention, thereby disrupting the government's
master narrative of terror. Habeas lawyers' access to the prisoners threw
Guantdnamo into a new realm of narrative contest, one in which the gov-
ernment participated vigorously, largely through storytelling.
One story the government told was that Guantdinamo was a humane
and effective interrogation center. This narrative sought to counter allega-
tions of torture and abuse by advancing a commitment to a nonconfronta-
tional, collaborative model of interrogation, and to counter demands for
Guantdnamo's closure by arguing that it continues to yield valuable human
intelligence in the fight against terrorism. 45 To tell this story, the govern-
ment has let reporters and members of Congress observe an interrogation
142 See Clive Stafford-Smith, Editorial, America's Legal Black Hole, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, at
A27.
143 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, No EXIT, AND THREE OTHER PLAYS (Lionel Abel trans., Vintage Books
1955) (1944).
144 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (Grosset & Dunlap
1946) (1865).
145 See Neil A. Lewis, Fresh Details Emerge on Harsh Methods at Guantnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
1, 2005, at Al 1 ("Military officials have gone to great lengths to portray Guanthnamo as a largely hu-
mane facility for several hundred prisoners, where the harshest sanctioned punishments consisted of iso-
lation or taking away items like blankets, toothpaste, dessert, or reading material. Maj. Gen. Geoffrey
D. Miller, who was the commander of the Guantinamo operation from November 2002 to March 2004,
regularly told visiting members of Congress and journalists that the approach was designed to build trust
between the detainee and his questioner.").
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(something they have refused to permit the prisoners' lawyers to do). And
yet, as Neil Lewis reported in the New York Times, these interrogations ap-
pear to have been staged:
Journalists who were permitted to view an interview session from be-
hind a glass wall ... were shown an interrogator and detainee sharing a
milkshake and fries from the base's McDonald's and appearing to chat
amiably. It became apparent to reporters comparing notes in August
[2005], however, that the tableau of the interrogator and prisoner shar-
ing a McDonald's meal was presented to at least three sets of journal-
ists.46
What Lewis and other journalists witnessed was a set piece, one more at-
tempt to construct and conceal reality, not unlike the high-end interrogation
room in which I met Omar in 2005.
Nowhere was the staging of Guantinamo more evident than in the
military commissions. Whereas the vast majority of Guantdnamo prisoners
have never been charged with a crime, and likely never will be, the gov-
ernment has charged a select few, including Omar, with alleged war
crimes,'47 to be tried by military commission. Trials are so common a fea-
ture in our popular culture that it is difficult not to view them through a
theatrical lens. In the military commissions, however, theater was not
merely a metaphor, but an ambition. The general suspicions that attach to
military trials,' coupled with the gross procedural and substantive irregu-
larities of these military commissions, have led critics to call the proceed-
ings nothing more than show trials. Mindful of this criticism, and seeking
to rebut it, the Bush Administration sought to bolster the commissions' legi-
timacy, and in so doing, only further undermined it.
The commission process was established by presidential order in No-
vember 2001,"1 and the first prisoners were charged and referred before a
146 Id.
147 See infra Part Il.B.2 for a discussion of the indeterminacy of war crimes as charged by the Bush
Administration.
148 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drlI/rls/hrrpt/2005/61567.htm
(documenting the "questionable" use in military trials of evidence obtained through torture); U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, PERU, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994 (Feb. 1995), available at
http://www.freelori.org/gov/statedept/94_perureport.html ("Proceedings in military courts do not meet
internationally accepted standards for due process. Military trials are closed to the public and carried
out in secrecy.").
149 Presidential Military Order, supra note 71. For a comprehensive history and critique of the mili-
tary commission system, see David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil
Over the Guantdnamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131 (2008) [hereinafter Da-
vid Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound]; Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape After Hamdan: The
Creation of Homeland Security Courts, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 1 (2006); Detlev F. Vagts,
Military Commissions: A Concise History, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 35 (2007); see also Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259,
1260 (2002) (contending that the President's order for the trial of suspected terrorists is "flatly unconsti-
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commission in 2004.50 From the very beginning, the commissions were
plagued by accusations of structural unfairness, inadequate protections for
defendants, and rules that seemed to change at whim.'5 ' Many of these
charges were vindicated by the Supreme Court's wholesale invalidation of
the commissions in Hamdan. In their original incarnation,'52 the commis-
sion rules permitted testimony obtained through torture,'53 the liberal use of
secret evidence, and exclusion of the defendant from his own trial.'54 Eva-
tutional"); David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st Century
Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REv. 2005 (2003) (arguing that to comport with legal norms of the
twenty-first century and ensure due process, military commissions should have the same procedure as
courts martial).
150 See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Charges Two at Guantdnamo With Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2004, at Al (reporting that Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al-Bahlul and Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-
Qosi were the first two detainees at Guantinamo Bay charged by the Pentagon); see also News Release,
U.S. Dep't of Def., Two Guantanamo Detainees Charged (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7088 (reporting the two were charged).
151 See, e.g., Eugene R. Fidell, Dwight H. Sullivan & Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commission Law,
2005 ARMY LAW 47 (2005) (noting that "the commission system's rules are subject to continuous
change and, in fact, have been revised in sometimes internally-inconsistent ways" (footnote omitted));
David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating Military
Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 55, 58 (2006) ("[T]hough President Bush mandated that the
Guantanamo tribunals provide a 'full and fair trial,' observers documented that commissioners essential-
ly made up procedures as the trials proceeded, and that even the presiding officers seemed unable to ar-
ticulate the legal regimes governing their courts." (footnotes omitted)); Neil A. Lewis, Lawyer Says
Detainees Face Unfair System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at A25; Memorandum from Amnesty Int'l, to
the U.S. Gov't, The Rights of People in U.S. Custody in Afghanistan and Guantdinamo Bay (Apr. 2002),
http://www.amnesty.orglen/library/asset/AMR51/053/2002/en/c92423a1 -d868-1 Idd-9df8-936c9068
4588/amr510532002en.pdf; Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 03-04
(2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b4l5ea3a64852566d6000daa79/
ethicsopinions/$FILE/EthicsOp_03-04.pdf; Nat'l Inst. of Mil. Just., Statement on Civilian Attorney
Participation as Defense Counsel in Military Commissions (2003), available at http://www.nimj.com/
documents/NIMJCiv AttyParticipationStatement.pdf.
152 The rules governing the military commissions have changed considerably, and nearly constantly,
since they were announced by the Presidential Military Order issued in November 2001. See supra note
71. Seemingly in the face of public criticism, the Pentagon issued a series of sometimes contradictory
rules and instructions which provided some additional detail on the procedures to be used. See David
Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound, supra note 149 (chronicling the unfolding rules of the commissions).
Following the invalidation of the military commissions by the Supreme Court in Hamdan, Congress's
enactment of the MCA established new rules. Id. at 174-85. On May 15, 2009, President Obama stated
that he would continue the use of military commissions and announced yet another set of new rules. See
Statement of President Barack Obama on Military Commissions, supra note 13.
153 See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
154 As a plurality of the Court explained in Hamdan:
The accused and his civilian counsel may be excluded from, and precluded from ever learning
what evidence was presented during, any part of the proceeding that either the Appointing Author-
ity or the presiding officer decides to "close." Grounds for such closure "include the protection of
information classified or classifiable... ; information protected by law or rule from unauthorized
disclosure; the physical safety of participants in Commission proceedings, including prospective
witnesses; intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and other national se-
curity interests."... Appointed military defense counsel must be privy to these closed sessions,
but may, at the presiding officer's discretion, be forbidden to reveal to his or her client what took
place therein.
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luating the military commission system in its early incarnation, Professor
Mary Cheh posed the baseline questions, and provided a terse and unambi-
guous answer: "Are the military commissions rigged? Are they fixed or ar-
ranged in a way to produce a desired result? Are they irregular courts in
which accepted procedures are perverted and defense counsel's hands tied?
In a word, yes."' 55 Mounting domestic..6 and international' 57 criticism, some
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 614 (2006) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting from and
citing to Military Commission Order No. I § 6(B)(3) (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf [hereinafter MCO No. 1]). But see id at 654
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that MCO No. I § 6(D)(5)(b) does not permit admission of secret
evidence if such admission would deprive defendant of a "full and fair trial"); id at 722-23 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (same).
155 Mary Cheh, Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems? The Case of the Military Commis-
sions, 1 J. NAT'L. SECURITY L. & POL'Y 375, 378 (2005). As Cheh notes, however, there were those
who believed the commissions to meet fundamental standards of justice. Id. at 378-79 n. 17. Notably,
Judge James Robertson, the district court judge in Hamdan, who ruled that Salim Hamdan could not be
tried by military commission because his prisoner of war status had not been determined by a "compe-
tent tribunal," stated, "In most respects, the procedures established for the Military Commission at
Guantinamo under the President's order define a trial forum that looks appropriate and even reassuring
when seen through the lens of American jurisprudence." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152,
166 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
156 The American Bar Association was among the first organizations to raise concerns about the use
of military commissions system. See ABA TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & THE LAW, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS (Jan. 4, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/military.pdf; ABA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2 (Aug. 2 2003), available at http://www.nimj.com/documents/
ABACDCCorrectedFinRepRec FULL 0803.pdf (noting that the military commission rules "as
now drafted, do not sufficiently guarantee that CDC [civilian defense counsel] will be able to render
zealous, competent, and effective assistance of counsel to detainees"); Letter from William H. Neukom,
President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to the President of the United States (Feb. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/antiterror/2008feb27 detaineesl.pdf. The National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York have also been im-
portant critics. See Nat'l Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Ethics Advisory Comm., Opinion 03-04 (2003);
Letter from Barry M. Kamins, President, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, to Senator Patrick
Leahy et al. (Mar. 12, 2008), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Guantanamo MC311 .pdf.
157 Perhaps most notable among the international criticism was that from the United Kingdom,
whose attorney general, Lord Peter Goldsmith, objected publicly in 2004 to the use of military commis-
sions for British citizens then detained at Guant~namo, stating:
[W]hile we must be flexible and be prepared to countenance some limitation of fundamental rights
if properly justified and proportionate, there are certain principles on which there can be no com-
promise.
Fair trial is one of those-which is the reason we in the U.K. have been unable to accept that
the U.S. military tribunals proposed for those detained at Guantanamo Bay offer sufficient guaran-
tees of a fair trial in accordance with international standards.
Attorney Gen. Lord Peter Goldsmith, Address at the Cour de Cassation on the Centenary of the Entante
Cordiale, (June 25, 2004), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/3839153.stm. See
also Lord Johan Steyn, Judicial Member, British House of Lords, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black
Hole, 27th F.A. Mann Lecture (Nov. 25, 2003), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/
guantanamo.pdf (arguing that the treatment of prisoners at Guant.nanio does not comply with interna-
tional standards for fair trials).
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of it coming from within the commission prosecutor's own office,'58 exerted
enormous pressure on the government to shore up the legitimacy of the
commission process, much of which was done on a purely cosmetic level.
The government went to great lengths to make the commissions look
as much like real courts as possible, even as they were emptied of the subs-
tantive rights that ordinarily inhere in a courtroom.'59 Although there was
no judge in these proceedings, the presiding officer was ordered to wear a
robe ' (and ours carried a gavel); although this was a commission and not a
court, the commission room, formerly a dental clinic, 6' was swathed with
blue velvet curtains and rich, dark wood furniture so as to look like a cour-
troom. The curtains only went two thirds of the way up the painted cinder
block wall-just high enough to fill the frame of the closed-circuit video
cameras. For those of us appearing as defense lawyers in the commissions,
we knew we were on a hastily constructed set, where costume and props
and scenic design attempted to consecrate the once-barren space. In our
very first commission session, we were handed a document listing speaking
parts for the presiding officer, the lawyers, and our client, and ordered, with
no apparent sense of irony, to follow "the script."' 62
This crude staging recalls the insights of Peter Gabel and Paul Harris,
who have noted the deployment of a "tableau of authoritarian symbols" by
legal systems in order to self-legitimize. 63 Describing this phenomenon of
self-legitimation, they write:
[A]ll forms of serious social conflict are channeled into public settings that are
heavily laden with ritual and authoritarian symbolism. Each discrete conflict
is treated as an isolated "case"; the participants are brought before a judge in a
black robe who sits elevated from the rest, near a flag to which everyone in the
room has pledged allegiance each day as a child; the architecture of the cour-
troom is awesome in its severity and in its evocation of historical tradition; the
158 See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
159 In November 2006, the Bush Administration proposed spending up to $125 million to build new
commission facilities at Guantfinamo. See Federal Business Opportunities, Legal Compound at Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba, http://www.fbo.gov (follow "Opportunities" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 17, 2009).
The proposal was subsequently shelved after it became public and faced criticism from the newly
elected Congress. See Carol Rosenberg, Plans to Build Courthouse at Guantdnamo Bay Revised, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 10, 2006, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/1377/story/320156.html.
160 See Email from Major Gen. John Altenburg, Jr., Appointing Auth. for Military Comm'ns, to
Keith Hodges, Assistant to the Presiding Officers (Jan. 5, 2006, 12:51 EST) (on file with author) ("Pre-
siding Officers will wear black judicial robes like those worn by Military Judges at Army and Air Force
courts-martial and by civilian judges throughout the United States.").
161 See Neil A. Lewis, Pentagon Charges 5 More in Guantrnamo Bay Camp, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8,
2005, at A22.
162 See Email from Keith Hodges, Assistant to the Presiding Officers, to Chief Prosecutor, Chief
Defense Counsel, and Chief Paralegals for Prosecution and Defense (Jan. 3, 2006) (on file with author)
(attaching trial script developed by the Office of the Presiding Officers).
163 Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the
Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 373 (1982-83).
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language spoken is highly technical and intelligible only to the select few who
have been "admitted to the Bar." This spectacle of symbols is both frightening
and perversely exciting. It signifies to people that those in power deserve to be
there by virtue of their very majesty and vast learning. When disseminated
throughout the culture (through, for example, the schools and the media), these
symbols help to generate a belief not only in the authority of the law, but in au-
thority in general."
The Gabel and Harris critique exposes the ritual and symbolism deeply
embedded in longstanding legal systems, and the role that they play in
upholding and perpetuating obedience to political authority. At Guantfina-
mo, however, the commissions were erected on a nearly blank slate: the last
American military commission was convened in 1942.65 Thus, the com-
missions at Guantinamo did not require the excavation of sociocultural arti-
facts buried deep within the legal system. Rather, because we were
witnessing the creation of a legal system nearly from scratch, the installa-
tion and instantiation of authority were on blatant display.
In the commissions, the trappings of law substituted for law itself. At
every turn, the government maintained that the prisoners at Guantdnamo
had no rights whatsoever, under any source of law, even when they were
being tried criminally. Moreover, while the Bush Administration claimed it
had legal authority to convene the commissions (a position repudiated by
the Supreme Court in Hamdan),66 there were few formal rules governing
the commission. The only substantive requirement for the commissions
was that they be "full and fair," '67 a phrase that the prosecution and the pre-
siding officer repeated ad nauseum, 16 ' and one that expanded, or more typi-
cally contracted, to meet the particular substantive challenge being raised.
Despite the protests of defense lawyers, the commissions operated with
virtually no rules of evidence, no discovery rules, no rules of decision, and
no rules regarding precedent. Thus, not only was positive law in short
supply, so, too, was any sense as to what interpretive practices would be
followed by the commissions or what precedential value a decision in one
commission would have in the same trial, in another trial before the same
presiding officer, or in a trial before a different presiding officer. While any
newly created legal system is bound to encounter initial problems, the fail-
ure of the commission system to contemplate or address these fundamental
issues of adjudication suggests how poorly designed it was.
164 Id. at 372 (footnote omitted).
165 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
166 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593-94 (2006).
167 Presidential Military Order, supra note 71, at 57,835.
168 Carol Rosenberg, War-Crimes Hearings Resume in Controversy, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 16, 2006,
at 25A (quoting military defense attorney, Army Maj. Tom Fleener, "If I hear 'full and fair trial' one
more time, it's going to make me sick.").
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Our military co-counsel, Lieutenant Colonel Colby Vokey, attempted
to gain some clarity on the question of what jurisprudence would be rele-
vant to the decision-making of the commission. In the course of voir dire of
the presiding officer, he attempted to learn what case law, if any-domestic
or international, criminal or civil, military or civilian-would be followed,
to which the presiding officer responded, "If you want to know if... a par-
ticular case is applicable or a point of law, file a motion and I will decide it
based on the briefs and the arguments and the law."'69 Leaving aside the
circularity of this argument, it contemplates counsel divining the law
through a system of pinging-motions citing various cases like so many
bursts of energy issuing into an ocean of unknowable dimension, with the
hope that they might actually hit something and signal the existence and lo-
cation of applicable law.
Unlike an established system of law, where the parties might seek to
distinguish other cases factually or legally from the one being litigated, the
commission system's fundamental principles of jurisprudence were un-
known. The commissions were thus a common law system at time zero,
boundless in its potential, but entirely bereft of guidance as to how the law
might actually evolve. The result was a lack of predictability and a corres-
ponding manipulability, both of which undermined the system as a whole.
Our faith in the system had never been very strong. In the several
months of Omar's commission case, we filed nearly forty motions, includ-
ing motions to adopt the rules of discovery and rules of evidence applicable
in courts-martial. The commission never decided these motions, and many
other substantive ones like it, before the Hamdan decision came down. One
decision it did issue, however, is worthy of mention. We had moved to dis-
qualify the commission's appointing authority (the rough equivalent of a
convening authority in courts-martial) for bias, and in support of that mo-
tion had moved for the production of the appointing authority in order to
demonstrate his bias through examination. The presiding officer denied our
motion to produce the appointing authority, finding that we had proffered
169 Draft Transcript of Proceedings at 447, United States v. Omar Ahmed Khadr (No. 05008) (Apr.
5, 2006) (on file with author). Later in the same proceeding, the presiding officer elaborated:
I think that we will look to international law, I think that we will look through military law, I think
that we will look through federal criminal law, I think that we will look at a lot of sources to-to
flesh out the procedural rules that govern this proceeding. The purpose or the obligation of coun-
sel is that as they see issues and they need it resolved, they file motions, they brief motions, they
cite what they think is appropriate authority, and then I decide it. If counsel have a question as to
the-what law is applicable, then-then it's their obligation to file a motion.
Id. at 448.
This approach stands in sharp contrast to that taken by the Supreme Court in Hayburn's Case. See
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). Only two years after the Court was formed, the Attorney General asked the
Court what "system of practice" it would follow, to which the Court responded, "The Court considers
the practice of the Courts of King's Bench and Chancery in England as affording outlines for the prac-
tice of this court; and that they will, from time to time, make such alterations therein, as circumstances
may render necessary." Id. at 411,413-14. My thanks to Gautam Huded for this example.
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only the areas on which we would question the witness, and not what the
witness would actually say."' We subsequently renewed our motion, noting
in passing that the requirement that we state what the witness would say in
order to obtain his production for the purposes of examining him had "an
Alice in Wonderland quality" to it. 7' The next day, the presiding officer re-
jected this filing, holding that the Alice in Wonderland reference was "pa-
tently disrespectful of' the commission and the presiding officer, and as
such would be moved to "the inactive section of the filings inventory." '
By uttering the words "Alice in Wonderland," we unwittingly had made the
motion disappear.
This ruling was among the last official actions taken by the commis-
sion before the Supreme Court shut it down. Tellingly, the ruling reflected
a preoccupation with the dignity of the commission, as a stand-in for legi-
timacy, and demonstrated the speed with which the commission could move
if it wanted, even as our substantive motions languished. Indeed, the com-
mission system had issued a rule ordering that the commission be treated
with dignity.'73 The Court established the illegitimacy of the commissions
less than a week later, suspending all issues before the commission, subs-
tantive and frivolous alike, though not before we filed a revised motion in-
cluding an appendix of the hundreds of Supreme Court decisions and briefs
and federal appellate, district, and state court opinions that reference Alice
in Wonderland"' The Alice in Wonderland appendix was both cheeky and
plainly serious, for it was meant to suggest that an established legal system,
secure in its own legitimacy, would not be so easily offended.
170 Ruling on Defense Motion for the Production of Witness John D. Altenburg, Jr. at 2, United
States v. Khadr (June 7, 2006) (on file with author).
171 Defense Renewed Motion to Compel Production of Witness John D. Altenburg, Jr. at 1, United
States v. Khadr (June 21, 2006) (on file with author).
172 Ruling on Defense Motion to Renew Their Motion for the Production of Mr. Altenberg [sic),
United States v. Khadr (June 22, 2006) (on file with author).
173 U.S. Dep't of Def., Presiding Officers Memorandum #16, Rules of Commission Trial Practice
Concerning Decorum of Commission Personnel, Parties, and Witnesses 2 (Feb. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/d200602I7POM16.pdf [hereinafter POM 16] (stating that
"[t]he decorum and dignity to be observed by all at the proceedings of these Military Commissions will
be the same as that observed in military and Federal courts of the United States").
POM 16 specifically mandates that "[aill communications, whether written or oral, should be
couched in civil, non-sarcastic language, focusing on the factual or legal disputes." Id. at 5 (emphasis
added).
174 Defense Renewed Motion to Compel Production of Witness Mr. John D. Altenburg, Jr., United
States v. Khadr (Revised) (June 26, 2006). The D.C. Circuit has since invoked Lewis Carroll to deride
the government's use of unreliable evidence in its attempt to establish enemy combatancy:
[The government suggests that several of the assertions in the intelligence documents are reliable
because they are made in at least three different documents. We are not persuaded. Lewis Carroll
notwithstanding, the fact that the government has "said it thrice" does not make an allegation true.
See LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK 3 (1876) ("I have said it thrice: What I tell you
three times is true.").
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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The Supreme Court's invalidation of the military commission system
in Hamdan led Congress to authorize a new system under the MCA,'75 thus
overcoming the Court's objection that the original commissions lacked
congressional authorization.'76 In 2007, a new military commission system
was unveiled'77 to renewed criticism, including sharp accusations of politi-
cal interference in the system made by its former chief prosecutor, Air
Force Colonel Morris Davis.7 While the new commission system resolved
some of the problems of its predecessors, it remained deeply flawed, and
criticisms such as Colonel Davis's fueled domestic and international con-
cerns about its legitimacy. Nonetheless, the commission system did man-
age to bring a case to completion in August 2008, that of Osama Bin
Laden's driver, Salim Hamdan. That case, which featured closed proceed-
ings and secret witnesses, ended in a conviction of Hamdan for providing
175 See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-950 (2006).
176 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590-95 (2006).
177 Omar Khadr was re-charged under the new commission system. United States v. Khadr, Charge
Sheet, Apr. 5, 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2007/Khadrreferral.pdf. Howev-
er, the charges against him were subsequently dismissed after a military judge concluded that he lacked
jurisdiction over the case. See United States v. Khadr, Order on Jurisdiction, June 4, 2007, available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Brownback6-4-07.pdf (dismissing charges for lack of
jurisdiction); United States v. Khadr, Disposition of Prosecution Motion for Reconsideration P 001, June
29, 2007, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2007/06/courtl .html (denying
government's motion to reconsider, and providing fuller explanation of dismissal of charges). Although
the decision was subsequently overturned on appeal, United States v. Khadr, CMCR No. 07-001, Sept.
24, 2007, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/CMCR%20ruling%209-24-
07.pdf, and the case against Omar continued, these decisions suggested a greater measure of rigor to the
post-MCA system. However, the commissions remained the target of criticism, and on his first day in
office, President Obama ordered military prosecutors to seek a 120-day continuance in all pending mili-
tary commission cases, including Omar's. See United States v. Khadr, Government Motion: Request for
120-Day Continuance in the Interests of Justice, Jan. 20, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/P%2001 1.pdf (arguing that continuance is "in the interests of justice,
as it will permit the newly inaugurated President and his Administration to undertake a thorough review
of both the pending cases and the military commissions process generally"); Peter Finn, Obama Seeks
Halt to Legal Proceedings at Guantanamo, WASH. POST., Jan. 21, 2009, at A2.
178 See Josh White, From Chief Prosecutor to Critic at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2008,
at Al (relating comments by Davis that Pentagon officials pressured him to bring cases that could have
"strategic political value" in an election year). Colonel Davis took the unusual step of testifying about
his claims of political interference in the military commission proceedings for Salim Hamdan. Id. Da-
vis is not the only military critic. Army Brigadier General Gregory Zanetti, the deputy commander of
the military task force running the detention operation at Guantinamo, has stated, "The strategy seemed
to be spray and pray, let's go, speed, speed, speed .... Charge 'em, charge 'em, charge 'er and let's
pray that we can pull this off." Jane Sutton, Guantanamo Trials Put Generals at Odds, REUTERS, Aug.
13, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN1 337894520080813. Zanet-
ti went on to describe Brigadier General Thomas Hartmann, the legal advisor to the military commis-
sions convening authority, as "abusive, bullying and unprofessional." Id. Hartmann has insisted that he
"viewed it as his mission to get the trials moving but in a fair and transparent manner. He acknowledged
telling prosecutors he wanted cases that would 'capture the public's imagination."' Id.
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material support for terrorism.179 And yet, rather than enhancing the com-
missions' legitimacy, the conviction and its accompanying sentence seemed
to diminish them further, as news accounts focused on two facts: first, that
the first "war on terror" war crime tribunal resulted in a five-and-a-half-year
sentence, for which Hamdan was given credit for all but five months; and
second, that the government maintained that even after completing the re-
maining months of his sentence, Hamdan might still be detained indefinite-
ly as an "enemy combatant."'8 °
B. Legal Erasure Through Radical Indeterminacy
The stated rationale for the use of military commissions at Guanttna-
mo rather than established courts was that the "war on terrorism" made the
application of ordinary standards of justice impracticable. 8' This exception
to the standard rules of criminal justice with regard to commissions tracks a
broader argument of exceptionalism with regard to the "war on terrorism,"
according to which the different, and exigent, nature of terrorism's threat
necessitates deviation from ordinary principles of law. This "state of excep-
tion," as Carl Schmitt termed the phenomenon in 1930s Germany,'82 pre-
supposes emergency, and by its own terms promises to be temporary.
Schmitt famously described the sovereign as he who has the power to de-
cide the state of exception.'83 And yet, as Giorgio Agamben argues, the his-
tory of the state of exception is one of unrelenting expansion, self-
justification, and self-perpetuation until the state of exception becomes
permanent.'84 As others have noted, the inauguration of a seemingly per-
179 See William Glaberson, Panel Convicts Bin Laden Driver in Split Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2008, at Al.
180 See id A New York Times editorial lambasted the government for pursuing its case against such
a low-level figure as Hamdan, and for affording so substandard a trial, concluding: "Mr. Bush's suppor-
ters have been crowing over the Hiamdan verdict as if it were some kind of a triumph. In truth, it is a
hollow victory in the war on terror, a blow to America's standards of justice and image in the world."
Editorial, The United States v. the Driver, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2008, at WK9. In November 2008,
Hamdan was sent to Yemen to serve out his remaining unsuspended sentence, and in January 2009, he
was released by the Yemeni government. Yemen Frees Former bin Laden Driver After Jail Term Ends,
REUTERS, Jan. 11, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSTRE50A2JR2009
0111.
181 See Presidential Military Order, supra note 71, at 57,833 ("Given the danger to the safety of the
United States and the nature of international terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under this or-
der, I find consistent with section 836 of title 10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in
military commissions under this order the principles of law and the rles of evidence generally recog-
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.").
182 See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY
1-15 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1934).
183 Id.
184 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005).
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manent "war on terrorism" transforms the exception into the prevailing pa-
radigm of governance. 85
Agamben demonstrates that the theoretical difficulty with the state of
exception is that it cannot exist strictly within or strictly outside of law: ei-
ther the positive law sanctions the exception, in which case law is donut-
shaped, or the exception is extralegal, in which case the exercise of ex-
panded state power in times of emergency demonstrates the limits of law's
dominion. 86 Law and lawlessness are inextricably linked, not unlike the
normalcy of small-town Guantdnamo and the deviance of the camps.
How, then, are we to understand the relationship between law and law-
lessness? How do we know when a state of exception is sanctioned by law,
and when it is not? As I have suggested previously, law instantiates norms;
it is normalizing.'87 But the domain of law is, by necessity, constituted by
reference to the lawless. At Guantdnamo, we see that law is all around, but
it only reaches so far. To use the law to place someone outside of it is to
reveal law's limit, the lawlessness of law.'88 The question of where those
limits are drawn, however, is political, cultural, and historical, and not fun-
damentally juridical. Mark Tushnet suggests that because the terms regulat-
ing states of exception are typically subject to interpretation (i.e., what
constitutes an emergency?), the interpretation of those terms is bound to be
political.'89 In this sense, "states of exception are ones in which politics rep-
laces law."' 9° But as Tushnet also notes, if one accepts the central insight of
Legal Realism, that politics always displaces law, then there are no states of
exception.' Rather, "[e]mergencies merely surface the usually hidden role
of politics in determining the content of law."'92
Gerald Neuman similarly has criticized "anomalous zones" such as
Guantdnamo, which he describes as "geographical exceptions to policies
185 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA.
L. REv. 699 (2006).
186 See Stephen Humphreys, Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben's State of Exception,
17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677, 678 (2006) (book review) (discussing two schools of thought regarding the state
of exception as identified by Agamben).
187 See supra Part I.A.
188 Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain provide an insightful analysis of how a constitutive lawlessness
of law can benefit a criminal defendant. See Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness:
George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307 (2004).
They describe executive clemency as "lawful lawlessness" and ask, "How does a system of rules under-
stand and accommodate the exercise of a power that is by its very nature unbound by rules?" Id. at
1314.
189 Mark Tushnet, Meditations on Carl Schmitt, 40 GA. L. REv. 877, 886 (2006); see also Levinson,
supra note 185, at 736 ("I increasingly believe ... that the discussion of emergency powers is ultimately
a profoundly political one, with law, at least as traditionally conceived, having relatively little to do with
the resolution of any truly live controversy.").
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otherwise regarded as fundamental."' 93 Consistent with Tushnet's analysis,
Neuman warns that such zones "may become, quite literally, sites of contes-
tation of the polity's fundamental values,"'94 thus revealing the political di-
mension to such suspensions of law.
And yet, while Guantdnamo may resonate with latent dynamics in law
more generally, it is an extreme example of law's submission to politics.
Indeed, the military commissions seemingly are a mathematical proof of the
central theorems of Critical Legal Studies: law transparently manufactured
by, and covering for, politics; legal process intended to meet political goals;
a radically indeterminate system based upon infinitely manipulable classifi-
cations; and seemingly neutral principles easily deployed by politicians in
service of prevailing power structures.'95
The central paradox of the commissions was exactly that addressed by
Agamben: the propagation of lawlessness through the exercise of law. As I
discussed previously,'96 the commission system lacked rules for the most
fundamental aspects of a trial, and what rules it had changed at whim. Be-
cause the system disavowed lineage to any extant common law system, it
was left no other option than to make up the law as it went along. This
"law" consisted of a steady flow of often contradictory directives from the
Secretary of Defense ("Military Commission Orders"), the Department of
Defense General Counsel ("Military Commission Instructions"), the Ap-
pointing Authority ("Appointing Authority Regulations" and "Appointing
Authority Orders"), and the presiding officers ("Presiding Officer Memo-
randa"). We were instructed to refer to these various rules as "Commission
Law," an invention that by its terminology, and capitalization, sought to en-
dow the commissions with the majesty and legitimacy of law.'97 This grasp
193 Neuman, supra note 84, at 1233.
194 Id.
195 See generally CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., 1987) (discussing
principal insights of Critical Legal Studies).
196 See supra Part II.A.
197 Our military co-counsel, Colonel Vokey, questioned the use of the term, "Commission Law," by
the presiding officer:
DC [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: By "Commission Law," sir, are you referring to the Military Commis-
sion Orders, the[-]?
PRESIDING OFFICER: Regulations, the Military Commission's Instructions, the Presidential Mili-
tary Order, the POMs [Presiding Officer Memoranda], and anything else that applies. We use
Commission Law as a shorthand for trying to encapsulate all that.
DC: All right, sir, but the term, "Commission Law," is not really law, is it?
PRESIDING OFFICER: Do you have a question, Colonel Vokey?
DC: Well the term, "Commission's Law," was that developed by yourself, or as a Presiding Offic-
er?
PRESIDING OFFICER: That's developed as a shorthand. I don't know where it came from originally.
I believe it does appear somewhere in either the POMs or MCIs [Military Commission Instruc-
tions] or somewhere, but I am not sure.
DC: All right, sir-
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for the mantle of law complemented the hastily decorated commission room
and judicially costumed presiding officers.
The intense struggle over what constituted "law" in the commissions,
and the government's attempt to label its ad hoc system as Law, reflect the
cultural, mythological, and political qualities that make law forever con-
tested and contingent. Robert Cover cogently described this phenomenon,
noting in particular the way in which the label of law can be legitimizing:
The word "law," itself, is always a primary object of contention. People argue
and fight over "what is law" because the term is a valuable resource in the en-
terprises that lead people to think and talk about law in the first place .... The
struggle over what is "law" is then a struggle over which social patterns can
plausibly be coated with a veneer which changes the very nature of that which
it covers up. There is not automatic legitimation of an institution by calling it
or what it produces "law," but the label is a move, the staking out of a position
in the complex social game of legitimation. The jurisprudential inquiry into
the question "what is law" is an engagement at one remove in the struggle over
what is legitimate.'98
As information about the inner workings of the commission system
emerged, it supported critics' suspicions that the system was designed to
produce convictions rather than do justice. When the commissions were
first established, military defense lawyers were assigned for the sole pur-
pose of convincing charged prisoners to plead guilty.'99 Emails from within
the prosecutor's office confirmed suspicions that the process would not
permit fair trials. As one prosecutor wrote:
[W]hen I volunteered to assist with this process and was assigned to this of-
fice, I expected there would at least be a minimal effort to establish a fair
process and diligently prepare cases against significant accused. Instead, I find
PRESIDING OFFICER: But again, Colonel Vokey, it is a shorthand, it is not intended as a term of art
or anything else. It is intended as a shorthand to capture the things that apply to this Commission.
DC: All right, sir. So for shorthand, we can use Military Commission's Regulations the same way?
PRESIDING OFFICER: I am not sure what you mean?
DC: Instead of calling it law, because you have to agree it is not law, right, sir?
PRESIDING OFFICER: No, I don't agree it is not law. If you want to call it, "regulations," then you
call it regulations. I am going to refer to it as "Commission Law," and I would hope that you
would be able to follow me. Let's move on, please.
Draft Transcript of Proceedings at 437-39, United States v. Khadr (No. 05008) (Apr. 5, 2006) (on file
with author).
198 Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 113, at 174-75 (footnotes omitted).
199 See Marie Brenner, Taking on Guantenamo, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2007, at 328, 335 (quoting
Judge Advocate General (JAG) defense attorney, Air Force Colonel Will Gunn, as stating: "It was made
clear to me that our access to [Guant~namo Bay] was contingent on our getting a guilty plea from [Sa-
lim] Hamdan"); Nat Hentoff, Eroding Detainees Rights; Administration Shows Disregard for Prisoners'
Attorneys, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at A19 ("Lt. Cmdr. Swift said he had been commanded by Pen-
tagon superiors to negotiate a guilty plea by Hamdan in 2003."); see also Neil A. Lewis, Military's Law-
yers for Detainees Put Tribunals on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at Al (quoting military defense
lawyers describing the tribunals as "fundamentally flawed" and "inherently unfair and rigged").
1729
103:1683 (2009)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
a halfhearted and disorganized effort by a skeleton group of relatively inexpe-
rienced attorneys to prosecute fairly low-level accused in a process that ap-
pears to be rigged.2°°
The chief prosecutor, who later resigned, was accused of stating repeatedly
to his office "that the military panel will be handpicked and will not acquit
these detainees. '20 1 His replacement would resign in protest, claiming that
Pentagon officials told him that the commission system could not tolerate
acquittals.0 2
As noted previously, the absence of an applicable jurisprudence left the
commission system of adjudication unbounded by principle and enabled the
easy deployment of seemingly neutral terms such as "rule of law" and "full
and fair" to political ends. Moreover, the relevant legal categories on which
detention, interrogation, and criminal liability were to be based were them-
selves radically indeterminate. As a signal example, the definition of
"enemy combatant"-the very basis for detention and interrogation at
Guantdnamo-has shifted dramatically over time, depending upon the
needs of the government in the particular political moment; under the Ob-
ama Administration, it has been abandoned in form if not in function.2 3
Rather than a static legal category, it has proven fluid and fundamentally
political. Similarly, the seemingly fixed meaning of "war crime," well es-
tablished in international law, has been redetermined by the administration.
Each of these examples is discussed in greater detail below.
1. The Indeterminacy of "Enemy Combatant. "--The "enemy comba-
tant" term emerged in popular parlance before the Bush Administration at-
tempted to endow it with legal meaning. Media accounts used the term to
describe suspected terrorists, and attributed it to Ex Parte Quirin."0 The
Bush Administration proffered at least six different definitions of the term,
often times conflating distinct categories established in international huma-
nitarian law.05 This debate has continued post-Boumediene, as that case
200 Email from Captain John Carr, Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel, to Colo-
nel Fred Borch, Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel (Mar. 15, 2004, 07:56 AM) (on
file with author).
201 Id.
202 See White, supra note 178 (reporting testimony from Colonel Morris Davis quoting Department
of Defense General Counsel William Haynes II as saying, "'We can't have acquittals .... We've been
holding these guys for years. How can we explain acquittals? We have to have convictions."').
203 See infra notes 232-233.
204 See, e.g., David G. Savage, Bush Order for Military Tribunals Gets Several Thumbs Down, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2001, at A26; William R. Slomanson, Should We Try Bin Laden in Court?, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 7, 2001, at B9.
205 Peter Jan Honigsberg, Chasing "Enemy Combatants " and Circumventing International Law: A
License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 46-70 (2007) (tracing the usage
of "enemy combatant").
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charged the lower courts with defining the term,"6 and eventually, the Ob-
ama Administration abandoned the term altogether. Rather than review
each etymological turn, I seek here to highlight three competing definitions,
each of which emerged to meet the political demands of the particu-
lar moment.
International humanitarian law distinguishes between lawful and un-
lawful belligerents, where lawfulness entitles the belligerent to prisoner of
war (POW) status upon capture and to immunity from prosecution under
domestic law for taking up arms.2" 7 Both lawful and unlawful combatants
may be detained for the duration of hostilities.0 The Bush Administra-
tion's use of "enemy combatant" at times conflated both categories,2 9 and
at other times seemed to create a third.
The presidential order purporting to authorize the detention of individ-
uals at Guantdnamo provides one important definition of "enemy comba-
206 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134, 135 (D.D.C. 2008) (Leon, J.) (consi-
dering a newly revised, and more expansive, definition of "enemy combatant" proffered by the govern-
ment, and a narrower definition proffered by prisoners' counsel, reporting the court's inclination to "end
up somewhere in the middle," and ultimately adopting the definition used in the Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunals (CSRTs)). For a discussion of the CSRTs, see infra note 220 and accompanying text.
The definition of "enemy combatant" has also been taken up by the Fourth Circuit. See AI-Marri v.
Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cit. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam), vacated as moot sub noma. Al-Marri v.
Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
207 See generally JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, I CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3-24 (Cambridge 2005) (explaining the distinctions between ci-
vilians and combatants); Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 65-68 (Deiter Fleck ed., 1995) (explaining the rules for
combatants and noncombatants in international law). International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is based on
a fundamental principle of distinction: all parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between comba-
tants and civilians. By definition, a combatant's status as a member of the armed forces of a party to an
armed conflict vests the individual with a right to directly engage in hostilities provided those acts com-
port with other IHL provisions governing lawful targets and methods of attack. Thus, in addition to en-
joying POW status, a legal presumption exists conferring immunity on lawful combatants for acts
committed during periods of armed conflict, in effect, barring prosecution of such combatants for the
"mere fact of fighting." Ipsen, supra, at 68. In contrast, a civilian's presumed status as a noncombatant
confers on him immunity from attack. But where a civilian directly participates in hostilities, he gener-
ally forfeits this immunity and will be treated as an unlawful combatant. Because unlawful combatants
lack the protective shield of POW status, if captured, an unlawful combatant can be subject to domestic
prosecution under a state's criminal law. Id.
208 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (noting that the capture and detention of
combatants-whether lawful or unlawful-to prevent their return to the battlefield is recognized by
"universal agreement and practice" as "important incident[s] of war" (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 28, 30 (1942)) (alteration in original)).
209 See, e.g., Letter from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., to Sen. Carl Levin,
Chairman, Comm. on Armed Servs. (Nov. 26, 2002), at 1, available at http://www.nimj.com
/documents/dodletter.pdf ("An 'enemy combatant' is an individual who, under the laws and customs of
war, may be detained for the duration of an armed conflict.").
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tant."2t It grants detention authority for any non-U.S. citizen whom the
President determines there is reason to believe:
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as Al Qaida, (ii) has engaged
in, aided or abetted or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or
acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as
their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens,
national security, foreign policy, or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harbored
one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii).
2 '
Arguably, it is this class of people to whom the "enemy combatant" term
was applied in the popular media. Thus, this iteration of the "enemy
combatant" category is a creation of the Executive, and requires nothing
more than a unilateral, presidential determination that there was "reason to
believe" an individual was connected, in any of a myriad of ways, to
terrorist activity adverse to the United States.
As the government's enemy combatant regime was challenged in
court, the definitions began to shift. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1 2 for example,
the definition narrowed considerably. Yaser Hamdi was a U.S. citizen
captured in Afghanistan, detained at Guantdnamo, and then transferred to a
military brig in South Carolina following discovery of his citizenship.2"3
When the Supreme Court considered the legality of his detention as an
"enemy combatant," Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, noted that
"[t]here is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the
Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses
in classifying individuals as such," '214 thus conceding the ambiguity of the
government's definition. The Court went on to consider Hamdi's case in
light of the specific definition proffered by the government, namely, an
individual who "'was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United
States or coalition partners' in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States.""'2 5 Suddenly, the requirements of the
Presidential Military Order of either membership in Al Qaeda or participa-
tion in terrorism dropped away, and conveniently so: the United States al-
leged that Hamdi had affiliated with the Taliban, not Al Qaeda, and alleged
that he was with a Taliban unit that was engaged in battle against the
210 Presidential Military Order, supra note 71, at 57,834. The presidential military order did not it-
self use the term "enemy combatant," but soon after its promulgation, Bush Administration officials be-
gan using "enemy combatant" as a shorthand for those subject to the order. The order also requires that
it be in the interest of the United States that such individuals be subject to the order, though this adds no
substantive requirement to the "enemy combatant" definition. Id. § 2(a)(2), at 57,834.
211 Presidential Military Order, supra note 71, at 57,834.
212 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
213 Id. at 510 (plurality opinion).
214 Id. at 516 (plurality opinion).
215 Id. (citing Brief for Respondents at 3, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020).
The government's brief did not explicitly limit its "enemy combatant" definition to Afghanistan, though
the Court read in this limitation. See Brief for Respondents, supra, at 24-34.
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Northern Alliance, not acts of international terrorism. 2 6 Accepting the gov-
ernment's new definition, the Court held that although Congress authorized
Hamdi's detention, due process required "a meaningful opportunity to con-
test the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.
2 17
In Rasul v. Bush,2"8 heard during the same term as Hamdi, the govern-
ment proffered the same "enemy combatant" definition as in Hamdi, only to
change it again once the two cases were decided. Whereas Hamdi con-
cerned the legality of the detention of a U.S. citizen as an "enemy comba-
tant," Rasul involved noncitizen prisoners at Guantdnamo Bay who sought
to challenge the legality of their detention in U.S. courts. The Rasul deci-
sion did not address the substantive definition of "enemy combatant," but
instead limited its inquiry to whether the federal habeas statute granted the
courts jurisdiction over the Guantdnamo prisoners' cases, concluding that it
did.219 The import of these two cases was immediately apparent: even when
Congress had granted detention authority over "enemy combatants," that
detention could be challenged in federal court, and at least where U.S. citi-
zens were involved, the fundamental notice and hearing requirements of
due process attached. Thus, the Supreme Court seemed to set the stage for
meaningful federal court inquiry into the government's definition of "ene-
my combatant."
In an effort to avoid such scrutiny, the government hastily constructed
a process it termed the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT). 2 ' The
CSRT was tasked solely with determining if a prisoner was an "enemy
combatant. 2 21 It provided rudimentary and incomplete notice to each pris-
oner of the basis of his detention, as well as a flawed and perfunctory hear-
ing process in which to contest that basis.222 By inventing a process, the
216 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
217 Id. at 509.
218 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
219 Id. at 483-84.
220 The Supreme Court handed down the Hamdi and Rasul decisions on June 30, 2004. A Depart-
ment of Defense memorandum issued on July 7, 2004 by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wol-
fowitz created the CSRT procedure. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def, to
Gordon R. England, Sec'y of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7,
2004) [hereinafter Wolfowitz Memo], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d200407
07review.pdf.
221 Id. at a.
222 See generally The Guantanamo Detainees' Second Supplemental Brief Addressing the Effect of
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 on this Court's Jurisdiction Over the Pending Appeals at 38-40, Al
Odah v. United States, 282 F. App'x 844 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Nos. 05-5064, 05-5095 to 05-5116), 2006
WL 679965 (documenting how CSRTs deprived prisoners access to counsel, permitted the use of evi-
dence obtained through torture, and barred any meaningful opportunity by prisoners to contest the
charges brought against them); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 468 (D.D.C.
2005) ("[T]he CSRT failed to provide any detainee with sufficient notice of the factual basis for which
he is being detained and with a fair opportunity to rebut the government's evidence supporting the de-
termination that he is an 'enemy combatant."'); MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING
HEARINGS: CSRT: THE MODERN HABEAS CORPUS? (2006), available at http://law.shu.edu/news/final-
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government also invented a new substantive definition of "enemy comba-
tant," this time defining it as "an individual who was part of or supporting
Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostili-
ties against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any
person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostil-
ities in aid of enemy armed forces." ' Once more, the definition shifted,
this time expanding massively beyond the battlefield of Afghanistan, and
well beyond actual engagement in armed conflict against the United
States.224
The CSRT definition is nothing more than a bill-of-attainder-style ca-
tegorization, as it was invented after the individuals whose detention the
government sought to justify were already in custody. Unlike Yaser Ham-
di, who looked much like a traditional combatant found on the battlefield in
Afghanistan, the CSRT definition had to contend with, and rationalize, the
detentions of individuals at Guantdinamo who had been picked up in places
no hearinghearingsreport.pdf (analyzing CSRT hearings of 393 prisoners); Kristine A. Huskey, Stan-
dards and Procedures for Classifying "Enemy Combatants ": Congress, What Have You Done?, 43 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 41, 46-50 (2007).
223 Wolfowitz Memo, supra note 220, at a.
224 With the enactment of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), the CSRT's role became more
complicated because it distinguished for purposes of jurisdiction under the MCA a "lawful enemy com-
batant" from an "unlawful enemy combatant," where only the latter of which could be tried under the
MCA. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948d(a), 120 Stat. 2600 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-50; 18 U.S.C. § 2441; and 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)-(e) (2006)) ("[M]ilitary commis-
sion[s] under this chapter shall have jurisdiction ... [over] alien unlawful enemy combatant[s]."). In
contrast, the CSRT made no determination as to whether a prisoner's combatancy was "lawful"
or "unlawful."
Further complicating matters, the MCA codified two separate substantive (and arguably contradicto-
ry) definitions of "unlawful enemy combatant": (1) "a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is
not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated
forces"; or (2) "a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary
of Defense." 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1). Yet because, pursuant to the Wolfowitz Memo, a CSRT lacked the
authority to distinguish between a "lawful enemy combatant" and an "unlawful enemy combatant," the
second definition offered by the MCA is facially invalid. See Wolfowitz Memo, supra note 220, at d
(giving the CSRT only the authority to review the classification of "enemy combatant," not the authority
to make such a classification).
Anyone determined to be an "enemy combatant" by a CSRT would thus fail the jurisdictional thre-
shold of an "unlawful enemy combatant" that was required for trial under the MCA.
This contradiction ended with the first ever decision by the Court of Military Commission Review,
an appellate body created by the MCA, which held that while military commissions created under the
MCA only had jurisdiction over "unlawful enemy combatants," military judges presiding over commis-
sions could independently determine whether a prisoner is in fact an "unlawful enemy combatant."




as remote from the battlefield as Gambia, Zambia, and Bosnia. 25 Similarly,
whereas the Hamdi definition of "enemy combatant" served the govern-
ment's needs when the case at hand was one of an individual caught with a
Taliban unit while engaged in armed conflict with a U.S. coalition partner
(the Northern Alliance), the requirement of engagement in armed conflict
was clearly inadequate to uphold the detentions of Osama Bin Laden's al-
leged chauffeur2 6 or individuals alleged to be mere acquaintances of sus-
pected Al Qaeda operatives.227 The Bush Administration's unfolding "war
on terrorism" required an "enemy combatant" definition that was global in
reach and extended beyond the ordinary indicia of combatant status.
The government readily conceded the breadth of its new "enemy com-
batant" definition, agreeing with a federal habeas judge that it would en-
compass
'[a] little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a
charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance
al-Qaeda activities .... a person who teaches English to the son of an al Qaeda
member, ... and a journalist who knows the location of Osama Bin Laden but
refuses to disclose it to protect her source.' 228
Equally remarkable, the government has argued that each prisoner had al-
ready been determined to meet the CSRT definition of an "enemy comba-
tant" through "multiple levels of review by officers of the Department of
Defense,"29 despite the fact that the applicable definition was invented only
after these reviews were supposed to have been performed23° and conflicted
225 See, e.g., First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4, Boumediene v. Bush, 450 F.
Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 04-1166), 2004 WL 5225826 (seeking a writ of habeas corpus for Bel-
kacem Bensayeh, a prisoner captured in Bosnia); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, E1-Banna v.
Bush, No. 04-01144 (D.D.C. July 8, 2004) (seeking a writ of habeas corpus for Jamil El-Banna and
Bisher A1-Rawi, two prisoners captured in Gambia, as well as Martin Mubanga, a prisoner captured in
Zambia).
226 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 569-70 (2006).
227 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 470 (D.D.C. 2005) (discussing how
a CSRT found Murat Kumaz to be an "enemy combatant" merely because he befriended an alleged sui-
cide bomber at a mosque in Germany (citing Kumaz Factual Return, Enclosure (1) at 2-3, Kumaz v.
Bush, 04-CV-1 135ESH)).
228 Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 475 (alteration in original) (citations omitted),
vacated by Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Al Odah v.
United States, 551 U.S. 1161 (2007).
229 Wolfowitz Memo, supra note 220, at $ a.
230 It is questionable whether any such reviews ever were performed. In litigation challenging the
CSRT determinations, the government resisted court orders to produce complete records of its "enemy
combatant" determinations even for the CSRTs, much less for reviews purported to have been per-
formed beforehand. Yet in a decision rendered February 1, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia denied the Bush Administration's petition for rehearing en banc, thus affirming
an earlier panel decision ordering the government to produce classified evidence used for CSRT deter-
minations of whether a prisoner was an "enemy combatant." See Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
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with competing definitions proffered by the government. Moreover, after
Boumediene, the government proffered yet another definition of the term. 3'
Soon after President Obama came into office, the new Administration
gave up on the "enemy combatant" terminology entirely. In form, at least,
it seemed to collapse under the weight of its multiple definitions and tainted
association with the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration
stated that it would no longer rely on either the "enemy combatant" catego-
ry or inherent Article II powers of the President to justify ongoing impri-
sonment of Guantdnamo prisoners, and instead would rely on the
Authorization for the Use Military Force" and IHL.233
Despite this change in terminology, it is not yet clear whether the sub-
stance of the Administration's decisions will follow. Human rights groups
and some commentators have criticized the Administration's move, for
while it relies upon international law in a way that the previous Administra-
tion did not, it nonetheless continues to claim broad detention authority.3
Thus, the "enemy combatant" construct continues to resonate, even if the
phraseology has changed.
Interestingly, even the rudimentary CSRT proceedings concluded that
some of the Guantfnamo prisoners were not, in fact, "enemy combatants,"
further undermining the claim that they previously had been subject to mul-
tiple levels of review, and undermining the reliability of the construct itself.
But rather than state explicitly, and honestly, that these individuals were not
"enemy combatants," the Bush Administration insisted on referring to them
as "no longer enemy combatants." '235 The "no longer enemy combatant" de-
signation suggests that these individuals once were, even though such a fac-
tual determination seems never to have been made. This kind of wordplay,
clever in an Alice in Wonderland sense ("How could I no longer be some-
thing I never was?"), was described by the prisoners' counsel as Orwel-
231 See supra note 206.
232 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
233 See Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, 3-8, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442,
(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Withdraws "Enemy
Combatant" Definition for Guantbnamo Detainees (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag-232.html. Soon after this announcement, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
stated that the Administration would no longer use the term "war on terror," signaling a broad rhetorical
shift away from the Bush Administration. See Jay Solomon, US. Drops "War on Terror" Phrase, Clin-
ton Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12384512369037
1231 .html.
234 See Noah Feldman, Op-Ed., A Prison of Words, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A31 (noting that
the government's "refined" position on its detention authority, requiring a showing of "substantial sup-
port" for terrorism, "is potentially broad enough to continue detaining everyone whom the Bush admin-
istration put in Guantdnamo in the first place").
235 See Qassim v. Bush, 382 F. Supp. 2d. 126, 127 (D.D.C. 2005).
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lian,236 but the judge chose a more familiar characterization: he called it
"Kafkaesque."237
2. The Indeterminacy of "War Crime. "--Just as the Executive Bran-
ch has defined and redefined "enemy combatant," so, too, has it attempted
to redetermine the meaning of the term "war crime," the legal predicate for
criminal liability before a military commission unless otherwise specifically
authorized by Congress. Prior to enactment of the Military Commissions
Act, the Uniform Code of Military Justice authorized the use of military
commissions only to try violations of the law of war, or other offenses pro-
vided for by statute.238 Under the MCA, however, neither the charges for
crimes to be heard before commissions nor their elements were defined by
Congress, but instead were provided by the Executive.239 Moreover, none
of the charges lodged against Omar and the other prisoners have ever been
recognized as war crimes. For example, all ten prisoners initially put before
commissions were charged with conspiracy, a charge that a four-member
plurality of the Supreme Court in Hamdan concluded did not constitute a
war crime.24° In addition, the principal charge against Omar, "murder by an
unprivileged belligerent," 241' has never been recognized as a war
crime either.242
Enactment of the Military Commissions Act cured the defect of inade-
quate congressional authorization of the commissions, but in so doing im-
plicated Congress in the redefinition of "war crime." The MCA includes a
catalogue of charges deemed triable by military commission, along with
their elements, including conspiracy. 43 In this way, it resembles an ordi-
nary criminal statute. But the Act includes a curious pronouncement: "The
provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally been
triable by military commissions. This chapter does not establish new
crimes that did not exist before its enactment, but rather codifies those
crimes for trial by military commission."2" This statement is proven de-
monstrably false by Congress's stubborn inclusion of conspiracy as an of-
236 Id. at 127-28 n.3.
237 Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198, 200 (D.D.C. 2005).
238 See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).
239 See Military Commission Instruction No. 2, 32 C.F.R. § 11.6 (2005).
240 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 603-04 (2006) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Justice
Kennedy did not reach this issue. See id. at 653 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
241 Charge Sheet, United States v. Khadr (charging Khadr with conspiracy, murder by an unprivi-
leged belligerent, attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent, and aiding the enemy), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2005/d2005 0lO4khadr.pdf.
242 The question of whether to criminalize unprivileged belligerency for otherwise lawful acts is
subject to some dispute, but appears to lack any historical support. See Derek Jinks, The Declining Sig-
nificance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367, 436-39 (2004).
243 10 U.S.C. § 950v (2006).
244 Id. § 950p.
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fense "traditionally triable by military commissions," despite the contrary
historical record.245
Once more, legal categories prove malleable rather than established,
fluid rather than fixed, and threaten to become the playthings of lawyers
and judges and politicians rather than the expressions of liberal principle.
The congressional statement of purpose attempts to inoculate against an ex
post facto claim, but can only avoid this charge of after-the-fact criminaliza-
tion by altering our understanding of the before-the-fact historical record. 46
In Omar's case, Congress engaged in the kind of linguistic legerdemain
that further undermines faith in the integrity of the Guantdnamo legal re-
gime. At the time of the MCA's enactment, Omar was the only prisoner to
be charged with "murder by an unprivileged belligerent.21 47 Like conspira-
cy, this charge was unknown to the law of war, and thus was an invention
of the Executive. The charge turned the law of war on its head by making
the status of the offender, rather than that of the victim, determinative of the
existence of a war crime. Whereas an unprivileged combatant could be
charged for murder under domestic law, he could only be charged with a
war crime if the victim was a protected person, such as medical or religious
personnel, civilians not taking active part in hostilities, or military person-
nel placed hors de combat (for example, by detention or injury).
248
The MCA appears to acknowledge the legal infirmity of the "murder
by an unprivileged belligerent" charge, as evident from its omission from
the statute's catalogue of charges. Instead, the MCA includes the charge of
"murder in violation of the law of war. '249 An earlier section of the statute
includes the well-recognized war crime offense of "murder of a protected
person,' 25 ° but this offense is distinguished from "murder in violation of the
245 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 602-13 (plurality opinion). But see MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY,
PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-41 (2007) (discussing inchoate and collective responsibili-
ty in international law, including use of joint criminal enterprise theory).
246 For a discussion of ex post facto problems with conspiracy and material support for terrorism
charges in military commissions, see Peter Margulies, Guantanamo By Other Means: Conspiracy Pros-
ecutions and Law Enforcement Dilemmas After September 11, 43 GONZ. L. REv. 513, 538-40 (2008).
247 Another prisoner, David Hicks, was charged with "attempted murder by an unprivileged bellige-
rent," but that charge was subsequently dropped as part of a plea agreement that led to his release in
March 2007. See sources cited infra notes 267-268.
248 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
37 I.L.M. 1002 (omitting any reference to an individual's status, whether lawful or unlawful, as deter-
minative to the definition of a "war crime" within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court);
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 233 (2004) (arguing that a combatant's unlawful status does not, alone, constitute a war
crime; rather, only where an unlawful combatant commits a serious breach of the International Humani-
tarian Law--e.g., murder of a protected person-can he be prosecuted under international law).
249 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(15) (2006).
250 Id. § 950v(b)(1). The MCA properly defines a protected person to include "any person entitled
to protection under one or more of the Geneva Conventions, including--(A) civilians not taking an ac-
tive part in hostilities; (B) military personnel placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, or detention;
and (C) military medical or religious personnel." Id.
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law of war." The latter offense appears to contemplate some other class of
murder that also is a war crime, and yet, it is not clear that any such offense
exists. The very purpose of this section of the statute is to codify law of
war offenses, but by incorporating "violation of the law of war" into the de-
finition of the offense, the MCA renders the definition circular. It is this
opaque offense with which Omar was charged following the enactment of
the MCA."'
For Omar, and I suspect for many of the other prisoners, it was difficult
to believe that he would ever get a fair trial before the commission. His le-
gal consciousness252 was of law's manipulability and its cover for political
power. Even when the charges against him were temporarily dismissed,253
there was little cause for hope, and indeed, the charges against him were
quickly renewed. His experience before, during, and after the commission
demonstrated that at Guantdnamo law was everywhere254 and nowhere at the
same time. As for his lawyers, we were not blind to the overwhelming poli-
tics of the process. And yet, in this rights-free environment, we elected to
pursue a primarily rights-based strategy, not merely in federal habeas pro-
ceedings, but in the commission at Guantdnamo as well. The question is,
why?
III. ARGUING RIGHTS IN A RIGHTS-FREE ZONE: TACTICS,
STRATEGIES, AND THEORIES
As I have discussed thus far, we believed the commission to be a pure-
ly political apparatus, devoid of legal legitimacy, and yet, rather than boy-
cott the proceedings, we participated in them. Moreover, despite our keen
awareness that the system was built upon a rights-free edifice, we insisted
on making rights-based arguments in the commission, as opposed to accept-
ing the rights-free system presented to us. Thus, we argued that the Consti-
tution, and in particular, Fifth Amendment due process protections,
extended to Omar, as did substantive and procedural protections of the Ge-
neva Conventions;... we argued that Omar had rights as a child, under in-
251 Charge Sheet, United States v. Khadr, supra note 59.
252 See Austin Sarat, "... The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of
the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 343 n.I (1990) (using legal consciousness as interchan-
geable with legal ideology); David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiric-
ism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 592 (1984) (defining legal consciousness as "all the ideas about the nature,
function, and operation of law held by anyone in society at a given time").
253 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
254 See Sarat, supra note 252, at 343 (quoting a man on public assistance as saying, "For me the law
is all over. I am caught, you know; there is always some rule that I'm supposed to follow, some rule I
don't even know about that they say.").
255 These arguments were made before the Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006), in which it found the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applica-
ble to the prisoners. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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ternational treaty obligations256 as well as customary international law; and
we argued that human rights law applied, and could not be displaced by in-
ternational humanitarian law.257 In contrast, the Pentagon would have had
us accept their system as is, and either persuade our clients to plead guilty
(as the first defense lawyers were asked to do) or proceed to a trial governed
by substandard rules and an unknown jurisprudence.
This rights-based strategy might seem futile given the malleability of
law and the contingency of its definitions and structures at Guantdnamo,
epitomized by the ever-shifting nature of such seemingly bedrock questions
as who is an "enemy combatant" and what is a "war crime"; so long as the
political context in which rights reside can be redefined, so, too, can the
rights themselves. 58 While all rights questions are subject to change over
time, as I have argued, the legal indeterminacy at Guantdnamo was espe-
cially problematic because of the novelty of its core principles, its disavow-
al of extant jurisprudence, and the unavailability of meaningful judicial
review. Moreover, the danger of a rights-based strategy is not merely futili-
ty, but complicity in the commission's project of self-legitimation, a con-
cern that haunted us throughout the process. Indeed, one of the most
sobering events for me came during the first session of Omar's commission,
in which I had made a lengthy legal argument. During a break, a presiding
officer from another case thanked me for the quality of my presentation and
said that I had elevated the process. Although I did not create it, I had
helped to hold up the commission's curtain of legitimacy.
The indeterminacy of rights at Guantdnamo did not only render them
unstable, but suggested that they were politically determined as well. Like
the velvet drapes in the military commission room, it seemed clear that law
and its rhetoric, structures, and trappings were serving as a cover for the op-
eration of political power. Still, we doggedly pursued a rights-based strate-
gy on Omar's behalf.
The question of why one might engage in rights-based litigation in as
rights-starved an environment as Guantdnamo involves tactical, strategic,
and theoretical considerations,259 each of which is discussed below.
256 See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Child-
ren in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-37, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222.
257 See Robert K. Goldman & Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law,
TASK FORCE PAPERS (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Presidential Task Force on Terrorism, Washington,
D.C.), Dec. 2002, at 33, available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf ("That the United States
must afford certain minimum human rights protections to unprivileged enemy combatants who fall into
its hands in the course of an international armed conflict is dictated by treaty and customary norms to
which it is bound under international human rights and humanitarian law.").
258 This is consistent with the view of many Critical Legal Studies scholars.
259 For a discussion of the distinction between tactics and strategy, see MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE
PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE (Steven Rendall trans., 1984).
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A. Rights Tactics and Rights Strategies
When confronted with profound, seemingly irremediable injustice in
the primary forum of contest, the lawyer's instinct, if not the human one, is
to appeal to a higher authority. In the military commissions, that higher au-
thority was a federal habeas court, which, unlike the commission, stood in-
dependent of the Executive and enjoyed a legitimacy to which the
commission could only aspire. As a tactical matter, therefore, we sought in
the commission proceedings to dramatize the irregularity of the commis-
sion, in contrast to the proceedings a criminal defendant could expect in a
regular court-either a military court martial or federal district court.
Rights were an effective discourse strategy for this project, for they pro-
vided instantly recognizable handles for the comparison: the right to see the
evidence against you, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to com-
petent counsel were all so familiar within the American courtroom that their
invocation in the commission-not just in principle but in the language of
rights-would help to cast the commission as fatally deficient in the eyes of
the habeas court when they reviewed the proceedings. This recalls Rick
Abel's insight regarding the apartheid regime in South Africa: "Because the
regime used legal institutions to construct and administer apartheid, it was
vulnerable to legal contestation."260
Similarly, Abel has observed that even though a reflection of power,
law nonetheless can be a source of countervailing power as well, because
state power is divided among the branches and therefore potentially hetero-
geneous."' Such heterogeneity creates opportunities for even nonstate ac-
tors to wield power, strategically and interstitially, working the gaps and
crevices within a complex state apparatus. Notably, recourse to the habeas
court proved to be the most successful strategy in challenging the legitima-
cy of the military commissions: the Hamdan case, which invalidated the
original military commission system at Guantdnamo, was brought via a col-
lateral habeas action. 6
As a corollary to Abel's theorem, our invocation of rights was de-
signed not only to appeal to the judiciary, but also to Congress, civil society
actors, and the press. Rights may be an impoverished discourse, susceptible
of manipulation and, even when recognized, unable to execute themselves
without political consent, but they are nonetheless a familiar and shared
discourse whose resonance carries across branches of government and
across different segments of society. When we engaged in rights talk with-
in the military commission, we knew that we were speaking to multiple au-
260 RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID,
1980-94, at 3 (1995).
261 Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 69, 102-03 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998).
262 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006).
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diences simultaneously-"playing to the gallery," as it is often pejoratively
described-and we knew that the language of rights, as a metric of both
correctness and fairness, was accessible to all.
As I have discussed previously, the structure of the commissions and
their early conduct convinced us that our assertions of rights would almost
always fail. But claiming the language of rights forced the government to
disclaim it. Each time we argued that the Geneva Conventions compelled
some protection for Omar, the government was forced to argue the inappli-
cability of the Geneva Conventions. This was also the case when we ar-
gued constitutional due process and international human rights claims. Our
hope was to dramatize, through the cumulative governmental disclaiming of
rights, what Omar understood intuitively: that Guantdinamo was a rights-
free zone.
The fact of divided government and diffuse power263 does not, of
course, compel the exercise of countervailing power. Just as the commis-
sions rejected our rights-based arguments, so, too, could the federal courts,
Congress, and the public. But the existence of multiple sources of power
also permits different relationships between law and power. The appeal of
rights, their narrative and jurisprudential meaning, can be expected to vary
with the narrative frame of the audience; rights may vary across space and
time. Because the commissions were a creation of the Executive and
housed within the cultural and command structures of the military, they
were institutionally situated far differently than the Article III habeas courts
and subject to different political pressures than Congress. Thus, the re-
peated failure of rights-based arguments in the commissions was not neces-
sarily itself a failure if competing arbiters of rights, in both the popular and
legal imaginations, were to come to different conclusions.
In many ways, our rights-based strategy was focused less on U.S. insti-
tutions and more on Canada, Omar's country of citizenship. This reflects a
geopolitical view that Omar's continued detention and his trial by military
commission are partially the function of Canadian acquiescence to Ameri-
can power. To date, the Canadian government has not publicly criticized
either GuantAnamo or Omar's trial by military commission. In contrast,
other countries, most notably Great Britain, have rejected both the detention
and trial by military commission of their citizens, stating publicly the unac-
ceptability of these practices, and expending political capital in order to end
them.2" As a result of these efforts, all Britons have been released from
Guantdnamo," 6 suggesting that international political arrangements circum-
263 See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 22 (arguing that power is dispersed among multiple and
unequal relational actors, rather than emanating solely from institutions).
264 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
265 See Lizette Alvarez, Last 4 Britons at Guantdnamo Return, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2005, at A6;




scribe Omar's legal predicament at Guantdnamo. The political domain,
then, includes not only the United States, and not only U.S.-Canada rela-
tions, but the domestic politics of Canada as well.
The case of former Guantdnamo prisoner David Hicks is instructive in
this regard. Hicks, an Australian citizen, was one of the first Guantdnamo
prisoners to be charged before a military commission. Through the ex-
traordinary work of his legal counsel and effective advocacy in Australia by
his family, Hicks became a cause ckbre in Australia, and a symbol of
American injustice toward an Australian citizen.266 His advocates forged a
narrative according to which as an Australian, Hicks was entitled to rights
which the military commissions failed to afford. Hicks ultimately pleaded
guilty to a single charge and was transferred back to Australia267 under an
agreement that was widely understood to be a political compromise be-
tween the Australian and American governments rather than the product of
independent legal process. 68
Thus, even if rights-based arguments fall flat in the United States,
Omar's circumstances might be improved if rights-based arguments were to
alter political discourse in Canada. This strategy could be viewed as reduc-
ing rights to politics, and deploying rights as mere political devices. But
once more we see how the value of rights can vary. Even as we worried
that a post-September 11 politics had made the United States inhospitable to
rights claims on behalf of terrorist suspects, we understood that in the same
historical moment, rights might have greater purchase in Canada. A rights-
based strategy therefore feeds into what is essentially ongoing interlocutory
review of Omar's case by the Canadian government (admittedly, governed
by its own political process, but a different politics), which is in turn in-
formed by broader Canadian public opinion.
And so our rights-based strategy in the military commissions attempted
to negotiate the uneasy relationship between law and politics, to view rights
as less than self-defining but more than "nonsense on stilts." '269 We sought
266 See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, A Lawyer in Marine Corps Khaki Wins Australian Support for His
Guantnamo Client, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at A16 (describing efforts of Hicks's military defense
lawyer, Major Dan Mori, and support garnered from celebrities such as Bono to Australian politicians);
Raymond Bonner, World Briefing Australia: Lawmakers Appeal For Guantinamo Release, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2007, at A2 (reporting that nearly half of Australia's Parliament signed a letter to Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi requesting Hicks's return); Military QC Slams Hicks Trial Process, AUSTRALIAN,
Aug. 2, 2005, available at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,16125839-1702,00
.html.
267 William Glaberson, Plea of Guilty From Detainee in Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007,
at Al.
268 See Raymond Bonner, Critics Say Australian Leader Was Alert to Politics in Detainee Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007, at A27; Misha Schubert & Mark Coultan, Outcry Over Hicks Sentence 'Fix',
THE AGE, Apr. 2, 2007, available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/outcry-over-hicks-
sentence-fix/2007/04/01/1175366078719.html.
269 See JEREMY BENTHAM, A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights, in BENTHAM'S
POLITICAL THOUGHT 257, 269 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1973).
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to subject the "law" of the commissions to the scrutiny of a range of politi-
cal actors. Thus, our strategy did not depend on victory in the commission
itself. Indeed, the goal of demonstrating the legal emptiness of the commis-
sions was better served by our arguments-for due process, for rules of evi-
dence, for prohibitions on coerced testimony-failing in them. We used the
commission, and its rejection of our rights-based strategy, for its political
and educational value, echoing Jules Lobel's call for deliberate use of
courts as forums for protest."' In so doing, we "drag[ged] the courtroom
into politics.
27'
Clearly, not all of our tactics worked, and certainly they did not pro-
duce our ultimate goal of returning Omar to Canada. Moreover, even these
tactics came at a cost of partially legitimizing the commission as a site of
legal contest.27 2 Nonetheless, I believe the strategic potential of rights-based
argument was sufficient to make our approach defensible. I must admit,
however, that it was not all clear-eyed strategy that led me to the rights-
based approach, for even before I had thought through the strategic poten-
tial, I was inclined toward arguing rights.
This rights tropism is the logical and predictable consequence of our
professional training as lawyers. Indeed, it is an occupational hazard. I do
not mean to disclaim rights wholesale, but at the same time, I am mindful,
and wary, of rights as the first recourse for helping our clients achieve their
goals. 73 Rights become the faith story for many of us, holding out hope for
a gradualist, liberal perfection of the injustice in the world.
B. Rights Theories
That a language of rights may gain us strategic advantage is helpful,
but does not itself tell us why this is the case. Are rights merely a vocabu-
lary for considering and structuring power contests as between individuals
and as between individuals and the state, or do they operate at some other
level?
1. Rights as Recognition.-As I have argued previously, rights can
only be understood in the context in which they arise. Indeed, it was only
through the assertion of rights in Omar's military commission proceedings
that I began to understand what role they might play for him.
In one of our first hearings in the military commissions, I filed a mo-
tion asking the commission to find that the Chief Prosecutor had committed
prosecutorial misconduct. On the eve of the commencement of Omar's
commission proceedings, the Department of Defense held a press confe-
270 See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REv. 477 (2005).
271 Id. at 483.
272 See infra Part IV.
273 See Gabel & Harris, supra note 163, at 375-79 (advocating power-based lawyering as preferable
to rights-based approaches).
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rence at Guantdnamo, at which both the prosecution and the defense were
invited to speak. I spoke first, and decried the lack of rules of the commis-
sion, the admissibility of evidence obtained through torture as well as cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment,274 and the fact that the government had
chosen to prosecute a child for alleged war crimes. I repeated allegations
that Omar had been tortured, and called the commission a "sham.
275
The Chief Prosecutor spoke after me, and as I sat at the back of the au-
ditorium listening, he referred to Omar as "a murderer" and "a terrorist,"
and expressed his personal belief that Omar was guilty of the charges
274 The original rules of the military commissions included no rule regarding the admissibility of
evidence obtained through torture, and on March 1, 2006, the spokesperson for the Office of Military
Commissions stated that under those rules, evidence obtained through torture could be admitted. See
Carol Rosenberg, Hearings May Consider Torture, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 2, 2006, at A3 (quoting Air
Force Major Jane Boomer as saying, "Hypothetically, is it possible? Do the rules allow for it? ...
Yes."). Major Tom Fleener, a military defense lawyer assigned to represent a prisoner named Ali Ham-
za al Bahlul, pressed the issue with Colonel Peter Brownback, the presiding officer in al Bahlul's case,
but Brownback refused to categorically prohibit evidence obtained through torture, stating only that:
"My personal belief is torture is not good." Id. Brownback also suggested that he and Fleener might
have different understandings of what constitutes torture, though he ultimately agreed that "poking a
person in the eye with a red-hot needle" would be torture. Id. On March 22, 2006, just days before the
Supreme Court would hear argument in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which challenged the legality of the
commissions, the Pentagon announced its intention to forbid evidence obtained through torture. See
Carol Rosenberg, U.S. Bars Any Evidence Resulting From Torture, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 23, 2006, at
A3. The rule, eerily titled "Certain Evidentiary Determinations," was issued on March 24, 2006. See
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMM'N INSTRUCTION No. 10, at 1 (2006), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/d20060327MCI10.pdf. While the new rule does prohibit
evidence obtained through torture, it fails to address evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment. Id. at 2.
While these additional admissibility issues were ultimately addressed in the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, the end result is that statements obtained through cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
may still be admissible. The MCA prohibits any such statements made after December 30, 2005-4he
enactment date of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (which outlawed cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment of individuals in the custody or under the physical control of the U.S. government), 10 U.S.C.
§ 948r(c) (2006)--but permits such statements if made prior to the DTA's enactment, so long as the
commission military judge finds that: "(1) the totality of the circumstances renders the statement reliable
and possessing sufficient probative value" and "(2) the interests of justice would best be served by ad-
mission of the statement into evidence." Id. Notably, the vast majority of prisoner interrogation at
Guantdnamo took place prior to enactment of the DTA.
Moreover, although the MCA purports to prohibit all statements obtained through torture whether
made before or after enactment of the DTA, id. § 948r(b), another provision of the MCA permits the in-
troduction of evidence by the government without disclosure of classified sources or methods of interro-
gation, so long as the military judge finds that the evidence is "reliable" and otherwise admissible. Id.
§ 949d(f)(2). The military judge may require that an unclassified summary of the sources and methods
be disclosed to the defense and the public, but is not required to do so. Id. Because hearsay evidence is
generally admissible, id. § 949a(b)(2)(E), the MCA may permit intelligence officers to testify to state-
ments made by the defendant or others without the defense having a meaningful opportunity to inquire
into or challenge the methods of interrogation, thus raising the specter of a laundering of evidence ob-
tained through torture. My thanks to Tom Fleener for this insight.
275 See Transcript of Press Conference, Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba (Jan. 10, 2006) (copy
on file with author).
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against him and that Omar would have preferred to spend the recently
passed Muslim holiday of Eid with Osama Bin Laden than at Guantina-
mo.276 Not surprisingly, his comments were broadcast widely by the inter-
national press gathered to cover the military connissions.277
The following day, I argued that the Chief Prosecutor had violated his
ethical obligations, thereby committing prosecutorial misconduct. In par-
ticular, I argued that his comments contravened the rules governing extra-
judicial pretrial statements.278 In its opposition, the prosecution argued that
I had opened the door to the offending statements by claiming that Omar
had been tortured and that the commission was a sham.279 In oral argument,
the commission's presiding officer expressed his distaste for the "torture"
and "sham" comments and an inclination to hold the prosecution and de-
fense to the same standard with respect to extrajudicial statements. After a
lengthy argument in which I parsed the relevant ethical rules and their
comments and reviewed the leading cases, I arrived at a moment of exaspe-
ration. My doctrinal analysis had failed to persuade the presiding officer
that the rules themselves apply a higher standard to prosecutors because of
the power disparity inherent in prosecution. The presiding officer likewise
appeared to reject my argument that just as the power to prosecute streng-
thens the hand of the prosecutor, so does the weight of an indictment often
compel the defense to speak publicly, and aggressively, on behalf of his
client. I had exhausted the caselaw-which, I believe, stood clearly on our
side-to no avail.
The argument had shifted, from the prosecution defending its clearly
prejudicial comments about Omar, to me defending the right to assert pub-
licly Omar's credible claims of torture, and by implication, his right not to
be tortured. And it was in this moment of exasperation and exhaustion that
276 Id.
277 See, e.g., Michael Rowland, Guantanamo Detainee Omar Khadr Faces Military Trial,
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP. TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 12, 2006; Michelle Shephard, TO. Teen "In-
deed a Terrorist, " US. Insists, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 11, 2006, at Al; Prosecutor Says OmarKhadr Not
a Young Innocent, CTV, Jan. 10, 2006, available at http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/
CTVNews/200601 O/omarkhadr_061001 ?sname=&noads-.
278 See Defense Motion for Order Prohibiting Prosecution From Making Inappropriate Extrajudicial
Statements and Requiring Prosecution to Take Steps to Remediate Past Inappropriate Statements, United
States v. Khadr, No. 05008 (Jan. 12, 2006) (copy on file with author). Our argument was based on
Rules 3.8 and 3.6 of the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, and analogous rules for
North Carolina and the Air Force, all of which governed the conduct of the Chief Prosecutor because of
his bar memberships. Id. Rule 3.8, entitled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor," includes the fol-
lowing: "Except for statements which are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the
prosecutor's action and which serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, [the prosecutor in a criminal
case shall not] make extrajudicial comments which serve to heighten condemnation of the accused."
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2007). Rule 3.6 concerns extrajudicial statements that may
create a threat to the impartiality of the judge or jury. Id. at R. 3.6.
279 See Prosecution Response to Defense Motion To Order [sic] Prohibiting Prosecution From Mak-
ing Inappropriate Extrajudicial Statements and Requiring Prosecution to Take Steps to Remediate Past
Inappropriate Statements, United States v. Khadr, No. 05008 (Jan. 12, 2006) (copy on file with author).
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I came to a deeper understanding of rights and the work that they do. Ab-
andoning doctrine, I argued the absolute necessity of my being able to
speak publicly and without recrimination of Omar's torture, for the simple
reason that he was not able to do so himself. I rehearsed the total control
that the government had over Omar, noting, "the state, the government, has
had sole custody of my client for three-and-a-half years, has had absolute
control over his physical body, has had absolute control over to whom he's
able to speak, has had absolute control [over] whether he has representation
[sic] to a lawyer for the first two years he was here, has had absolute control
over his knowledge of the outside world."28 I went on for some time long-
er, not quite sure how or where to land this argument. Finally, I blurted,
"[H]e hasn't had available to him the opportunity to speak, the opportunity
to say anything. He could not even give his name, raise his hand, and say,
'I'm here.""'28 Though the transcript does not reflect it, I remember pausing
here, feeling dizzy, and wondering, as the presiding officer later would,282
what this had to do with anything. We lost the motion.
Only later did I come to understand that by claiming rights, we were
demanding recognition: raising one's hand, not waiting to be called on be-
fore answering, "I am here." The government had sought to remove Omar
and the other prisoners from the ambit of law, and in doing so, from the
world. They chose Guantdinamo because it was remote, then cloaked it in
darkness, refusing to disclose the names or identities of those there,283 refus-
ing access to the outside world. Legal erasure enabled physical erasure. In
this context, rights were not just notional, they were existential.
Here, we might consider the existential assertion of rights as a form of
bearing witness.284 The statement, "I am here," is an insistence upon
Omar's legibility in the world,285 made not by him, but by a lawyer who by
virtue of citizenship, professional identity, and the speaking platform af-
forded by the state, can testify to the world as he sees it, the reality of
Omar's human existence, even in the face of a master narrative of his invi-
280 Record of Trial, United States v. Omar Ahmed Khadr, No. 05008, Vol. VII, I st Volume of Tran-
script, Jan. 11 & 12, 2006 Sess. (Redacted Version) 195 [hereinafter Khadr Record of Trial], available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/d20060222KhadrV7.pdf.
281 Id. at 198, 201; Errata Sheet by the Defense, U.S. v. Khadr, Session Transcript of 11 & 12 Janu-
ary 2006 (copy on file with author).
282 Khadr Record of Trial, supra note 280, at 201.
283 See Josh White & Julie Tate, Pentagon Releases Detainees' Names; About 315 From Guanta-
namo Identified, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2006, at A7 (reporting on the Pentagon's release of names and
personal information of 315 current and former detainees at Guantinamo following successful litigation
by the Associated Press under the Freedom of Information Act); see also Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't
of Def., 410 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying government's motion for summary judgment
and ordering the Pentagon to release relevant identifying documents on detainees held at Guantinamo).
284 I am grateful to Martha Minow for suggesting this frame.
285 See JAMES C. SCorr, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITION HAVE FAILED 2 (1998) (describing state attempts to order society by making its subjects
legible and, by implication, making others illegible).
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sibility. The assertion of rights helped to gain Omar recognition not merely
as a jurisdictional subject, but as his own self-"I"-----a human being.
Martha Minow similarly has noted that "[t]he language of rights voices
an individual's desire to be recognized in tones that demand recognition."2"6
For Minow, the claim to rights is a bid to be heard, a hailing device that "in-
itiates a form of communal dialogue." '287 Moreover, by turning the question
from one of speaker to one of audience, she identifies rights claims as an
inherently communitarian project. Although we often think of rights in in-
dividualistic terms, Minow argues persuasively that rights claims always
must be made to someone-a community-and that by making the claim,
the claimant implicates herself in the community.288 The result is not neces-
sarily substantive equality, but instead what Minow terms "an equality of
attention." '289 She writes:
The rights tradition in this country sustains the call that makes those in power
at least listen. Rights-as words and as forms-structure attention even for
the claimant who is much less powerful than the authorities, and for individu-
als and groups treated throughout the community as less than equal. The in-
terpretive approach construes a claim of right, made before a judge, as a plea
for recognition of membership in a community shared by applicant and judge,
much as reader and author share the world of the text.290
Rights, then, are intertextual, and while litigant and adjudicator may not
hold equal interpretive power, they are bound by a shared interpretive
project.29" '
Minow's insight reminds us that when Omar attempts to proclaim
(through his lawyers or otherwise), "I am here," the ambition is to proclaim
it to somebody, and in so doing, to insist upon his place in the community.
Minow's claim is not that rights assertion creates community, but that it re-
286 Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1880
(1987).
287 Id at 1875.
288 Id at 1874 ("By invoking rights, an individual or group claims the attention of the larger com-
munity and its authorities. At the same time, this claim acknowledges the claimant's membership in the
larger group, her participation in its traditions, and her observation of its forms.").
289 Id at 1879.
290 Id at 1879-80 (footnotes omitted).
291 Robert Cover expressed this idea as an interdependence of constitutional understandings:
Neither religious churches, however small and dedicated, nor utopian communities, however iso-
lated, nor cadres of judges, however independent, can ever manage a total break from other groups
with other understandings of law. Thus it is that the Shaker understanding of 'contract' is hardly
independent of understandings of contract that were prevalent in the nineteenth century. The
Amish concept of church-state relations is not entirely independent of secular, libertarian concepts
of such relations. The interdependence of legal meanings makes it possible to say that the Amish,
the Shakers, and the judge are all engaged in the task of constitutional understanding. But their
distinct starting points, identifications, and stories make us realize that we cannot pretend to a uni-
tary law.
Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 35, at 33.
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confirms it.292 Here, then, is a limiting principle to rights claims: they can-
not create community where community does not already exist. Put another
way, the ability of the rights claimant to gain even the "equality of atten-
tion" of which Minow writes requires a baseline of consent of the commu-
nity that the claimant belongs to it. The return to the realm of belonging
requires the community's consent to admission.
Here, then, is the limiting principle of rights claims at Guantdnamo: the
community did not admit of the prisoners' membership. To the contrary, it
cast the prisoners both physically and metaphysically as far away
as possible.
Minow's conception of rights and community is consistent with Han-
nah Arendt's notion of citizenship. Linda Bosniak has incisively mapped
the multiple dimensions that citizenship can occupy,293 but for Arendt, polit-
ical citizenship, membership in the polity, was fundamental. She defined
citizenship as "the right to have rights,' 294 by which she meant that one
could not gain the benefit of first-order rights, such as a right against depri-
vation of life or liberty, if one was not, a priori, deemed a member of the
political community. Arendt wrote with regard to statelessness. The ex-
traordinary violence done to Jews during World War II, she argued, was
possible only through political dispossession.295 Once Jews were removed
from any national polity, they lost that a priori right to have and claim
rights. The consent to Jewish membership in the polity having been re-
voked, so, too, was the Jews' ability to claim rights that flow from member-
ship in a polity. For Arendt, and for Minow, rights presuppose politics, and
not the other way around. It is this critical insight that proves fatal to Omar
and the other prisoners at Guantinamo.
We see at Guantdinamo the inverse of Arendt's formulation of citizen-
ship: no right to have rights. The legal debate at Guantinamo has almost
never been about the content of the prisoners' rights, their contours, or their
meaning.296 Rather, time and again, the fundamental question has been
whether the prisoners have the right to have rights, or in Minow's formula-
tion, whether they have the right to "the basic equality of consideration," or
more simply, the right not only to speak, but to be heard ("I am here!").
This demand to be heard is exactly what the Guantdinamo habeas litigation
has been about since its inception in 2002, and it is what the government
has resisted and rejected ever since.
292 Minow, supra note 286, at 1873.
293 See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP (2006).
294 ARENDT, supra note 16, at 298.
295 Id. at 11-78.
296 Hamdan stands as an important exception, as there the Supreme Court determined that the pris-
oners were protected by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 630-31 (plurality opinion) ("Common Article 3 ... is applicable here and... requires that Hamdan
be tried by a regularly constituted court ....") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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2. Rights as Resistance.-Habeas corpus, whose history has been ex-
plored exhaustively by others,297 translates as "show me the body," and cap-
tures the communitarian, corporeal, and testimonial dimensions of not just
rights claims, but citizenship. For a judge to order the government to pro-
duce a defendant for the purposes of considering the legality of his deten-
tion is to recognize the defendant's a priori membership in the community.
To require that the defendant himself-his corpus-be produced, and not
just reasons for his detention proffered, is to acknowledge the physicality
and inescapably human experience of an otherwise abstract liberty interest.
And to permit the defendant to not only attend his own hearing, but to speak
on his own behalf, is to credit his standing as an actor and agent. Taken to-
gether, the communitarian, corporeal, and testimonial bespeak a shared
concern: human dignity.
It is this human dignity, the human as distinguished from the merely
biological, with which Arendt was fundamentally concerned. For Arendt,
rights are indispensable to humanity, a protective membrane poised be-
tween the state and the individual. What she saw, and Giorgio Agamben
has recently revived,298 is the idea that a confrontation between the state and
the individual unmediated by rights reduces the individual to bare life, or
naked life, 99 which is life without humanity. It is this unmediated, unmiti-
gated confrontation that both requires and enables the rendering of the hu-
man inhuman, animal, and savage."' It is this rights-free confrontation that
permits torture-the hand of the state encumbered by no law other than the
laws of physics. And it is this unmediated confrontation that permits the
transmogrification of a child into a terrorist. For Arendt, to be a citizen is to
be human, and to be anything else is merely, and barely, life.
The conception of rights as a bare protection interposed between the
individual and state violence is intuitively familiar to the anti-death penalty
advocate30' and to criminal defense lawyers generally. But the American
297 See, e.g., Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curae in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2007) (No. 06-1195), 2007 WL 2441583; WILLIAM F. DUKER, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS:
RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF
PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 143 (1858); Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Cor-
pus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ-ll, 18 CAN. B. REV. 172 (1940); Richard H. Fal-
Ion, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror,
120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531
(2000); Jared Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165 (2007); Jonathan L. Hafetz,
The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509
(1998).
298 AGAMBEN, supra note 184.
299 Id.
300 See Frederic Mdgret, From 'Savages' to 'Unlawful Combatants': A Postcolonial Look at Inter-
national Law's 'Other', in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS (Anne Orford ed., 2006).
301 See generally Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, supra note 188.
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legal embodiment of citizenship as rights is Dred Scott.3°2 While Scott was
suing for his freedom from slavery, the case turned upon his citizenship.
The Supreme Court found that Scott was not a "citizen of a State," and
therefore, under the jurisdictional limits of Article III of the Constitution,
could not bring suit in federal court.303 Thus, the case removed Scott's right
even to be heard, by removing him from the polity. Like the Guant~inamo
prisoners, he had no right to have rights, and the negation of his political ci-
tizenship condemned him to the unmitigated violence of slavery.
The denial of habeas to Omar and the other prisoners similarly placed
them outside the communitarian consent that rights require. This expulsion
from the polity authorizes the expulsion from humanity that torture
represents. Here, we must remember that this expulsion was prefigured by
the state iconography that placed the prisoners outside the realm of human
understanding, and therefore outside of humanity itself.3 4
Stripped of the mediation of rights, Guant~inamo reveals the essential
and inescapable violence of law. Politics may dictate who is entitled to
mediation and what form it will take, but all are subject to the force of the
state that, fundamentally, animates law. The demand for rights is a plea to
blunt state force, and not to fundamentally reorganize the structure
of power.
With this understanding of rights in mind, I return to the litigation
strategy we adopted in Omar's case. By invoking rights, we sought recog-
nition of Omar in a polity of significance. In this way, rights hailed Omar
into the community, though his admission would depend upon community
consent.
As Arendt's analysis suggests, the demand for recognition is tanta-
mount to a claim to humanity. To be human, to rise above biological exis-
tence and to secure political and social life, requires rights. And yet, once
more, this bid was subject to political forces. No amount of rights-claiming
could overcome a political will to deny the prisoners' humanity.
In light of this, our strategy can be understood in a third way: rights as
resistance. By this account, the rights claim sought not to escape the vi-
olence of the state, but to make that violence more costly to the state. To
continue its brutal regime at GuantAnamo, the government first would have
to do violence to rights; to lay its hands on Omar again, the state would
have to crash through his rights claims. Rather than avoid the state's con-
frontation with the individual, this strategy seeks to expose it. The onus
then shifts from the prisoner trying to establish the existence of rights to the
state establishing their nonexistence, from the individual establishing harm
done to the state justifying its own violence.
302 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
303 Id.
304 See supra Part I.B.
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In some respects, this strategy has worked. So long as it could avoid
any discussion of Guantdnamo, as it long attempted to do, the government
could enact violence without political cost. But rights claims force the gov-
emnment into discourse in which the violence of the state is put on display
and must be justified. The claim of rights itself may interpose a membrane
between the state and the individual even if the right itself ultimately is
found not to exist.
Thus, our rights-based strategy could be understood as interposing a
protective membrane between Omar and the state. In this way, we wanted
to mediate, and moderate, the relationship between the state and Omar, with
the hope of ultimately transforming the relationship from one of potentate
and biological mass to one more recognizable as warden and prisoner. This
was a form of resistance to Omar's mistreatment, which required the state
either to stop its violence or to engage in it in the public forum of the court.
This approach had some success, as the worst of the mistreatment of Omar
and the other prisoners stopped once the government was forced to grapple
with it in the daylight of federal court."' And yet, Omar's other fundamen-
tal material conditions-indefinite detention, and trial before a substandard
tribunal-remained the same, just as the fundamentals of Guantdnamo have
remained largely the same for the hundreds of other prisoners.
At the end of the day, I believe our approach has not proven more suc-
cessful because the fundamental question of political citizenship has not
been resolved in the prisoners' favor, and as I have argued, the success of
even first-order rights depends upon a priori political membership.
When I have rehearsed these arguments for others, particularly law-
yers, the response I have often gotten is that we did the best that we could,
and that there was no alternative. To argue the existence of rights, and to
do so forcefully, is to fulfill the professional obligation of a lawyer. But
this strikes me as too weak a conception of professional obligation. I be-
lieve that the rights-based approach has been worthy and necessary, but not
merely because it was a form of last-resort lawyering. Rather, the rights-
based lawyering has performed an essential role of mounting resistance to
the unbridled exercise of state violence, essential not because there is noth-
ing else to be done, but because of the opportunities and potentialities that
resistance creates. This is consistent with what Scott Cummings has termed
"constrained legalism," 06 for it capitalizes on what law can accomplish,
even as it recognizes what law cannot.
305 Arguably, however, the worst violence stopped for other reasons. Prisoner abuse was an inter-
rogation tactic (or as the Bush Administration would call it, an "enhanced" interrogation tactic). It fol-
lows that after dozens of interrogations over a period of years, the utility, if any, of such a tactic would
diminish.
306 See Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness in Action, 120 HARV. L. REV. (FORUM
ISSUE) 39 (2007), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/120/feb7/cummings.pdf
(describing "constrained legalism" as "an approach to legal activism informed by a critical appreciation
of law's limits that seeks to exploit law's opportunities to advance transformative goals").
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IV. RESISTANCE RECONSIDERED: THE HUNGER-STRIKING PRISONER
AND THE RIGHTS-ASSERTING LAWYER
What is the value of resistance, and what is the benefit of conceiving of
rights in a resistance frame? To answer this question, I first examine modes
of resistance engaged in directly by the prisoners at Guantdnamo-in par-
ticular, the hunger strike-and then suggest that these forms of resistance
and the litigation undertaken by the prisoners' lawyers are more similar
than they might first seem. In so doing, I argue that the rights-based litiga-
tion in which the lawyers engaged may be nothing more-but importantly,
nothing less-than a mode of resistance to state violence.
The lawyers representing the Guantdnamo prisoners have done ex-
traordinary work. Over a period of six years, they have filed hundreds of
motions, secured Supreme Court victories in three cases, and forced a pub-
lic accounting of the government. In addition, they have engaged in the
kind of multidimensional advocacy that is frequently urged among social
change theorists," 7 working assiduously with the media, lobbying foreign
governments, engaging human rights institutions, and literally traveling the
world-Germany, Bosnia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and many other countries-to investigate and advocate their clients' cas-
es.3"8 Despite these efforts, the vast majority of prisoners have yet to re-
ceive a meaningful opportunity to contest the legality of their detention, and
the habeas courts have yet to determine what substantive rights the prison-
ers even possess. Perhaps most damning, the issue before the Supreme
Court in Boumediene in 2008 was, functionally, the same as that brought
307 For a thick description and analysis of such multidimensional advocacy, see Sameer M. Ashar,
Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1879 (2007); see also Sameer M.
Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355 (2008) (advocating incorpo-
ration of collective mobilization strategies into public interest lawyering); Ann Southworth, Lawyers
and the "Myth of Rights" in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 506-09
(1999) (discussing the importance of multidimensional strategies where sociopolitical advocacy is a
primary objective).
308 In a particularly compelling example of such multidimensional advocacy, lawyers from the Fed-
eral Public Defenders office in Portland, Oregon, representing a Sudanese man named Adel Hamad,
created an online video describing Hamad's case, as well as the lawyers' investigation in Afghanistan
and elsewhere. The video describes Hamad's claim of innocence and then presents video testimony of
former colleagues in Afghanistan corroborating his account. The video, posted on YouTube, has been
viewed more than 100,000 times. See YouTube Video: Guantanamo Unclassified (William Teesdale
2007), http://youtube.com/watch?v=D5E3w7ME6Fs (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). The lawyers also
created an accompanying website to facilitate broader advocacy on Hamad's behalf. See Project Ha-
mad, http://projecthamad.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). First taken to Guantdnamo in 2003, Hamad
was released and returned to Sudan in December 2007. See Project Hamad Blog, http://
www.projecthamad.org/blog/2007/12/ (Dec. 13, 2007, 10:39 EST). Shortly before his release, a military
lawyer involved in the review of prisoners' cases at Guantinamo termed Hamad's detention "umcons-
cionable." See Leonard Doyle, Guantanamo Military Lawyer Breaks Ranks to Condemn 'Unconsciona-
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before the Court in Rasul in 2003: whether the prisoners can be heard in
habeas corpus proceedings. Although the prisoners prevailed in both cases,
the victory in Rasul necessarily has tempered enthusiasm for that in Bou-
mediene. It is no wonder, then, that in the eyes of many prisoners, nothing
has changed.
This is not to say that legal process does not work, for during this time
many prisoners have been released after litigation exposed the injustice of
their imprisonment,3 °9 and a small number have since been released follow-
ing orders by the habeas courts.310 Moreover, the litigation appears to have
played an important role in shifting the politics around Guantdinamo, enabl-
ing President Obama's promise to close the facility. And yet, the seemingly
sweeping victories of Rasul and Boumediene coexist with Guantdnamo's
ongoing operation, suggesting that the litigation, while effective, might be
insufficient.
This unsatisfying record only deepened many of the prisoners' despair.
When the lawyers first got to Guantdnamo, over two years after it opened,
and after two years of isolation, interrogation, and torture, there was a mo-
ment of hope for many prisoners. For the first time since their capture,
there was someone on their side. And though many lawyers had difficulty
establishing or maintaining trust with their clients, given the extraordinary
conditions of Guantdnamo, 1' I believe that many of the prisoners initially
placed their faith in their lawyers and gave the lawyers the benefit of the
doubt. But as the mountains of motions piled up without meaningful
change in the material conditions of the prisoners' lives, as the clarity of
Rasul's promise of a hearing before an impartial judge dissolved into con-
volution, formalism, and bureaucracy of federal litigation, the detainees'
despair began to return. Former prisoner Jumah al Dossari, who made nu-
merous suicide attempts while at Guantdinamo, expressed the failures of Ra-
sul's promise and the resulting despondency:
309 See, e.g., MARGULIES, supra note 24, at 198 (discussing role of evidence of torture of Margulies'
client Mamdouh Habib in effecting his release: "When asked to explain the sudden change of heart,
American officials refused to comment on the record. But they told the Australians they had decided to
release him 'because the C.I.A. did not want the evidence about Mr. Habib being taken to Egypt, and his
allegations of torture, raised in court."'); see also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d
443, 470 (D.D.C. 2005) (highlighting exculpatory evidence regarding Murat Kumaz); Craig Whitlock,
U.S. Frees Longtime Detainee: Court Had Ruled In Favor of Turk, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2006, at A9
(discussing release of Kumaz and criticism by U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green of the United
States for ignoring exculpatory evidence).
310 See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 199 (D.D.C. 2008) (directing Respondents "to
take all necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate the release of Petitioners Lakhdar Bou-
mediene, Mohamed Nechla, Hadj Boudella, Mustafa Ait Idir, and Saber Lahmar forthwith"); see also El
Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2009) (ordering release of Mohammed el Gharani); Ba-
sardh v. Bush, No. 05 Civ. 889, 2009 WL 856345 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2009) (ordering release of Yasin
Muhammed Basardh).
311 See Luban, supra note 139 (discussing how the conditions at GuantAnamo disrupted the lawyers'
relationships with their clients).
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[One day] the military gave me a piece of paper that laid out the allegations
against me. I had been in Guantanamo at that point for 2 1/2 years. My law-
yer later told me that I had received this paper as a result of a U.S. Supreme
Court ruling that detainees were to be allowed to have court hearings. We
never got the promised hearings; instead, we went through military hearings at
Guantanamo in which we were not shown any evidence or allowed to have
lawyers. All we got was the piece of paper.
•.. Between suicide attempts, I tried desperately to hold on to the few fleet-
ing moments of light that presented themselves to me. I met every few months
with my attorneys and felt better whenever they were in Guantanamo, but my
despair would return within a day of their departure.312
The prisoners' despair was twofold: first was a concern that the law-
yers' efforts could not produce their freedom; second, and more troubling,
was a growing view among some of the detainees that not only could the
lawyers not help, but they were actually hurting. The argument was that
despite our promises and best intentions to be on their side, we were com-
plicit in the very structure of oppression of Guantdnamo. From the very
beginning, the most compelling argument against Guantdnamo was that it
was lawless. But the presence of lawyers, the filing of motions, and the ap-
pearances before judges all suggested that there was both law and justice at
Guantdnamo. The danger, then, was that our presence and participation, in
both habeas proceedings in Washington and in military commission pro-
ceedings at Guantdnamo, legitimized the very institution whose illegitimacy
and illegality we sought to establish. This trade-off is familiar in any sys-
tem of dubious legitimacy.
It is against this backdrop of unsuccessful legal advocacy, unending
detention, and the persistence of legal forms such as "enemy combatancy,"
the CSRTs, and the military commissions, that some prisoners have charted
an alternative path of action and protest. This has taken many forms:
throwing at guards a cocktail of feces, urine, and saliva known as an "A
bomb";313 refusing to meet with their lawyers;314 boycotting or disrupting
military commission proceedings (for those few who have them);3"5 suicides
and suicide attempts;3"6 and hunger strikes. 17 In each of these, the prisoners
312 Al Dossari, supra note 25.
30 See Sgt. Jim Greenhill, Outmoded Images of Detention Center, Mission Frustrate Guantanamo
Troopers, ARMED FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 1, 2006, available at http://www.defenselink.millnews/
NewsArticle.aspx?ID=2272.
314 See William Glaberson, Many Detainees at Guantcnamo Rebuff Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2007, at Al.
315 For an insightful account of prisoners' attempts to boycott military commission proceedings and
to dismiss their counsel, see Matthew Bloom, "1 Did Not Come Here to Defend Myself': Responding to
War on Terror Detainees'Attempts to Dismiss Counsel and Boycott the Trial, 117 YALE L.J. 70 (2007).
316 In June 2006, two Saudi prisoners and one Yemeni committed suicide. See James Risen & Tim
Golden, 3 Prisoners Commit Suicide at Guatanamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at Al. There have
been forty-one suicide attempts at Guantdnamo. Id. From August 18-26, 2003, twenty-three prisoners
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make use of what little they have in order to engage in resistance. Bereft of
any weapon with which to strike their captors, they use the refuse of their
own bodies, demonstrating once more that Guantdnamo is about the body.
Unable to make any meaningful decision about the time they eat, the time
they exercise, or the time the lights come on or go off, they exercise their
agency by refusing their lawyers; forced into irregular and unfair military
commissions, they choose no process at all; pushed to the brink of bare life,
they choose no life at all.
Despite the range of resistance activities that exist at Guantdnamo, it is
the hunger strike on which I want to focus, and which I want to compare to
the rights-based litigation advanced by the lawyers. Hunger strikes have
been a persistent feature of Guantdtnamo since shortly after the interrogation
and detention center opened. Some of the hunger strikes have been short-
lived, while others have been broken by a government's policy of forced-
feeding."' There have been as many as two hundred prisoners on hunger
strike at any one time.3"9 At the end of 2005, by which time the habeas liti-
gation had seriously stalled, eighty-four prisoners were on hunger strike,
leading the government to initiate its forced-feeding policy; by February
2006, only three prisoners remained on hunger strike.32
Sami al-Haj is one of the prisoners who remained on hunger strike. A
Sudanese journalist for Al Jazeera, al-Haj was held at Guantdnamo for six
years, on various and shifting charges of terrorist affiliations.32' On January
7, 2007, the fifth anniversary of his imprisonment at Guantdnamo, al-Haj
began his hunger strike,322 which continued for sixteen months-the signi-
ficance of which can only be appreciated by examining how the govern-
ment's forced-feeding regime works upon the prisoner's body.
23
attempted suicides, which the government characterized as "self-injurious behavior." 23 Detainees At-
tempted Suicide in Protest at Base, Military Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/25/national/25gitmo.htrnl?scp=43&sq-guantanamo+suicides&st-nyt
This information was not disclosed until January 2005. Id. For an account of Guantdnamo by a prisoner
who attempted suicide multiple times before ultimately being released, see Al Dossari, supra note 25.
317 See George J. Annas, Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo-Medical Ethics and Human Rights in a
"Legal Black Hole", 355 N. ENG. J. MED. 1377 (2007).
318 Id.
319 Id. at 1378.
320 Id. at 1377.
321 See Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Sami's Shame, and Ours, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A2 1;
Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., When We Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A35; Joel Campagna, The
Enemy?, CMTE. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, Oct. 3, 2006, available at http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/
2006/DA fall_06/prisoner/prisoner.html.
322 See Memorandum from Clive Stafford-Smith on Sami al-Haj Hunger Strike Diary 1 (Mar. 4,
2007) [hereinafter "Stafford-Smith Memo"] (copy on file with author); Prisoner 345,
http://www.prisoner345.net (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
323 The following description is a composite drawn from a diary maintained by al-Haj, see Stafford-
Smith Memo, supra note 322, and a description of hunger strike protocols provided by the Commander
of the U.S. Navy Hospital at Guantdnamo. See Declaration of John S. Edmondson, M.D., Al Joudi v.
Bush, 406 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 05-0301), available at http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/
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First, the prisoner refuses food and drink. Initially, officials try to per-
suade the prisoner otherwise, offering food and liquids. If the prisoner re-
fuses those, military officials take him to a medical facility and feed him
intravenously. If the prisoner refuses I.V. fluids, as many have, or pulls the
tube out, then medical staff strap him into a restraint chair. (According to
the chair's manufacturer, "It's like a padded cell 'on wheels""'3 4) Doctors
then force a feeding tube up the prisoner's nose, down the throat, and into
the stomach.325 This is done twice a day, without the consent of the prison-
er, even when the prisoner is competent to give such consent.326 As one of
al-Haj's lawyers has described, "It's really a regime to make it as painful
and difficult as possible," a characterization that the government rejects.327
As another of his lawyers stated, "Have you ever pushed a 43-inch tube up
your nostril and down into your throat? Tonight, Sami will suffer that for
the 479th time.
3 28
As in countless struggles before theirs, prisoners at Guantdnamo have
used hunger strikes for multiple purposes: building solidarity, demanding
improved treatment, and drawing attention to their plight.329 Indeed, like so
much else at post-September 11 Guantdnamo, the hunger strikes have a
precedent in the experience of Haitians detained there in the early 1990s,33
but also in the political struggles of figures as diverse as Gandhi, Bobby
Sands, Palestinians in Israeli jails, and U.S. prisoners protesting their harsh
conditions.' Hunger strikes are typically described and understood as
nonviolent, and many of them are just that. But the persistence of a small
number of Guantdinamo prisoners in their hunger strikes despite the gov-
ernment's forced-feeding regime suggests another motivation. While
projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/testimny-of-miitary-physicians/edmndson-
affidavit.pdf.
324 See Emergency Restraint Chair, http://www.restraintchair.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
325 See Annas, supra note 317, at 1377.
326 Id. at 1379.
327 Kristof, When We Torture, supra note 321 (quoting lawyer Zachary Katznelson).
328 Stafford-Smith, America's Legal Black Hole, supra note 142.
329 Annas, supra note 317, at 1378-79; see also Hernan Reyes, Int'l Cmte. of the Red Cross, Medi-
cal and Ethical Aspects of Hunger Strikes in Custody and the Issue of Torture (Jan. 1998), available at
http://www.icrc.orgWeb/eng/siteeng.nsf/iwpList302/F 18AA3CE47E5A98BC 1256B66005D6E29
(discussing the reasons prisoners go on hunger strike).
330 See BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: How A BAND OF YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED
THE PRESIDENT-AND WON 199-222 (2005). While many of the lawyers for post-September It Guan-
tdnamo prisoners have been supportive of their clients' hunger strikes, the Haitians' lawyers were more
interventionist, trying to persuade their clients to stop their hunger strikes. Id. at 204.
331 See generally DAVtD BERESFORD, TEN DEAD MEN: THE STORY OF THE 1981 IRISH HUNGER
STRIKE (1987) (discussing the hunger strike undertaken by Bobby Sands and others in Northern Irel-
and); MARK Dow, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS (2004) (discussing use and
efficacy of hunger strikes as a means of protest within American immigration prisons); SHARMAN APT
RUSSELL, HUNGER: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY (2005) (tracing the role of hunger as a force for social
change, and analyzing its use by religious and political figures).
1757
103:1683 (2009)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
peaceful in their execution, the hunger strikes seem intended to provoke the
enactment of violence upon the hunger striker?32
For al-Haj and others who know that day after day their continued
hunger strike will bring only more painful forced feedings, the strikes seem
more than just a passive form of resistance. It is not that they would choose
death rather than suffer further at Guantdinamo. Indeed, al-Haj stated that
he did not wish to die, writing, "It is sad to be on this strike. I have no de-
sire to die. I am suffering, hungry. The nights are very long and I cannot
sleep. But I will continue the struggle until we get our rights. The strike is
the only way that I can protest." '333 Now that the forced feeding regime is in
place, its brutality established and its ineluctability clear, the actions of the
hunger strikers are better understood as a more active form of resistance.
By refusing food and water, al-Haj forced the unmediated confrontation be-
tween state power and the individual of which Arendt wrote. After more
than a year of forced feeding, he knew that the government possessed the
means and the will to keep him from dying. But each day, he chose to
make them engage in violence upon his body in order to achieve their goal.
In this way, he refused to be complicit in his own captivity. But he also re-
fused to be passive in the face of state power. He might not have been able
to stop it, but he was able to mount resistance, to make the exercise of state
violence more costly to the state, to ensure that the cost for his captors' de-
gradation of him was their degradation of themselves. Hovering at the
brink of annihilation--on the verge of bare life-he nonetheless resisted to-
tal dehumanization by forcing his captors to brutalize him. And in this way,
through this agency and even righteousness, his decrepit body, that wither-
ing mass of vibrating flesh, was made and kept human again.
Sami al-Haj was released from Guantdinamo on May 2, 2008."'4
We can understand the radical hunger strike-radical not in its ideolo-
gy, but in its peaceful invitation to violence-as a rejection of the rights-
based strategy. Rather than making recourse to rights to intercede in the
conflict between state and individual, the hunger striker seeks to force the
confrontation. He understands that while rights may mediate the conflict to
332 The government's forced-feeding regime has been criticized as contrary to medical ethics. See
Annas, supra note 317; Sondra S. Crosby et al., Hunger Strikes, Force-Feeding, and Physicians' Re-
sponsibilities, 298 JAMA 563 (2007); Press Release, Physicians for Human Rights, Forced Feeding of
Gitmo Detainees Violates International Medical Codes of Ethics (Sept. 16, 2005) available at
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/news-2005-09-16.html. For a discussion of other medical
ethics issues at Guantdnamo, including the involvement of psychologists in the development of interro-
gation methods, see Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors as Pawns? Law and Medical Ethics at Guantdnamo
Bay, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 711 (2007). For an analysis of U.S. prison practices regarding hunger
strikes, see Tracey M. Ohm, What They Can Do About It: Prison Administrators' Authority to Force-
Feed Hunger-Striking Inmates, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 151 (2007).
333 Stafford-Smith Memo, supra note 322, at 4.
334 See Press Release, Al Jazeera, Sami al Haj Freed from Guantanamo (May 2, 2008), available at
https://www.zawya.com/printstoy.c fm?storyid=ZAVYA20080502112225&1 = 1 12200080502.
1758
Resisting Guantdnamo
the individual's advantage, the mediation also serves the interests of the
state, as it both legitimizes and masks the violence of state action. The
hunger striker has made a strategic calculation that the invocation of rights
at Guantdnamo does more work for the government than it does for the
prisoner, for it contributes to the perception that the prisoners are subject to
legal process, that Guantdinamo is governed by law, while the government's
ability to maintain its detention regime is little disturbed. Thus, the hunger
striker seeks to expose the inherent violence of the state by forcing upon the
government an unmediated confrontation.
It is only logical that the site for confrontation between the individual
and the state is the body, for once the mediating force of rights is removed,
only the body remains. The inherent violence of the Law of Guantdinamo
manifests once more, inextricably bound up with the body. As Robert Cov-
er wrote:
[T]he normative world building which constitutes "Law" is never just a mental
or spiritual act. A legal world is built only to the extent that there are com-
mitments that place bodies on the line. The torture of the martyr is an extreme
and repulsive form of the organized violence of institutions. It reminds us that
the interpretive commitments of officials are realized, indeed, in the flesh. As
long as that is so, the interpretive commitments of a community which resists
official law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it be the flesh of its own
adherents.335
Thus, just as Law is realized in the body of the prisoner, so, too, is the pris-
oner's resistance. 36
Alternatively, we might understand the foregrounding of the prisoner's
body in terms of agency. So totalizing is the violence of Guantinamo that it
reduces the prisoner's zone of autonomy to the point that it is coterminous
with the body; the only exercise of the autonomous self is the exercise of
the body itself, because nothing else is in the prisoner's control, and the
body remains the last and final site in the contest between state power and
the individual. There is nowhere else for the blows to land, and nothing
else with which to strike back.
The condition of the prisoners at Guantd.namo, and the forms of their
resistance, recall the insistently visceral, corporeal dimension of the work of
Frantz Fanon, for whom the body was inescapably implicated in the coun-
terviolence of the colonized. 37 Like the colonizer and the colonized, the
335 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1605 (1986).
336 This fundamental role of the body in acts of resistance was similarly articulated by Martin Luth-
er King, Jr.: "We had no alternative except to prepare for direct action, whereby we would present our
very bodies as a means of laying our case before the conscience of the local and the national communi-
ty." Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From A Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), reprinted in WHY WE
CAN'T WAIT 80 (1964), available at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/ArticlesGen/Letter
Birmingham.html.
337 See FANON, supra note 58, at 1-62.
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struggle at Guantdinamo is "between brute realities and resistant bodies." '338
As Homi Bhaba suggests, this resurgence of the body is the consequence of
radical dehumanization. 39 The colonized body is conditioned to violence,
thereby gaining a "visceral intelligence dedicated to the survival of body
and spirit,"34 or as Fanon wrote, "The muscles of the colonized are always
tensed." '341
As lawyers, we sought to use rights to mediate the confrontation of
state power and the individual, but prisoners like Sami al-Haj have chosen
to use their bodies to force the unmediated confrontation. We thought that
rights might transform the realities of Guantdnamo, but to date they have
not (though Boumedieneand President Obama's executive order, suggest
they still may). Al-Haj thought that his protest might force his captors to
return to their own humanity,342 and for more than a year it did not (though
ultimately he was released). In this way, the rights-based litigation of the
lawyers and the hunger strikes of the prisoners may be more alike than they
are dissimilar. Far from being transformative, rights, in this context, might
do something more modest: to serve as resistance, a way of not necessarily
stopping the violence of the state, but of making it more costly. Rights
claims can be understood as a domesticated hunger strike, a rhetorical, ab-
stracted, and comparatively unmessy form of engaging state power.343 For
the government to continue its practices at Guantdnamo, it must crash
through the protective membrane of rights that we assert, just as it must
force the feeding tube down Sami al-Haj's throat. Both strategies possess
transformative potential, but each may have to settle for being resistance
and nothing more, but also nothing less.
My point is not to argue that the prisoners' hunger strikes have been
more effective than the lawyers' rights-based litigation, or vice versa, nor
do I seek to romanticize hunger strikes or denigrate rights. Rather, I see
both strategies pulling in the same direction, and both arising from the same
conceptual and material challenge of confronting the violence of state pow-
338 Homi Bhaba, Forward to FANON, supra note 58, at xxv.
339 Id.
340 Id. at ix.
341 FANON, supra note 58, at 16.
342 Of course, the brutality of Guantinamo has been punctuated by compassion as well. As former
prisoner Jumah al Dossari described, "On occasion, I was helped by compassionate guards. After the
[brutal] beating [I received] in Camp X-Ray, a young female guard appeared at my cage, looking to
make sure that no other guards were watching. 'I'm sorry for what happened to you,' she whispered to
me. 'You're a human being just like us."' Al Dossari, supra note 25.
343 1 recognize that at Guantinamo and in other instances of lawyering against extreme state vi-
olence, individual lawyers have assumed significant professional risk and have demonstrated great cou-
rage in the face of it. This is especially true of the cadre of lawyers who first took the prisoners' case up
to the Supreme Court in Rasul-the Center for Constitutional Rights, Joe Margulies, and Tom Wilner
and Neil Kaslowe at Shearman and Sterling-as they began this work at a time when it was deeply un-
popular, and was also believed to be unwinnable. It seems fair to say, however, that the risk that law-
yers incur is different in kind from that of the prisoners.
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er. Moreover, lawyers can play three critical roles with respect to hunger
strikes, even assuming that rights are ultimately insufficient to gain their
clients' freedom. First, through the assertion of rights, they can dramatize
the injustice of Guantdnamo, thereby making hunger strikes appear all the
more logical and sympathetic. Second, for the many prisoners who are ei-
ther unwilling or unable to engage in such self-harming self-help as hunger
strikes, lawyers are able to use rights-based strategies to engage in resis-
tance on their behalf. In so doing, lawyers take professional risk on their
clients' behalf and may provide sustenance to their clients by demonstrating
in direct and appreciable ways their willingness not only to provide legal
representation, but to vouch for their client's humanity. Lastly, lawyers are
able to help publicize the hunger strikes-to amplify their clients' pangs of
hunger, that they might be heard outside the cages of Guantdnamo, and in
the rarified spaces of the territorial United States. This proved to be a high-
ly effective strategy in the case of Sami al-Haj, whose lawyers used court
filings to oppose the practice of forced feeding and simultaneously to raise
the profile of al-Haj's condition. Notably, New York Times columnist Ni-
cholas Kristof took up al-Haj's cause, writing about him on numer-
ous occasions.3"
There are, however, at least three critical differences between the law-
yers' and the prisoners' strategies. First, in the hunger strike, the prisoner
expresses his own agency. Indeed, the key to the forced confrontation with
state power is the absence of an intermediary. The lawyer is not merely ab-
sent, she is rejected. Second, for the government to crash through rights
claims is a metaphysical violence; for it to force feed the prisoners is physi-
cal violence, flesh on flesh, the body and will of one human being strug-
gling against the body and will of another. Finally, by rejecting rights and
achieving no better, but also no worse result, the hunger striker demon-
strates the weakness of rights at Guantdnamo, as if to say, asserting rights is
no more effective than throwing them away. And yet, paradoxically, if we
accept that the end goal of the radical hunger striker is life and not death,
humanity and not bare life, then the hunger strike is for rights, for it is the
right to have rights that many of the prisoners understand to constitute their
humanity. As al-Haj wrote in his diary, "I will continue the struggle until
we get our rights."345
AI-Haj's case points to how the rights-based and hunger-striking mod-
es of resistance can pull in the same direction, and how synergies can be
achieved between the two. At the same time, it is important to recognize
that the choice to engage in a hunger strike at Guantdnamo is, in my view,
fundamentally existential, and is made by at least some of the prisoners
344 See Kristof, Sami's Shame, and Ours, supra note 321; Kristof, When We Torture, supra note
321; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., A Prison of Shame, and It's Ours, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008,
at WK13.
345 Stafford-Smith Memo, supra note 322, at 4.
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without expectation of publicity or calculation as to how public knowledge
might be used. Thus, the hunger strike has value as an enactment of hu-
manity, helped by but ultimately indifferent to public attention.
CONCLUSION
How does the body speak in extremis, how does the mind withstand?
-Homi Bhaba
341
To be sure, there have been lawyers representing GuantAnamo prison-
ers who understood from the beginning that the litigation would not be
transformational, but was instead the exercise in resistance which I have de-
scribed here. I was not one of them. Rather, my professionally induced
rights tropism led me into the Guantdnamo litigation in the immediate af-
termath of the Rasul decision, when it seemed that the Supreme Court had
settled the question of whether the prisoners had the right to have rights, be-
lieving that through an insistence upon rights, I could gain my client's free-
dom. In reality, the threshold question of the prisoner's humanity-the
question of whether Omar was a child (and therefore human) or a terrorist
(and therefore not)-was the only contest in which we have ever really en-
gaged. The violence of the state, I learned (though perhaps I should have
known all along), was not only reductive but relentless, and would not be so
easily contained.
Much like the death penalty lawyer, our purpose was to intervene in
the prevailing, post-September 11 social organization of violence. Under-
standing this intervention as a resistance practice rather than a transforma-
tive act yields three benefits. First, it enlarges the time frame for action and
result, decentering the transformative "rights moment"-the landmark case,
the smoking gun document, the game-changing revelation-and instead
commits the lawyer to a long-term oppositional stance, and a set of daily
practices of objection and contravention.347 Second, the resistance frame
contextualizes the individual client representation within the larger struc-
tures and operations of power, rejecting an atomistic view of lawyering or a
diffuse engagement with the state and opting instead for direct confronta-
tion with state violence. Lastly, the resistance frame can provide the lawyer
a source of sustenance in her and her client's protracted struggle. As in
death penalty litigation, resistance is mounted not merely because of a felt
need to "do something," but because through tactical maneuver and strateg-
ic intervention, previously unavailable spaces can be opened, new realities
can be created, and new opportunities for more meaningful intervention rea-
lized. Lawyers can help gain their clients' release, even if not through court
order; moments of transformative potential, though fleeting, can be created;
346 Bhaba, Forward to FANON, supra note 58, at xxxi.
347 See generally DE CERTEAL, supra note 259.
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still others can be exploited. Unlike the traditional litigation model, which
presupposes a beginning, a middle, and, perhaps most important, an end, re-
sistance rejects linearity and is not strictly teleological. It thus demands that
the resister-whether lawyer or prisoner-search for what altered realities
might be created through the act of resistance, without knowing what or
where they will be.
But the resistance frame also points to the limits of our work as law-
yers, and the limits of the agentic lawyer-client relationship. That the
struggle of Guantdnamo is fundamentally one of humanity, the social and
political meaning of the biological flesh warehoused there, makes inevitable
the direct participation of the prisoners in the conflict. The process of re-
presentation at Guantdnamo recapitulates the divestiture of agency on
which Guantdnamo was built, and for many (though not all) of the prison-
ers, unacceptably so. The hunger strike is a profound and necessary asser-
tion of the self-messy, unabstracted, and inescapably human. Because
Guantdnamo places the prisoners on the razor's edge of bare life, such di-
rect resistance is not merely an act of defiance or a means of retaliation, but
a way of staying human. The crisis the prisoners face-year after year of
unending detention-is fundamentally existential, and it therefore follows
that the prisoners would want, and need, to assert what agency they can.
Ultimately, the body in extremis must speak. For the lawyers, our
challenge is to listen and to amplify, to be in conversation, to speak when
our clients cannot, and sometimes to be in silence, so that the clients' asser-
tion of humanity might be heard. The prisoners' resistance thus unders-
cores a far more basic value of the lawyers' rights assertion: it, too, is
resistance, and it, too, can help to keep the prisoners human.
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